Please correct answer and don't use hend raiting and don't use Ai solution --Consider a 2 good (X and Y), 2n person (n persons of typeA and n persons of type B) replica exchange economy (n= 1, 2, 3, .). Let each person of type A have utility, UA(x, y) = 2x + 3ya and an initial endowment of ex = (20, 16)and let each person of type B have utility, Ua(xB. yB) = 3xb+2yb and an initial endowment of eb = (12, 20). Thecompetitive as well as core allocations are specified byspecifying allocation of good X and good Y to a singlerepresentative person of type A and a single representativeperson of type B.Q. This economy has,A no competitive equilibriumB. unique competitive equilibriumC. multiple but finite competitive equilibriaD. infinitely many competitive equilibria.

To solve this problem, let's approach it step-by-step:1) First, let's clarify the utility functions…

Answered: - - Consider a 2 good (X and Y), 2n…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. Alex and Bill share a flat. Alex enjoys reading in silence, while Bill enjoys listening to loud music. Bill controls his music system, which can produce noise levels up to 100 Decibels. Bill has no cash but Alex has £100. Their utility functions are given by: UA = 10(100 – D)i + (100 – M), %3D Ug = 10(D)i + M, where D denotes the Decibel level chosen by Bill, and M denotes any cash given to Bill by Alex. (a) Explain how Bill's music level affects Alex. Find the contract curve between Alex and Bill. Why is there a unique Pareto efficient noise level? (b) What is the maximum amount Alex would be willing to pay Bill to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? What is the minimum amount Bill would be willing to accept in order to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? Can the Pareto efficient noise level be achieved through private bargaining?
Please answer all parts it would mean alot. For the rest of this question consider a two goods economy where Kim and Jung can trade Ferraris (good x) and VR headsets (good y) with each other. Kim and Jung both enjoy driving Ferraris and having more VR headsets (so more friends can play the same game). They start at the same (high) level of income. Kim has an initial endowment of (x0k, y0k) = (10,30) and Jung has an initial endowment of (x0j, y0j) = (30,10) a) Illustrate the initial endowment in an Edgeworth box. Clearly label the axes and explain the dimensions of the box. Show the indifference curve each of them is on at the endowment point. b) Consider an allocation where Kim gets (xk, yk) = (40,40) and Jung gets the remaining Ferraris and VR headsets. Show where this point is in the Edgeworth box. Is this allocation Pareto efficient? Is it equitable? How likely is this to arise in practice? c) Assume that Kim has preferences Uk (Xk, Yk) = 3Xk + 3Yk and Jung has…
You are considering going to a football game. However, the roads are cover in ice due to bad weather. Your ticket was a gift. You derive a value of z from attending the game, and a cost of D for driving on the icy roads. Your utility function is given by: ug(Z) + ui(D) = In(Z - 3) - In(2 - D). In your ultimate wisdom, you calculate that the cost of driving on the icy roads is 1 unit (So, D=1). What is the minimum value you must obtain from attending the game, so that you decide to go? Solution sent me fast ..
Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 agents. The Örst agent has the utilityfunction, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2, and the other one has u (y1; y2) = 2 ln y1 + ln y2.The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (50; 100). Suppose there is asocial planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem b) Calculate the first-best outcome (i.e., the social plannerís solution).
You are maxiimizing utility when :A)(MU of X)/(P of X) < (MU of Y)/(P of Y). B)(MU of X)/(P of X) > (MU of Y)/(P of Y). C)(MU of X)/(P of X) = (MU of Y)/(P of Y). D)(MU of X)/(P of Y) = (MU of Y)/(P of X).
Suppose Jimi has reference dependent preferences over guitars and money as in Tversky and Kahneman (1991). His utility functions are given below. Gains Gains 400 2 -2 -2 Guitars 24 Losses Losses -600 -2 What is the least amount of money Jimi is willing to accept to sell one of his guitars? (just enter a dollar amount, i.e., "1000", not "$1000"
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x₂ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 5 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary. For parts (a) - (f), let a = 1. Draw Jeff's indifference curves for the utility levels u = 4, 9, 16. Draw a straight line between the bundles (x₁, x₂) = (4,0) and (x₁, x₂) = (0,4). Now, use your picture to determine whether the following two statements are true or false. Answer "1" for true. Answer "0" for false. a) Statement 1: Jeff's preferences are strongly monotone. b) Statement 2: Jeff's preferences are strictly convex. c) Find the bundle at which one of Jeff's indifference curves is tangent to the budget line. (x₁, x₂)=( d) Evaluate…
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x2 measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 5 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary.
Given the utility function U (x1, x2) = x³x2.7 select all that are true. a) 30% of the budget is spent on good 1. ○b) V (p, I) = 30.370.7 I 10 P1P2 c) If P2 = 2 and I = 60, then $18 is spent on good 21. d) If P1 = 9, P2 = 2, and I = 60 then the consumer enjoys 1.81 utils of utility. e) Half the budget is spent on good 1 and the other half is spent on 2.
Suppose Katie buys the bundle (20,9) from the budget line 3x_1 + 5x_2 = 105. When the price of good 1 changes to p1 = 6 and the price of good 2 remains the same, she buys the bundle (5,15). On a later date when p1 = 5 and p2 = 4, by observing Katie’s choices we can say that the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) is violated if a) She buys the bundle (10,15). b) She buys the bundle (15,10) c) She buys the bundle (23,6) d) She buys the bundle (25,25). e) None of the above choices violates WARP.
Suppose you find that MU1(X1Xx2)=2x2 and MU₂(x1+x₂)=2x1. What is the rate at which the consumer is willing to trade good 2 for good 1 at bundle (2,4)? (Note: enter a positive number, i.e. enter the quantity of good 2 that the consumer is willing to give up for an additional-marginal-unit of good 1.) Question 20 Suppose you find that the expressions of the marginal utilities for a consumer are given by MU1 (1,2)= 2 and MU₂ (1,2)= 7. Then you can conclude that: This consumer has Cobb-Douglas tastes For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect complements For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect substitutes O None of the above
Suppose you find that MU1(X1Xx2)=2x2 and MU₂(x1+x₂)=2x1. What is the rate at which the consumer is willing to trade good 2 for good 1 at bundle (2,4)? (Note: enter a positive number, i.e. enter the quantity of good 2 that the consumer is willing to give up for an additional-marginal-unit of good 1.) Question 20 Suppose you find that the expressions of the marginal utilities for a consumer are given by MU1 (1,2)= 2 and MU₂ (1,2)= 7. Then you can conclude that: This consumer has Cobb-Douglas tastes For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect complements For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect substitutes None of the above Question 21 Suppose a consumer is always willing to give up 5 units of good 2 for an additional unit of good 1. For this consumer: Good 1 and good 2 are perfect complements Good 1 and good 2 are perfect substitutes Good 1 and good 2 are both essential goods None of the above

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