Please correct answer and don't use hend raiting and don't use Ai solution --Consider a 2 good (X and Y), 2n person (n persons of typeA and n persons of type B) replica exchange economy (n= 1, 2, 3, .). Let each person of type A have utility, UA(x, y) = 2x + 3ya and an initial endowment of ex = (20, 16)and let each person of type B have utility, Ua(xB. yB) = 3xb+2yb and an initial endowment of eb = (12, 20). Thecompetitive as well as core allocations are specified byspecifying allocation of good X and good Y to a singlerepresentative person of type A and a single representativeperson of type B.Q. This economy has,A no competitive equilibriumB. unique competitive equilibriumC. multiple but finite competitive equilibriaD. infinitely many competitive equilibria.

To solve this problem, let's approach it step-by-step:1) First, let's clarify the utility functions…

Answered: - - Consider a 2 good (X and Y), 2n…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Denote the number of children by n and the survival probability of a child to adult- hood by . A parental household derives utility out of consumption (c), the number of surviving offspring (nπ) and child expenditures (h). Preferences are specified as follows u = . In(cc) B₁ ln(n ⋅ π(ñ, h)) + ß₂ ln(h), ẞ1 > B2, (1) where the parameter ē > 0 reflects subsistence consumption. Child survival is given by π = π + (1 − µπ)λh, μ ≥ 0, λ > 0. (2) π is exogenous to the household and positively affected by average income ÿ such that ñ = ñ(ỹ). The representative household's budget constraint reads as y = c + nhy a) Solve the household's utility maximisation problem. (3) b) Show and explain how fertility n responds to changes in households' income y. c) Show and explain how n and h respond to changes in 7.
2. Alex and Bill share a flat. Alex enjoys reading in silence, while Bill enjoys listening to loud music. Bill controls his music system, which can produce noise levels up to 100 Decibels. Bill has no cash but Alex has £100. Their utility functions are given by: UA = 10(100 – D)i + (100 – M), %3D Ug = 10(D)i + M, where D denotes the Decibel level chosen by Bill, and M denotes any cash given to Bill by Alex. (a) Explain how Bill's music level affects Alex. Find the contract curve between Alex and Bill. Why is there a unique Pareto efficient noise level? (b) What is the maximum amount Alex would be willing to pay Bill to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? What is the minimum amount Bill would be willing to accept in order to turn down the music to the Pareto efficient level? Can the Pareto efficient noise level be achieved through private bargaining?
Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 agents. The Örst agent has the utilityfunction, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2, and the other one has u (y1; y2) = 2 ln y1 + ln y2.The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (50; 100). Suppose there is asocial planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem b) Calculate the first-best outcome (i.e., the social plannerís solution).
You are maxiimizing utility when :A)(MU of X)/(P of X) < (MU of Y)/(P of Y). B)(MU of X)/(P of X) > (MU of Y)/(P of Y). C)(MU of X)/(P of X) = (MU of Y)/(P of Y). D)(MU of X)/(P of Y) = (MU of Y)/(P of X).
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x₂ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 5 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary. For parts (a) - (f), let a = 1. Draw Jeff's indifference curves for the utility levels u = 4, 9, 16. Draw a straight line between the bundles (x₁, x₂) = (4,0) and (x₁, x₂) = (0,4). Now, use your picture to determine whether the following two statements are true or false. Answer "1" for true. Answer "0" for false. a) Statement 1: Jeff's preferences are strongly monotone. b) Statement 2: Jeff's preferences are strictly convex. c) Find the bundle at which one of Jeff's indifference curves is tangent to the budget line. (x₁, x₂)=( d) Evaluate…
There are two shows on Netflix that Jeff can watch, Show 1 and Show 2. x₁ measures the number of episodes watched of Show 1 and x2 measures the number of episodes watched of Show 2. Jeff's preferences can be represented by u(x₁, x₂) = x² + ax². Jeff has 5 hours available for watching Netflix today. Each episode of Show 1 lasts 30 minutes, while each episode of Show 2 lasts one hour. For all question parts, round to three decimal places if necessary.
not use ai please
Given the utility function U (x1, x2) = x³x2.7 select all that are true. a) 30% of the budget is spent on good 1. ○b) V (p, I) = 30.370.7 I 10 P1P2 c) If P2 = 2 and I = 60, then $18 is spent on good 21. d) If P1 = 9, P2 = 2, and I = 60 then the consumer enjoys 1.81 utils of utility. e) Half the budget is spent on good 1 and the other half is spent on 2.
Suppose you find that MU1(X1Xx2)=2x2 and MU₂(x1+x₂)=2x1. What is the rate at which the consumer is willing to trade good 2 for good 1 at bundle (2,4)? (Note: enter a positive number, i.e. enter the quantity of good 2 that the consumer is willing to give up for an additional-marginal-unit of good 1.) Question 20 Suppose you find that the expressions of the marginal utilities for a consumer are given by MU1 (1,2)= 2 and MU₂ (1,2)= 7. Then you can conclude that: This consumer has Cobb-Douglas tastes For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect complements For this consumer good 1 and good 2 are perfect substitutes None of the above Question 21 Suppose a consumer is always willing to give up 5 units of good 2 for an additional unit of good 1. For this consumer: Good 1 and good 2 are perfect complements Good 1 and good 2 are perfect substitutes Good 1 and good 2 are both essential goods None of the above
Question 1. (i) please!
1. A standard model of choice under risk is Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in which preferences over lotteries that pay monetary prizes (x₁, x2, ..., xs) with probabilities (P1, P2, ..., Ps) with Eps = 1 are represented by the function L S (a) What does it mean to say that a function represents the consumer's prefer- ences? Σpsu(xs) Choice 1 8=1 (b) State and briefly comment on the axioms required for the EUT representation. (c) Consider the following experiment of decision making under risk in which sub- jects are asked which lottery they prefer in each of the following two choices: Lottery B 0 with prob. 0.01 10 with prob. 0.89 50 with prob. 0.10 Lottery D Choice 2 Lottery A 0 with prob. 0 10 with prob. 1 50 with prob. 0 Lottery C 0 with prob. 0.90 10 with prob. 0 50 with prob. 0.10 Suppose that the modal responses are Lottery A in Choice 1 and Lottery D in Choice 2. Assume that utility of zero is equal to zero and illustrate why it is not possible to reconcile these experimental…
Persons A and B are roommates. Person A smokes and Person B does not. The index s measures how smoky the room is. It varies from s=0, where there is no smoke in the room, to s=1, when the room is filled with smoke. Thus, 1-s measures how "clean" the air in the room is. Person A's utility function is UA(XA,S)=XA+In(1+s), where xA is the amount of money Person A owns. Person B's utility function is uB(XB,1s)%3D3XB+2(1-s), where Xg is the amount of money Person B owns. Each person starts with an endowment of 5 units of money. Persch B has the legal right to a smoke-free room and there is a market for "emission right." At the Walrasian equilibrium, what will be the (per unit of smoke index) price p of the emission rights if the price of money is 1? O a. None of the other answers. O b. p=2/3 O c. p=1 O d. p=3/2 О е. р31/6

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