Beta's Price Policy High Low A B $20 $30 High Alpha's $20 $10 Price Policy C $10 D $ $15 Low $30 $15 Refer to the diagram, where the numerical data show profits in millions of dollars. Beta's profits are shown in the northeast corner and Alpha's profits in the southwest corner of each cell. With independent pricing, the outcome of this duopoly game will gravitate to cell

You are playing a game with a friend. It’s yourmove but you don’t have a dominant strategy.Your payoff depends on what your friend doesafter your move. You consider flipping a coin todecide what to do. You are about to reach for acoin, but then you realize that your friend has adominant strategy. Explain how using backwardinduction (rather than a coin toss) will now determine your next move

Consider the payoff matrix of Hulu and Netflix. Why don't both firms just raise prices? NETFLIX HULU 15, 15 8, 20 20, 8 10, 10 O It is in each firm's profitable interest to lower prices, no matter what the other competitor does. O Raising prices is illegal in this case. O Firms are concerned about a third competitor entering at higher prices. O Higher prices will increase the number of customers beyond what the firms can handle.

◄ Search 12:47 PM Sun Nov 12 ← Note Nov 12, 2023 Uptown's price strategy The Nash equilibrium occurs when High Low LED RareAir's price strategy High $12 $15 The more favorable outcome would be for $12 Tt ✪ $6 B Low $6 D $8. $15 $8 S O both firms have an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the dominant strategy of cell A. 92% neither firm has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the dominant strategy of cell D. O one firm consistently has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the high-price strategy of cell B. O one firm consistently has an incentive to deviate from this strategy given the strategy of the competing firm. It is shown by the high-price strategy of cell C. O the firms to collude and use the high-price strategy but this strategy requires cooperation. O one firm to take the lead and let the…

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Game Theory. 1. Yuppie town has two food stores, LA Boulangerie, which sells bread, and La Fromagerie, whichsells cheese. It costs $1 to make a loaf of bread and $2 to make a pound of cheese. If LaBoulangerie's price is P 1 dollars per loaf of bread and La Fromagerie's price is P 2 dollars per pound ofcheese, their respective weekly sales, Q 1 thousand loaves of bread and Q 2 thousand pounds ofcheese, are given by the following equations:   a) For each store, write its profits as a function of P 1 and P 2 , and find the Nash equilibriumprices in this game. b) Suppose that the two stores collude and set prices jointly to maximize the sum of theirprofits. Find the joint profit-maximizing prices for the stores.c) Provide an explanation for the differences between the Nash equilibrium prices and thosethat maximize joint profits.

15. Consider two competing firms, JR and OG. Suppose OG produces an estab- lished product and JR can either produce a clone or a differentiated product. If JR produces a clone, OG can either sue JR or not sue it. If JR produces a differentiated product rather than a clone, OG can either buy JR or not buy it. The two firms are in a non-cooperative game whose extensive form is rep- resented in the tree diagram below, where the payoffs on the right represent profits. -1 for OG 1 for JR sue OG don't -2 for OG clone sue 1 for JR JR don't clone 1 for OG -1 for JR buy OG don't buy 2 for OG 0 for JR If the two firms' managers are rational and recognize each other as rational, then (a) JR clones and OG sues (b) JR does not clone and OG buys (c) JR does not clone and OG does not buy (d) JR clones and OG does not sue (e) JR clones and OG sues with probability .5

Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion Suppose two firms produce identical good. The inverse demand curve for the good is: P = 240-Q, where Q is the total quantity produced by the two firms. Each firm has a constant marginal cost 20 of producing the good and fixed cost = 100. Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium of this game. What quantity will each firm produce? what will be the market price? What would be the profits of each firm?