b. Which of the following is/are the Nash equilibria to this game?Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box one to placea check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box.O Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B.O Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B.O Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B.V Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B.O Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. Use the following extensive-form game to answer the questions below.(60, 120)(50, 50)B(0, 0)Y(100, 150)

We will use game theory concept to answer this question.

b. Which of the following is/are the Nash equilibria to this game? Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box one to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. | Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. | Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B. | Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. | Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B.

b. Which of the following is/are the Nash equilibria to this game? Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box one to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. | Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B. | Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B. | Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. | Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4. Finding Nash equilibria in sequential games Hubert and Larry are trying to decide what movie to see together. There are two theaters in town, each playing one movie. Hubert would prefer to see one movie (call it movie H) and Larry would prefer to see the other movie (movie L), but both would prefer to see one of the movies together rather than their preferred movies separately. As they are discussing where to meet, Larry's cell phone loses power, cutting the conversation short. Both movies start in 10 minutes; therefore, each person must decide which movie to see without being able to communicate with the other. The following payoff matrix represents the game they are playing. Hubert Movie H Movie L Hubert Larry Movie H 45, 30 0,0 Suppose Larry is near home and quickly starts charging his phone. At home, however, he gets terrible phone service but a strong wireless signal. Therefore, instead of calling Hubert, he uses a smartphone app to observe Hubert's location using GPS. Because…
a) Write out the extensive form of a game between a farmer (playing in the first round) and nature (playing a mixed strategy in the second round). Assume that the farmer can either pay a cash rent of $1500 for land (English system) or 1/2 of crop production to the landlord (sharecropping). Assume the farmer is planting corn and will produce 2 tons of corn. Assume that nature has a 50% chance of playing a strategy in which the price of corn is $3500/ton and a 50% chance of playing a strategy in which the price of corn is $500/ton. The farmer keeps any money left after paying cash rent and sells any corn left after paying the landlord in sharecropping. b)What is the most that a risk neutral farmer would be willing to pay for an accurate prediction of the price of corn in problem 1 before choosing whether to pay cash rent or sharecrop?
5. Design and solve a one-period game with two players who each have two possible actions. Assume the players make their respective choices of actions simultaneously. Design your game so that there are three Nash equilibria (at least). After solving the Nash equilibria of the game, interpret your game in the context of corporate culture.
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Felix and Janet are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Felix chooses Right and Janet chooses Right, Felix will receive a payoff of 7 and Janet will receive a payoff of 4. Felix Left Right Left 6,3 3,3 Janet Right 6,4 7,4 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Felix chooses and Janet chooses
6
38. Consider the following game. There are ten churches in town: nine are Catholic and one is Eastern Orthodox. All churches conduct their divine services at 10am on Sunday morning. You and your friend, without communication, agree to meet at a church service. If you fail to meet at the same church, then you are sad and become a Doomer. What is this game's focal point? Remember that you cannot communicate about this. (A) You meet at any of the Catholic churches. (B) You meet at any of the churches – denomination does not matter. We're all the same bro. (C) You meet at the Orthodox church. (D) There is no focal point. 39. Consider a fractional-reserve banking system in which an initial deposit of $1,000 can generate up to $4,000 in money. What is the reserve ratio? (A) 4 percent. (B) 5 percent. (C) 25 percent. (D) 75 percent.
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Carlos and Deborah are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Carlos chooses Right and Deborah chooses Right, Carlos will receive a payoff of 5 and Deborah will receive a payoff of 1. Carlos Deborah Left Left 4,4 Right 2,4 Right 6,7 5,1 The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Carlos chooses and Deborah chooses
Up Down Up Down Player 1 In the game above, what is/are the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium? (up,up) (up,down) (down, up) (down, down) No equilibrium exists Up Down Player 2 eLearning Help P1 gets $45 P2 gets $155 P1 gets $100 P2 gets $10 P1 gets $85 P2 gets $85 P1 gets $95 P2 gets $95
Consider the game with the payoffs below. Which of the possible outcomes are MORE efficient than the Nash Equilibrium (NE)? Note, they do NOT need to be Nash equilibria themselves, they just need to be more efficient than the NE. Multiple answers are possible, but not necessary. You need to check ALL correct answers for full credit. JILL High Medium LowMAGGIE Left 3,4 2,3 2,2Center 4,8 9,7 8,7Right 7,6 8,5 9,4Group of answer choices (Left, Low) There is no strategy combination that is more efficient than the Nash equilibrium for this game. (Right, Medium) (Left, High) (Center, Medium) (Center, High) (Center, Low) (Left, Medium) (Right, Low) (Right, High)
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A prisoner is trying to escape from jail. He can attempt to climb over the walls or dig a tunnel from the floor of his cell. The warden can prevent him from climbing by posting guards on the wall, and he can prevent the con from tunneling by staging regular inspections of the cells, but he has only enough guards to do one or the other, not both. 1.What are the strategies and payoffs for this game?2.Express the payoffs in both non-numerical and numerical terms.3.Express this game in normal form.4.Express this game in extensive form, assuming that the prisoner and the warden make their decisions at the same time.5.Express this game in extensive form, assuming that the warden makes his decision first, and the prisoner knows the warden’s decision when he chooses his strategy. Give fast answer And only typed Answer