- Assume city budget is $50,000, Police $20. Pfice $10. Feds offer 1:1 match up to 100 fire units. Using indifference curves show a situation where the city increases the purchase of fire units by exactly 100 units.

- Assume city budget is $50,000, Police $20. Pfice $10. Feds offer 1:1 match up to 100 fire units. Using indifference curves show a situation where the city increases the purchase of fire units by exactly 100 units.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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