An economics professor is considering improving class attendance and preparation by giving pop quizzes. Two approaches are being considered: pop quizzes on days when homework is due, or keeping the pop quizzes a secret and giving them on random days. Suppose that the students use rational expectations theory in the classroom True or False: Giving pop quizzes on random days will increase attendance more than pop quizzes on days when homework is due. True False

An economics professor is considering improving class attendance and preparation by giving pop quizzes. Two approaches are being considered: pop quizzes on days when homework is due, or keeping the pop quizzes a secret and giving them on random days. Suppose that the students use rational expectations theory in the classroom True or False: Giving pop quizzes on random days will increase attendance more than pop quizzes on days when homework is due. True False

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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