After ten years as a general auto mechanic in a local garage, Joe decides he is tired of working for others, especially since business is typically slow and he works partially on commission. So, he decides to open his own garage. After estimating the cash flows for his new garage, he finds a large, positive NPV. Which of the following is most likely true about his analysis? Select one: O a. The discount rate he used must be too high. O b. Unless he can find a true source of value in his new venture, he probably made a mistake in estimating his cash flows. He has likely been overly optimistic about the future and has underestimated future cash flows. Oc. O d. His estimates of initial outlays must be off. 0 e. His analysis is probably correct provided there is adequate competition in the auto repair business.

After ten years as a general auto mechanic in a local garage, Joe decides he is tired of working for others, especially since business is typically slow and he works partially on commission. So, he decides to open his own garage. After estimating the cash flows for his new garage, he finds a large, positive NPV. Which of the following is most likely true about his analysis? Select one: O a. The discount rate he used must be too high. O b. Unless he can find a true source of value in his new venture, he probably made a mistake in estimating his cash flows. He has likely been overly optimistic about the future and has underestimated future cash flows. Oc. O d. His estimates of initial outlays must be off. 0 e. His analysis is probably correct provided there is adequate competition in the auto repair business.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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