ACTIVITY 3 1. You were given the following capital balances of the partners of thePinnacle Trading: Pablo Php 10,000.00 Norman Php 20,000.00 Christian Php 30,000.00 The partners agreed to divide profit or loss in the ratio of their capital balances. If the partnership earned a profit of Php 30,000.00 for the year, compute the share of Pablo, Norman, and Christian to the profit of the business. a. Share of Profit for Pablo = Php %3D b. Share of Profit for Norman = Php %3D

ACTIVITY 3 1. You were given the following capital balances of the partners of thePinnacle Trading: Pablo Php 10,000.00 Norman Php 20,000.00 Christian Php 30,000.00 The partners agreed to divide profit or loss in the ratio of their capital balances. If the partnership earned a profit of Php 30,000.00 for the year, compute the share of Pablo, Norman, and Christian to the profit of the business. a. Share of Profit for Pablo = Php %3D b. Share of Profit for Norman = Php %3D

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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