3. We consider the following situation between 2 firms. Firm A (the "acquirer") would like to take over firm 7 (the "target"). It does not know firm I's value; it believes that this value, when firm T is controlled by its own management, is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the dollar values in this range (we assume that the value is distributed uniformly on this interval). Firm T will be worth 50% more under firm A's management than it is under its own management. Suppose that firm A bids p to take over firm T; and firm T is worth x (under its 3 own management). Then if T accepts A's offer, A's payoff is 2x-p and T's payoff is p; if T rejects A's offer, A's payoff is 0 and T's payoff is x. (a) Formalize this situation as a Bayesian Game (b) Find the Bayesian Nash Equilibria of this game.
3. We consider the following situation between 2 firms. Firm A (the "acquirer") would like to take over firm 7 (the "target"). It does not know firm I's value; it believes that this value, when firm T is controlled by its own management, is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the dollar values in this range (we assume that the value is distributed uniformly on this interval). Firm T will be worth 50% more under firm A's management than it is under its own management. Suppose that firm A bids p to take over firm T; and firm T is worth x (under its 3 own management). Then if T accepts A's offer, A's payoff is 2x-p and T's payoff is p; if T rejects A's offer, A's payoff is 0 and T's payoff is x. (a) Formalize this situation as a Bayesian Game (b) Find the Bayesian Nash Equilibria of this game.
Principles of Microeconomics
7th Edition
ISBN:9781305156050
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter17: Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 9PA
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![3. We consider the following situation between 2 firms. Firm A (the "acquirer") would like to take over firm T (the
"target"). It does not know firm I's value; it believes that this value, when firm T is controlled by its own management,
is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the dollar values in this range (we assume
that the value is distributed uniformly on this interval). Firm T will be worth 50% more under firm A's management
than it is under its own management. Suppose that firm A bids p to take over firm 7; and firm T is worth x (under its
own management). Then if T accepts A's offer, A's payoff is 2x-p and T's payoff is p; if T rejects A's offer, A's payoff is 0
and T's payoff is x.
(a) Formalize this situation as a Bayesian Game
(b) Find the Bayesian Nash Equilibria of this game.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fbf8ee92f-ba39-4be8-985d-aa9c69d8e21c%2Fe15648a9-8966-4e0c-8026-78099240e59b%2F91knr69_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:3. We consider the following situation between 2 firms. Firm A (the "acquirer") would like to take over firm T (the
"target"). It does not know firm I's value; it believes that this value, when firm T is controlled by its own management,
is at least $0 and at most $100, and assigns equal probability to each of the dollar values in this range (we assume
that the value is distributed uniformly on this interval). Firm T will be worth 50% more under firm A's management
than it is under its own management. Suppose that firm A bids p to take over firm 7; and firm T is worth x (under its
own management). Then if T accepts A's offer, A's payoff is 2x-p and T's payoff is p; if T rejects A's offer, A's payoff is 0
and T's payoff is x.
(a) Formalize this situation as a Bayesian Game
(b) Find the Bayesian Nash Equilibria of this game.
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