A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano's and Giardino's. Normally both restaurants prosper with no advertising. Romano's could take some of Giardino's customers by running radio ads, and Giardino's could do the same thing. The one-month profit matrix (showing payoffs in thousands of dollars) is: Romano's Don't Advertise Advertise 4 Don't Advertise 3 Giardino's 1 Advertise 4 (a) Use best response analysis to find any pure strategies Nash equilibrium in the static (one-month) game? (b) If the game is repeated indefinitely, can the use of tit-for-tat strategies result in a Nash equilibrium? (c) Does the game have multiple equilibria if it is repeated indefinitely? (d) Would pre-play communication have implications for the repeated game equilibrium? Please explain both in the static version of the game, and also if the game is repeated indefinitely.

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A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano's and Giardino's. Normally both restaurants prosper with no advertising. Romano's could take some of
Giardino's customers by running radio ads, and Giardino's could do the same thing. The one-month profit matrix (showing payoffs in thousands of dollars) is:
Romano's
Don't Advertise
Advertise
4
Don't
Advertise
3
Giardino's
1
Advertise
4
(a) Use best response analysis to find any pure strategies Nash equilibrium in the static (one-month) game?
(b) If the game is repeated indefinitely, can the use of tit-for-tat strategies result in a Nash equilibrium?
(c) Does the game have multiple equilibria if it is repeated indefinitely?
(d) Would pre-play communication have implications for the repeated game equilibrium? Please explain both in the static version of the game, and also if
the game is repeated indefinitely.
Transcribed Image Text:A small tourist town has two Italian restaurants, Romano's and Giardino's. Normally both restaurants prosper with no advertising. Romano's could take some of Giardino's customers by running radio ads, and Giardino's could do the same thing. The one-month profit matrix (showing payoffs in thousands of dollars) is: Romano's Don't Advertise Advertise 4 Don't Advertise 3 Giardino's 1 Advertise 4 (a) Use best response analysis to find any pure strategies Nash equilibrium in the static (one-month) game? (b) If the game is repeated indefinitely, can the use of tit-for-tat strategies result in a Nash equilibrium? (c) Does the game have multiple equilibria if it is repeated indefinitely? (d) Would pre-play communication have implications for the repeated game equilibrium? Please explain both in the static version of the game, and also if the game is repeated indefinitely.
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