Solve it as soon as possible with correct answer and proper explanation Player 2Xy2a5,23,42, 1b4,43,23,3Player 1C3,44,40,4d2,31,53,0 a) Refer to the game in the figure below. Which strategies survive for Player 1 after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? Write your answer as a comma-separated list ofstrategies. Example: if b and c survive, write your answer as b, c.b)Refer to the game in the figure below. Which strategies survive for Player 1 after iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies? Write your answer as a comma-separated list ofstrategies. Example: if b and c survive, write your answer as b, c.c) Refer to the game in the figure below. Which strategies survive for Player 2 after iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies? Write your answer as a comma-separated list ofstrategies.Player 2Player 1

Answer given that: Consider strategies a and b. Whatever player chooses x, y or z, strategy b gives…

Answered: Player 2 X y 2 a 5,2 3,4 2, 1 b 4,4 3,2…

Economics:

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285859460

Author:BOYES, William

Publisher:BOYES, William

Chapter26: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13E

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Suppose that there are only two firms in a market in which demand is given by p = 64 - Q, where Q is the total production of the two firms. Each firm can choose either a low level of output, qL = 15, or a high level of output, qH = 20. The unit cost of production for both firms is $4. Write down the normal-form representation of the game in which the strategic variable for each firm is the quantity of output and the firms make their choices simultaneously. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game (quantities produced and market price).
Industrial Organziation game - Business Strategy & Game theory Consider a game with competitive for market-share in a large region (a country or city). Firm 1 initially makes a decision to either compete in the Eastern (E) or Western (W) part of a region, or to opt out entirely (O). Once this decision has been made, Firm 1 and Firm 2 (who is already present in the region) simultaneously make a decision to be aggressive (A) or passive (P) in the region. Denote actions in the Eastern region without a prime (i.e. A and P) and those in the Western region with a prime (i.e. A` and P`). We'll make the following assumptions about these firms - If Firm 1 opts out, its payoff is 8 and the payoff for Firm 2 is 12 If Firm 1 ENTERS the Eastern region both firms receive 9 if both are AGGRESSIVE both firms receive 6 if both are PASSIVE if one plays AGGRESSIVE and the other plays PASSIVE, the aggresive firm gets 5 and the passive firm gets 2 If Firm 1 ENTERS the Western region…
The above table shows the payoffs that either Darrin or Rob receive depending on whether they choose a high or a low price strategy. Who has a dominant strategy? The above table shows the payoffs that either Darrin or Rob receive depending on whether they choose a high or a low price strategy. The predicted outcome is
Two car producers, Firm A operates in Country A and Firm B operates in Country B, are considering producing a new 8-seater Multi-Purpose Vehicle (MPV)for the international market. The payoff matrix is as follows (payoff values are in millions of dollars). The above payoffs imply that the international market demand is large enough to support only one producer. If both firms produce, both will sustain a loss. (i) Explain and solve for the Nash equilibrium in this game. (ii) Suppose the government of Country A decides to subsidise Firm A with $25 million if it produces. Revise the payoff matrix to account for this subsidy. What is the new equilibrium outcome? Compare the two outcomes and discuss the effect of the subsidy.
Help Thanks.Merry Christmas .
where is the nash equilibrium? find out the dominant strategy. it was discovered that two domestic manufacturing companies were fixing prices. if each company is silent, there is no penalty, but production and business are disrupted due to continuous investigation by the Fair Trade Commission. The penalty for revealing the estimated loss due to the investigation and collusion is as follows: Firm 2 Silence Disclosure Silence -200, -200 -590, 0 Firm 1 Disclosure 0, -590 -450, -450 fine( a hundred million won)
Note: Hand written solution is not allowed.
A strategy is a decision rule that describes the actions a player will take at each decision point. The normal-form game indicates the players in the game, the possible strategies of the players, and the payoffs to the players that will result from alternative strategies. In the game presented in Table Normal-Form Game, does player B have a dominant strategy? What is the secure strategy for player B in the game presented in Table Normal-Form Game?
Is there a Nash Equilibrium for this game? If so, what is it? O The Nash Equilibrium is for both first to choose the high price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for both first to choose the low price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for Chevron to choose the high price while Shell chooses the low price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for Shell to choose the high price while Chevron chooses the low price. O There is no Nash Equilibrium for this game.
Two firms are considering simultaneously developing a new product for a market. The costs of developing the product are $10m but there will only be revenue in the market of $40m if only one of the firms develops the product. If both firms develop the product then earnings/revenues will be competed away. a) Capture this entry game in a payoff matrix. b) What is the Nash equilibrium and why? Please provide explanation. c) Does either firm have a dominant strategy? Please provide explanation.
The following market is a duopoly populated only by the companies Alpha and Beta. The pay-off matrix immediately below shows the combinations of pricing strategies available to the two companies. The numbers represent millions of dollars in profit. (The negative sign indicates a loss.) Assuming Beta has a first mover advantage, in a one-shot game, what is liekly to be the Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. Alpha High price Low price High price 250, 200 200, 100 Beta Low price 50, 150 100, 250
Now answer the following questions: Perform iterative elimination of dominated strategies on the game. Draw the new table for each iteration as shown in the lecture video. Write corresponding actions at left and up of the table. Explain why are you removing each row or column. You should reach a 2*2 game. Rewrite the table separately. From the 2*2 game you get in question 1, find a mixed strategy σ1=(p,1−p) for Player 1 that will make Player 2 indifferent about two actions. Find a mixed strategy σ2=(q,1−q) for Player 2 that will make Player 1 indifferent about two actions. If the players are playing the mixed strategies σ1 and σ2, they both will indifferent about their strategies, hence the strategy profile (σ1,σ2) will be a Nash Equilibrium of this game. Find the expected utility for both Player 1 u1(σ1,σ2) and Player 2 u2(σ1,σ2) at this Nash Equilibrium.

SEE MORE QUESTIONS

Recommended textbooks for you

Economics:

Economics

ISBN:

9781285859460

Author:

BOYES, William

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Microeconomic Theory

Economics

ISBN:

9781337517942

Author:

NICHOLSON

Publisher:

Cengage

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Economics:

Economics

ISBN:

9781285859460

Author:

BOYES, William

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Microeconomic Theory

Economics

ISBN:

9781337517942

Author:

NICHOLSON

Publisher:

Cengage

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an…

Economics

ISBN:

9781305506381

Author:

James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Exploring Economics

Economics

ISBN:

9781544336329

Author:

Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:

SAGE Publications, Inc

SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS