A new amusement park is about to open and features a number of attractions. It is expedcted that the park will attract 1,000 people per day Tastes of consumers are homogeneous, so it can be assumed that everyone will have the same demand function, and that each person will take x = 50 – 50p rides, where p is the price of a ride in Euro. The marginal cost of a ride is zero. If the owners decided to use a two-part tarif, how much would they charge for the admission to the park and how much for each ride? O (a) Admission fee: 6.25 Euro; price for a ride: 50 cents. O (b) Admission fee: 25 Euro; price for a ride: 0. O (c) Admission fee: 20 Euro; price for a ride: 0. O (d) Admission fee: 24 Euro; price for a ride: 50 cents.

A new amusement park is about to open and features a number of attractions. It is expedcted that the park will attract 1,000 people per day Tastes of consumers are homogeneous, so it can be assumed that everyone will have the same demand function, and that each person will take x = 50 – 50p rides, where p is the price of a ride in Euro. The marginal cost of a ride is zero. If the owners decided to use a two-part tarif, how much would they charge for the admission to the park and how much for each ride? O (a) Admission fee: 6.25 Euro; price for a ride: 50 cents. O (b) Admission fee: 25 Euro; price for a ride: 0. O (c) Admission fee: 20 Euro; price for a ride: 0. O (d) Admission fee: 24 Euro; price for a ride: 50 cents.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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