A monopoly sells its good in the U.S. and Japanese markets. The American inverse demand function is Pa= 120 -0, and the Japanese inverse demand function is = 100 - 20, where both prices, P, and p, are measured in dollars. The firm's marginal cost of production is m = S20 in both countries. If the firm can prevent resales, what price will it charge in both markets? (Hint. The monopoly determines its optimal (monopoly) price in each country separately because customers cannot resell the good) The equilibrium price in Japan is S (round your answer to the nearest penny) The equilibrium price in the U.S. is S (round your answer to the nearest penny)

A monopoly sells its good in the U.S. and Japanese markets. The American inverse demand function is Pa= 120 -0, and the Japanese inverse demand function is = 100 - 20, where both prices, P, and p, are measured in dollars. The firm's marginal cost of production is m = S20 in both countries. If the firm can prevent resales, what price will it charge in both markets? (Hint. The monopoly determines its optimal (monopoly) price in each country separately because customers cannot resell the good) The equilibrium price in Japan is S (round your answer to the nearest penny) The equilibrium price in the U.S. is S (round your answer to the nearest penny)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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