A monopoly has two production plants with cost functions C₁ = 50+ 0.1Q₁2 and C₂ = 30+ 0.05Q22. The demand it faces is Q = 500 - 10P. What is the condition for profit maximization? Multiple Choice O MC1(Q1) = MC2(Q2)=P(Q1 + Q2). Next MC1(Q1 +Q2) = MC2(Q1 + Q2) =P (Q1 + Q2). MC1(Q1 + Q2) = MC2(Q1 + Q2) = MR (Q₁ + Q2). MC1(Q1) = MC2(Q2) = MR(Q1 + Q2).

A monopoly has two production plants with cost functions C₁ = 50+ 0.1Q₁2 and C₂ = 30+ 0.05Q22. The demand it faces is Q = 500 - 10P. What is the condition for profit maximization? Multiple Choice O MC1(Q1) = MC2(Q2)=P(Q1 + Q2). Next MC1(Q1 +Q2) = MC2(Q1 + Q2) =P (Q1 + Q2). MC1(Q1 + Q2) = MC2(Q1 + Q2) = MR (Q₁ + Q2). MC1(Q1) = MC2(Q2) = MR(Q1 + Q2).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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