A Bargaining Game Two players, PI and PII, have to divide 23 M&M's: 12 regular ones (R's) and 11 peanut-coatedones (P's). PI likes both types equally but PII likes only the P's (she will have no use for anyR's she gets). Moreover, both players' preferences are known to both and the bargaining willbe restricted to the allocations of M&M's, e.g., no monetary side payments or othermodifications involved. (a) PI Divides and PII Chooses: PI divides the M&M's into two piles in any way hechooses. Then PII selects one of the piles, leaving the other one to PI. What will bethe outcome of this game? (b) PII Divides and PI Chooses: The same as in Problem 1, but with the order reversed.What will be the outcome?
A Bargaining Game Two players, PI and PII, have to divide 23 M&M's: 12 regular ones (R's) and 11 peanut-coatedones (P's). PI likes both types equally but PII likes only the P's (she will have no use for anyR's she gets). Moreover, both players' preferences are known to both and the bargaining willbe restricted to the allocations of M&M's, e.g., no monetary side payments or othermodifications involved. (a) PI Divides and PII Chooses: PI divides the M&M's into two piles in any way hechooses. Then PII selects one of the piles, leaving the other one to PI. What will bethe outcome of this game? (b) PII Divides and PI Chooses: The same as in Problem 1, but with the order reversed.What will be the outcome?
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.9P
Related questions
Question
A Bargaining Game
Two players, PI and PII, have to divide 23 M&M's: 12 regular ones (R's) and 11 peanut-coated
ones (P's). PI likes both types equally but PII likes only the P's (she will have no use for any
R's she gets). Moreover, both players' preferences are known to both and the bargaining will
be restricted to the allocations of M&M's, e.g., no monetary side payments or other
modifications involved.
(a) PI Divides and PII Chooses: PI divides the M&M's into two piles in any way he
chooses. Then PII selects one of the piles, leaving the other one to PI. What will be
the outcome of this game?
(b) PII Divides and PI Chooses: The same as in Problem 1, but with the order reversed.
What will be the outcome?
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