(b) COLIN Left Right Up 0,0 0,0 ROWENA Down 0,0 1, 1 In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's Colin's ). This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's Colin's ).

(b) COLIN Left Right Up 0,0 0,0 ROWENA Down 0,0 1, 1 In this simultaneous move game, the iterated dominance equilibrium is (Rowena's Colin's ). This game has two Nash equilibria one of which is the iterated dominance equilibrium. The other Nash equilibrium, which is not the IDE, is (Rowena's Colin's ).

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.3P

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Does each individual in a prisoners dilemma benefit more from cooperation or from pursuing self-interest? Explain briefly.
Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Film A) is large and the other film (Film B) is small, as the prisoners dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. Assuming that both films know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?

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