6. Firms 1 and 2 compete Bertrand-style. They each have zero marginal costs and zero fixed costs, and simply wish to maximize their own revenue. For a constant K >0, demand is q = K - p for the firm with the lower price and zero for the firm with the higher price, or q = 0.5(K - p) if both firms set the same price. When it matters, firms have a time discount factor 8.

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6. Firms 1 and 2 compete Bertrand-style. They each have zero marginal costs and zero
fixed costs, and simply wish to maximize their own revenue. For a constant K > 0,
demand is q = K – p for the firm with the lower price and zero for the firm with the
higher price, or q = 0.5(K – p) if both firms set the same price. When it matters, firms
have a time discount factor 8.
a. Find the unique NE prices and profits of the static game.
b. Suppose there was only one firm who set monopoly prices, called pm. What would
Pm be?
Back to two competing firms.
c. Suppose this game is repeated 10 times; describe the unique SPNE outcome.
d. Suppose the game is repeated indefinitely. Describe SPNE strategies that would
result in both players playing pm, given high enough 6.
e. What is the lowest & can be for your strategy described in part (d) to work?
Transcribed Image Text:6. Firms 1 and 2 compete Bertrand-style. They each have zero marginal costs and zero fixed costs, and simply wish to maximize their own revenue. For a constant K > 0, demand is q = K – p for the firm with the lower price and zero for the firm with the higher price, or q = 0.5(K – p) if both firms set the same price. When it matters, firms have a time discount factor 8. a. Find the unique NE prices and profits of the static game. b. Suppose there was only one firm who set monopoly prices, called pm. What would Pm be? Back to two competing firms. c. Suppose this game is repeated 10 times; describe the unique SPNE outcome. d. Suppose the game is repeated indefinitely. Describe SPNE strategies that would result in both players playing pm, given high enough 6. e. What is the lowest & can be for your strategy described in part (d) to work?
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