5. Consider the game having the following payoff table: Strategy Player 1 1 2 3 1 -3 1 1 Player 2 2 1 2 0 3 2 -2 (a) Can you apply the dominated strategies method for this game? If so, determine the optimal strategy for each player by successively eliminating dominated strategies. Give a list of the dominated strategies and the corresponding dominating strategies in the order in which you were able to eliminate them. Also find the value of the game. (b) Use the minimax criterion to determine if this game has a saddle point? If so, find the best strategy for each player, and the value of the game.

5. Consider the game having the following payoff table: Strategy Player 1 1 2 3 1 -3 1 1 Player 2 2 1 2 0 3 2 -2 (a) Can you apply the dominated strategies method for this game? If so, determine the optimal strategy for each player by successively eliminating dominated strategies. Give a list of the dominated strategies and the corresponding dominating strategies in the order in which you were able to eliminate them. Also find the value of the game. (b) Use the minimax criterion to determine if this game has a saddle point? If so, find the best strategy for each player, and the value of the game.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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