45% 11:04 pm BUSINE SS E THICS ASSIGNMENT # Financial Compensation for the Victims of Bhopal On December 3, 1984, some 2,000 people were killed and 200,000 were injured when a cloud of poisonous methyl isocya- nate gas was accidentally released from the Union Carbide Com- pany plant in Bhopal, India. The methyl isocyanate was used to manufacture Sevin, a plant pesticide that was distributed widely throughout India for use on that country's corn, rice, soybean, cotton, and alfalfa crops. It was said that the use of Sevin in- creased the harvest of the food crops by over 10 percent, enough to feed 70 million people. The accident apparently occurred when between 120 and 240 gallons of water were introduced into a tank containing 90,000 pounds of methyl isocyanate.' The tank also contained approx- imately 3,000 pounds of chloroform, which is used as a solvent in the manufacture of methyl isocyanate; the two chemicals should have been separated before storage, but that had not been done for some time in the operating process at Bhopal. The water reacted exothermically (producing heat) with the chłoroform, generating chlorine ions, which led to corrosion of the tank walls, and the iron oxide from the corrosion in turn re- acted exothermically with the methyl isocyanate. The increase in heat and pressure was rapid but unnoticed because the pressure gauge on the tank had been inoperable for four months and the operators in the control room, monitoring a remote temperature gauge, were accustomed to higher-than-specified heat levels (25°C rather than the 0°C in the operating instructions) due to the continuał presence of the chloroform and some water vapor in the tank. The refrigeration unit built to cool the storage tank had been disconnected six months previously. The "scrubber," a safety device to neutralize the methyl isocyanate with caustic soda, had been under repair since June. An operator, alarmed by the suddenly increasing temperature, attempted to cool the tank by spraying it with water, but by then the reaction was unstoppable, at a probable 200°C. The rupture disc (a steel plate in the line to prevent accidental operation of the safety valve) broke, the safety valve opened (just before, it is assumed, the tank would have 60 CHAPTER 2/MANAGER II 45% 11:04 pm CASES 59 burst), and over half the 45 tons of methyl isocyanate in storage were discharged into the air. Following the accident, Union Carbide officials in the United States denied strongly that their firm was responsible for the trag- edy. They made the following three statements in support of that position: 1. The Bhopal plant was 50.9 percent owned by the Ameri- can firm, but the parent corporation had been able to exercise very little control. All managerial and technical personnel were citizens of India at the insistence of the Indian government. No Americans were permanently employed at the plant. Safety warn- ings from visiting American inspectors about the Sevin manufac- turing process had been ignored. 2. Five automatic safety devices that had originally been in- stalled as part of the Sevin manufacturing process had, by the time of the accident, been either replaced by manual safety methods to increase employment, shut down for repairs, or dis- connected as part of a cost-reduction program. The automatic temperature and pressure warning signals had been removed soon after construction. The repairs on the automatic scrubber unit had extended over six months. The refrigeration unit had never been used to cool the tank and had been inoperable for over a year. 3. The Bhopal plant had been built in partnership with the Indian government to increase employment in that country. Union Carbide would have preferred to make Sevin in the United States and ship it to India for distribution and sale, because the insec- ticide could be made less expensively in the United States due to substantial economies of scale in the manufacturing process. Warren Anderson, chairman of Union Carbide, stated that while he believed that the American company was not legally lia- ble for the tragedy due to the three points above, it was still "mor- ally" responsible, and he suggested that the firm should pay prompt financial compensation to those killed and injured in the accident. Q1 Class Assignment. Assume that the question of legal liabili the accident at Bhopal never will be settled, due to diff in the law between the two countries and the diffic 2/MANAGERIAL ETHICS AND MICROECONOMIC THEORY ....... . II

Practical Management Science
6th Edition
ISBN:9781337406659
Author:WINSTON, Wayne L.
Publisher:WINSTON, Wayne L.
Chapter2: Introduction To Spreadsheet Modeling
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 20P: Julie James is opening a lemonade stand. She believes the fixed cost per week of running the stand...
icon
Related questions
icon
Concept explainers
Topic Video
Question

Do a stakeholder Analysis, specifying to What extent or to what degree the stakeholders should be held responsible for the accident.

45% 11:04 pm
BUSINE SS E THICS
ASSIGNMENT #
Financial Compensation for the Victims
of Bhopal
On December 3, 1984, some 2,000 people were killed and
200,000 were injured when a cloud of poisonous methyl isocya-
nate gas was accidentally released from the Union Carbide Com-
pany plant in Bhopal, India. The methyl isocyanate was used to
manufacture Sevin, a plant pesticide that was distributed widely
throughout India for use on that country's corn, rice, soybean,
cotton, and alfalfa crops. It was said that the use of Sevin in-
creased the harvest of the food crops by over 10 percent, enough
to feed 70 million people.
The accident apparently occurred when between 120 and 240
gallons of water were introduced into a tank containing 90,000
pounds of methyl isocyanate.' The tank also contained approx-
imately 3,000 pounds of chloroform, which is used as a solvent in
the manufacture of methyl isocyanate; the two chemicals should
have been separated before storage, but that had not been done
for some time in the operating process at Bhopal.
The water reacted exothermically (producing heat) with the
chłoroform, generating chlorine ions, which led to corrosion of
the tank walls, and the iron oxide from the corrosion in turn re-
acted exothermically with the methyl isocyanate. The increase in
heat and pressure was rapid but unnoticed because the pressure
gauge on the tank had been inoperable for four months and the
operators in the control room, monitoring a remote temperature
gauge, were accustomed to higher-than-specified heat levels
(25°C rather than the 0°C in the operating instructions) due to the
continuał presence of the chloroform and some water vapor in
the tank. The refrigeration unit built to cool the storage tank had
been disconnected six months previously. The "scrubber," a
safety device to neutralize the methyl isocyanate with caustic soda,
had been under repair since June. An operator, alarmed by the
suddenly increasing temperature, attempted to cool the tank by
spraying it with water, but by then the reaction was unstoppable,
at a probable 200°C. The rupture disc (a steel plate in the line to
prevent accidental operation of the safety valve) broke, the safety
valve opened (just before, it is assumed, the tank would have
60
CHAPTER 2/MANAGER
II
Transcribed Image Text:45% 11:04 pm BUSINE SS E THICS ASSIGNMENT # Financial Compensation for the Victims of Bhopal On December 3, 1984, some 2,000 people were killed and 200,000 were injured when a cloud of poisonous methyl isocya- nate gas was accidentally released from the Union Carbide Com- pany plant in Bhopal, India. The methyl isocyanate was used to manufacture Sevin, a plant pesticide that was distributed widely throughout India for use on that country's corn, rice, soybean, cotton, and alfalfa crops. It was said that the use of Sevin in- creased the harvest of the food crops by over 10 percent, enough to feed 70 million people. The accident apparently occurred when between 120 and 240 gallons of water were introduced into a tank containing 90,000 pounds of methyl isocyanate.' The tank also contained approx- imately 3,000 pounds of chloroform, which is used as a solvent in the manufacture of methyl isocyanate; the two chemicals should have been separated before storage, but that had not been done for some time in the operating process at Bhopal. The water reacted exothermically (producing heat) with the chłoroform, generating chlorine ions, which led to corrosion of the tank walls, and the iron oxide from the corrosion in turn re- acted exothermically with the methyl isocyanate. The increase in heat and pressure was rapid but unnoticed because the pressure gauge on the tank had been inoperable for four months and the operators in the control room, monitoring a remote temperature gauge, were accustomed to higher-than-specified heat levels (25°C rather than the 0°C in the operating instructions) due to the continuał presence of the chloroform and some water vapor in the tank. The refrigeration unit built to cool the storage tank had been disconnected six months previously. The "scrubber," a safety device to neutralize the methyl isocyanate with caustic soda, had been under repair since June. An operator, alarmed by the suddenly increasing temperature, attempted to cool the tank by spraying it with water, but by then the reaction was unstoppable, at a probable 200°C. The rupture disc (a steel plate in the line to prevent accidental operation of the safety valve) broke, the safety valve opened (just before, it is assumed, the tank would have 60 CHAPTER 2/MANAGER II
45% 11:04 pm
CASES
59
burst), and over half the 45 tons of methyl isocyanate in storage
were discharged into the air.
Following the accident, Union Carbide officials in the United
States denied strongly that their firm was responsible for the trag-
edy. They made the following three statements in support of that
position:
1. The Bhopal plant was 50.9 percent owned by the Ameri-
can firm, but the parent corporation had been able to exercise
very little control. All managerial and technical personnel were
citizens of India at the insistence of the Indian government. No
Americans were permanently employed at the plant. Safety warn-
ings from visiting American inspectors about the Sevin manufac-
turing process had been ignored.
2. Five automatic safety devices that had originally been in-
stalled as part of the Sevin manufacturing process had, by the
time of the accident, been either replaced by manual safety
methods to increase employment, shut down for repairs, or dis-
connected as part of a cost-reduction program. The automatic
temperature and pressure warning signals had been removed
soon after construction. The repairs on the automatic scrubber
unit had extended over six months. The refrigeration unit had
never been used to cool the tank and had been inoperable for
over a year.
3. The Bhopal plant had been built in partnership with the
Indian government to increase employment in that country. Union
Carbide would have preferred to make Sevin in the United States
and ship it to India for distribution and sale, because the insec-
ticide could be made less expensively in the United States due to
substantial economies of scale in the manufacturing process.
Warren Anderson, chairman of Union Carbide, stated that
while he believed that the American company was not legally lia-
ble for the tragedy due to the three points above, it was still "mor-
ally" responsible, and he suggested that the firm should pay
prompt financial compensation to those killed and injured in the
accident.
Q1
Class Assignment. Assume that the question of legal liabili
the accident at Bhopal never will be settled, due to diff
in the law between the two countries and the diffic
2/MANAGERIAL ETHICS AND MICROECONOMIC THEORY
....... .
II
Transcribed Image Text:45% 11:04 pm CASES 59 burst), and over half the 45 tons of methyl isocyanate in storage were discharged into the air. Following the accident, Union Carbide officials in the United States denied strongly that their firm was responsible for the trag- edy. They made the following three statements in support of that position: 1. The Bhopal plant was 50.9 percent owned by the Ameri- can firm, but the parent corporation had been able to exercise very little control. All managerial and technical personnel were citizens of India at the insistence of the Indian government. No Americans were permanently employed at the plant. Safety warn- ings from visiting American inspectors about the Sevin manufac- turing process had been ignored. 2. Five automatic safety devices that had originally been in- stalled as part of the Sevin manufacturing process had, by the time of the accident, been either replaced by manual safety methods to increase employment, shut down for repairs, or dis- connected as part of a cost-reduction program. The automatic temperature and pressure warning signals had been removed soon after construction. The repairs on the automatic scrubber unit had extended over six months. The refrigeration unit had never been used to cool the tank and had been inoperable for over a year. 3. The Bhopal plant had been built in partnership with the Indian government to increase employment in that country. Union Carbide would have preferred to make Sevin in the United States and ship it to India for distribution and sale, because the insec- ticide could be made less expensively in the United States due to substantial economies of scale in the manufacturing process. Warren Anderson, chairman of Union Carbide, stated that while he believed that the American company was not legally lia- ble for the tragedy due to the three points above, it was still "mor- ally" responsible, and he suggested that the firm should pay prompt financial compensation to those killed and injured in the accident. Q1 Class Assignment. Assume that the question of legal liabili the accident at Bhopal never will be settled, due to diff in the law between the two countries and the diffic 2/MANAGERIAL ETHICS AND MICROECONOMIC THEORY ....... . II
Expert Solution
trending now

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

steps

Step by step

Solved in 2 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Inventory management
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, operations-management and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
Recommended textbooks for you
Practical Management Science
Practical Management Science
Operations Management
ISBN:
9781337406659
Author:
WINSTON, Wayne L.
Publisher:
Cengage,
Operations Management
Operations Management
Operations Management
ISBN:
9781259667473
Author:
William J Stevenson
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education
Operations and Supply Chain Management (Mcgraw-hi…
Operations and Supply Chain Management (Mcgraw-hi…
Operations Management
ISBN:
9781259666100
Author:
F. Robert Jacobs, Richard B Chase
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education
Business in Action
Business in Action
Operations Management
ISBN:
9780135198100
Author:
BOVEE
Publisher:
PEARSON CO
Purchasing and Supply Chain Management
Purchasing and Supply Chain Management
Operations Management
ISBN:
9781285869681
Author:
Robert M. Monczka, Robert B. Handfield, Larry C. Giunipero, James L. Patterson
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Production and Operations Analysis, Seventh Editi…
Production and Operations Analysis, Seventh Editi…
Operations Management
ISBN:
9781478623069
Author:
Steven Nahmias, Tava Lennon Olsen
Publisher:
Waveland Press, Inc.