4. Firm 1 and Firm 2 are in a duopoly, earning each annual profits of £10 million per year. Firm 1 could earn £20 million per year as a monopolist. Firm 1 drops its price to £40 when its marginal cost is £50 and holds it there for a year to be able to drive Firm 2 out of the market. (a) What pricing strategy is the manager of Firm 1 considering? Explain this strategy and how it helps to reduce competition in a market. (b) The year that it drops its price, Firm 1 will lose £10 million. At what level of interest rate i will the strategy of Firm 1 be profitable?

4. Firm 1 and Firm 2 are in a duopoly, earning each annual profits of £10 million per year. Firm 1 could earn £20 million per year as a monopolist. Firm 1 drops its price to £40 when its marginal cost is £50 and holds it there for a year to be able to drive Firm 2 out of the market. (a) What pricing strategy is the manager of Firm 1 considering? Explain this strategy and how it helps to reduce competition in a market. (b) The year that it drops its price, Firm 1 will lose £10 million. At what level of interest rate i will the strategy of Firm 1 be profitable?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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1. Suppose we live in a world where the widgets market is a monopolistically competitive market with homogenous firms (i.e. no productivity differences among firms). There are two countries: A and B. In each country, consumer demand for widgets can be written as Q = S x- x (P – P), 30 where n is the number of widget firms, P the price of widget charged by the firm, and P the average price of widget by other firms in the market. Moreover, widget firms in both countries have the same total cost function, which is C = 750 + (5 × Q). It is also given that marginal revenue of each 30Q firm can be written as MR = P – Total demand for widget in country A is SA = 900 and Sg = 1600 in country В. a) Derive the average cost function from the total cost function. What is the marginal cost? b) Calculate the number of firms and the prices of widget in each country when trade is not allowed (that is, calculate na, ng, Pa, PBÌ- c) Calculate the number of firms and the price of widget in the unified…
3. Demand for a good produced by a duopoly is given by P = 100 - Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs, MC = 20 and zero fixed costs. Firms can choose to maximize profit or revenue. Suppose firm 1 choose to maximise profit and firm 2 choose to maximise revenue. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of each firm.
14. Aside from advertising, how can monopolisticallycompetitive firms increase demand for their products? 17. Would you expect the kinked demand curve to bemore extreme (like a right angle) or less extreme (like anormal demand curve) if each firm in the cartel producesa near-identical product like OPEC and petroleum?What if each firm produces a somewhat differentproduct? Explain your reasoning.
4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…
3. Reuben and Simeon are duopolists producing jeans in a differentiated goods market. The market demand for Reuben's jeans is y₁ = 75 − P₁ + P2, while the market demand for 1 1 Simeon's jeans is y₂ = 75 − P2 + ₂P₁. Reuben's cost function is C₁(y₁) = 75y₁ while Simeon's cost function is C₂ (y₂) = 75y2. a) Calculate the Bertrand equilibrium in this market. Indicate each firm's price, output level, and profits. (Answer: p₁ = 100 USD, y₁ = 25 units) b) Find prices and output levels that would maximize joint profits, and calculate the maximum joint profits. c) Draw a payoff matrix using the results from a) and b) and determine the Nash equilibrium.
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Hubert and Kate, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Hubert and Kate can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. is Price (Dollars per gallon) 5.40 4.95 4.50 4.05 3.60 3.15 2.70 2.25 1.80 1.35 $ 0.90 0.45 0 Suppose Hubert and Kate form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Hubert and Kate agree to split production equally. Therefore, Hubert's profit is and Kate's profit is $ Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 Suppose that Hubert and Kate have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Hubert says to himself, "Kate…
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3. Firm A and Firm B are two firms in an industry. Firm A and Firm B are planning to merge. (a) Firm A and Firm B are Bertrand duopolists with identical and constant marginal costs. Post-merger marginal cost is lower than pre-merger. Use a figure that includes a downward-sloping linear market demand to show how the merger of Firm A and Firm B will lead to anticompetitive losses as well as cost-savings. (b) Firm A and Firm B are Cournot duopolists with identical marginal costs. Post- merger marginal cost is the same as pre-merger. Use a figure that includes a downward-sloping linear market demand to show how the merger of Firm A and Firm B will lead to anticompetitive losses. (c) Firm A and Firm B are Stackelberg competitors with identical marginal costs. Post-merger marginal cost is the same as pre-merger. Firm A is the Stackelberg leader. Use a figure that includes a downward-sloping linear market demand to show how the merger of Firm A and Firm B will lead to anticompetitive losses.…
3. Is monopolistic competition efficient? Suppose that a firm produces wooden train engines in a monopolistically competitive market. The following graph shows its demand curve, marginal- revenue (MR) curve, marginal-cost (MC) curve, and average-total-cost (ATC) curve. Place a black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the long-run monopolistically competitive equilibrium price and quantity for this firm. Next, place a grey point (star symbol) to indicate the minimum average total cost the firm faces and the quantity associated with that cost. ? PRICE (Dollars per engine) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 MC ATC MR 0 + Demand H 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 QUANTITY (Thousands of engines) Mon Comp Outcome Min Unit Cost Because this market is a monopolistically competitive market, you can tell that it is in long-run equilibrium by the fact that optimal quantity for each firm. Furthermore, the quantity the firm produces in long-run equilibrium is True or False: This indicates…
4. We assume that there are two countries, X and Y, each has a monopolistically competitive Home Appliance Market. By using the data of the Table below, define and specify the main effects of the Krugman's Model. Home Appliance Home Appliance Market Market in Integrated Market in Country X Before Trade Country Y Before Trade After Trade Total Sales of Home 700,000 1,300,000 2,000,000 Appliance Number of firms Sales per firm Axarage Cost Price 8. 116,000 162,500 222,000 15,000 12,000 10,000 15,000 12,000 10,000
25: What are the Characteristics of a Oligopoly Market? 26: What are the Characteristics of a Monopoly Market? 27: What are Intellectual Property Rights?