4. Consider a three-player bargaining, where the players are negotiating over a surplus of one unit of utility. The game begins with player 1 proposing a three-way split of the surplus. Then player 2 must decide whether to accept the proposal or to substitute for player 1's proposal his own alternative proposal. Finally, player 3 must decide whether to accept or reject current proposal (it is player 1's if player 2 accepts or player 2's if player 2 offer a new one). If he accepts, then the players obtain the specified shares of the surplus. If player 3 rejects, then the players each get 0. (a) Draw the extensive form game of this perfect-information game. (b) Determine the subgame perfect NE.

4. Consider a three-player bargaining, where the players are negotiating over a surplus of one unit of utility. The game begins with player 1 proposing a three-way split of the surplus. Then player 2 must decide whether to accept the proposal or to substitute for player 1's proposal his own alternative proposal. Finally, player 3 must decide whether to accept or reject current proposal (it is player 1's if player 2 accepts or player 2's if player 2 offer a new one). If he accepts, then the players obtain the specified shares of the surplus. If player 3 rejects, then the players each get 0. (a) Draw the extensive form game of this perfect-information game. (b) Determine the subgame perfect NE.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

To Vote or Not to Vote Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote. Mrs. Ward vote. don't vote Mr. Ward Vote. -1, -1. 1, -2 don't vote. -2, 1. 0,0?
9. For the payoff matrix below, consider a sequential version of the game in which Player 2 moves first and then Player 1 moves second. Which of the following is not a correct statement? Player 1 Top Center Bottom Left 1,2 5,1 6,0 Player 2 Middle 7,1 11,2 -4,3 Right 10,4 1,0 8,5 The subgame perfect payoffs coincide with those of a Nash equilibrium b. Depending on Player 2's move, Player 1 will sometimes optimally choose Bottom c. Player 2 will choose Right in the subgame perfect equilibrium d. Player 2 would be willing to pay a positive $ amount to move first rather than second e. Player 1 would be willing to pay a larger $ amount than Player 2 to move first
Thank you for helping on this!
Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote.
2
Prove that in the variation on the centipede game given in figure 14.5(b) the unique sequential equilibrium described is, in fact, the unique Nash equilibrium. (Hint: Take some presumed Nash equilibrium and suppose information set 2n+ 1 [for player 2] is the first unreached information set. Derive an immediate contradiction. Then suppose that node (2n) t is the first unreached information set and derive a contradiction that is one degree removed from immediate.)
3. Consider a two-player, sequential-move game where each player can choose to play right or left. Player 1 moves first. Player 2 observes player 1's actual move and then decides to move right or left. If player 1 moves right, player 1 receives £20 and player 2 receives £45. If both move left, player 1 receives £15 and player 2 receives £30. If player 1 moves left and player 2 moves right, player 1 receives £40 and player 2 receives £40. a. Draw the above situation in the form of an extensive form game. b. Find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the extensive form game.
2. Consider the following "centipede game." The game starts with player 1 choosing be- tween terminate (T) and continue (C). If player 1 chooses C, the game proceeds with player 2 choosing between terminate (t) and continue (c). The two players choose be- tween terminate and continue in turn if the other player chooses continue until the terminal nodes with (player l's payoff, player 2's payoff) are reached as shown below. TTTT Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2 (3, 3) t (1, 1) (0, 3) (2, 2) (1, 4) (a) List all possible strategies of each player. (b) Transform the game tree into a normal-form matrix representation. (c) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (d) Find the unique pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
c) Consider the centipede game which illustrates the situation where it is mutually beneficial for all players to stay in a relationship while a player would like to exit the relationship if they know that the other player will exit in the next day. Note that the fourth day is the choice for Player 2 to move and choose either o or B. Use the logic of backwards induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game in Figure 1. Figure 1: The Centipede Game (1 (64,16) (2,8) O (4,2) (16,4) (8,32)
3. Repeated Game Consider the game in which the stage game depicted below is infinitely repeated and in which both players discount future payoffs with discount factor 6 € [0, 1]. Player 1 E S Player 2 E 3,3 4, -1 S -1.4 1,1 (a) Suppose that both players play the tit-for-tat strategy. This strategy is characterized by exerting effort (playing E) in the first round. Then in future rounds, a player copies the action chosen by his opponent in the previous period (i.e if Player 2 shirks (plays S) in period 2, then Player 1 plays S in period 3). Then, for what values of d can tit-for-tat be supported on the equilibrium path of play? (b) Suppose that both players play the perfect tit-for-tat strategy. This strategy is characterized by exerting effort (playing E) in the first round. Then in future rounds, a player plays E unless the actions are disagreed in the previous period. Then, for what values of d can perfect tit-for-tat be supported on the equilibrium path of play?
1. Consider a game of chicken: two players approach a narrow bridge with room only for one, and each chooses either to go through and hope the other guy backs off (call this action H, for "hawk"), or backs off to let the other go through (call this action D, for "dove"). If both players are normal, then each gets a payoff of -1 from a collision (i.e. if both choose H), 1 if they choose H against D, 0 if they choose D (regardless of what the other player chooses). Now perturb the game as follows: there is a chance p > 0 that P2 is a “violent type", who gets 1 from playing H regardless of Pl's action, and -1 from playing D, again regardless of P1's action. (a) Illustrate the game tree corresponding to the Harsanyi transformation of this game (i.e. the dynamic game of imperfect information in which nature moves first). (b) Illustrate the extended game (i.e. the normal form game corresponding to your game tree in part (a)). (c) Find all values of p for which there is a BNE in which P1…