33. Consider the following situation. Armin and Jacques have a fetish for cannibalism. Jacques wants Armin to eat his fingers. So Armin, who is a surgeon, arranges for Jacques to be placed under anaesthesia, and safetly cuts off his fingers. Jacques and Armin then proceed to cook Jacques's fingers, fried in butter and spices, and to enjoy a delicious meal with Chianti. Which of the following statements is true? (A) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought. (B) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under Natural Law and Patristic thought, but morally acceptable under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (C) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under Natural Law, but morally wrong under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (D) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought.

33. Consider the following situation. Armin and Jacques have a fetish for cannibalism. Jacques wants Armin to eat his fingers. So Armin, who is a surgeon, arranges for Jacques to be placed under anaesthesia, and safetly cuts off his fingers. Jacques and Armin then proceed to cook Jacques's fingers, fried in butter and spices, and to enjoy a delicious meal with Chianti. Which of the following statements is true? (A) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought. (B) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under Natural Law and Patristic thought, but morally acceptable under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (C) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under Natural Law, but morally wrong under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (D) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

31 Joe Low Effort Sarah Low Effort High Effort 7 7 High Effort 15 5 13 6 10 9 The figure shown represents the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive. What payoff can we predict Joe will receive as the outcome of this game? Multiple Choice О О 5 7 О 13
M7
7
17. In the following bargaining game, a firm (F) and a syndicate (S) have to share the benefits generated by their economic activity. Assume that the benefits are equal to 2 million euros. The game has three stages. Offers are alternating between F, S and F. In each stage, the player who has not offered how to share the benefits has the choice of accepting or rejecting the proposal made by the other player. If she accepts the proposal, the game ends and if she rejects, in the next stage, she will become the proposer. If the players do not reach any agreement, after the third proposal, both of them get a zero payoff. a) What will be agreement reached in equilibrium and in which time period will the agreement be reach if the discount factor of both players is & = 1/4? b) What will be agreement reached in equilibrium and in which time period will the agreement be reach if F has a discount factor 8p = 1/4 and S has 8s = 1/2? c) Compare the two agreements and try to provide an intuitive…
Q11) Explain the pay off matrix below in the context of the prisoner's dilemma: Table 1.3: Erica and Fred's game. Fred Testify Remain silent Testify (-14,–14) (0, – 15) Erica Remain silent (-15, 0) (-1, –1)
Kyoko and Rina are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a weekend getaway. Since a public park is a public good, both Kyoko and Rina will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Kyoko and Rina choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Kyoko and Rina would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Kyoko chooses to spend $300 on a weekend getaway, Kyoko would get $300 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Rina wouldn't receive any benefit from Kyoko's choice. If Kyoko still spends $300 on a weekend getaway and Rina chooses to contribute…
7. Which of the following is not true of the “Battle of the Sexes" Game? a. The predicted outcome demonstrates how independent and rational play by players can quickly reach an agreement or a convergence of expectations concerning which strategy will be played by each player in equilibrium. b. The Battle of the Sexes Game can be used to depict a variety of situations where the players' interests do not precisely coincide, except for the fact that they both want to avoid the outcomes that would result from choosing different actions from one another. c. Players do not have a dominant strategy but playing “Boxing" say, is a best response to the other playing "Boxing" even if it doesn't give the player the payoff associated with his or her preferred alternative. d. Played only once, the outcome where each goes to their preferred venue cannot be Nash Equilibrium.
How about for when he does 8 customers?I'm having trouble figuring out how to do this due to the fact that I can't seem to understand when MR is truly greater than MC.VC and TFC are still the same.
4. A model of network externalities. Suppose that there are 50 potential consumers in the market for a new technology that exhibits network effects. There is a uniform distribution of consumers with individual valuations, v, ranging from S1, $2,.., S50. Consumer valuation from consuming the technology is given by vN, where N is the number of consumers adopting the technology. Consumers with purchase the product as long as their valuation is greater or equal to the price, so that the marginal consumer has a valuation such that p3vN. The number of consumers adopting the technology is given by the number of people with valuation greater than y, i.e. N = 50 - v. %3D a) Using the information above, derive the relationship between the price of the product and the number of consumers adopting the product, N. Characterize this relationship – does it reflect a typical market demand curve? b) If the price for the product is $600, find the three equilibrium number of adopters in the market. c)…
Juanita is deciding whether to buy a skirt that she wants, as well as where to buy it. Three stores carry the same skirt, but it is more convenient for Juanita to get to some stores than others. For example, she can go to her local store, located 15 minutes away from where she works, and pay a marked-up price of $102 for the skirt: Store Travel Time Each Way Price of a Skirt (Minutes) (Dollars per skirt) Local Department Store 15 102 Across Town 30 85 Neighboring City 60 76 Juanita makes $42 an hour at work. She has to take time off work to purchase her skirt, so each hour away from work costs her $42 in lost income. Assume that returning to work takes Juanita the same amount of time as getting to a store and that it takes her 30 minutes to shop. As you answer the following questions, ignore the cost of gasoline and depreciation of her car when traveling.
4. Sonia the Terrible lands her ship and crew of scurvy-pirate raiders onto a foreign beach. Up on the headland is a village, led by Jen the Brave. At this point, Sonia has a choice: she can SLASH her water barrels, eliminating her water supplies; or she can NOT SLASH, which keeps her water supplies completely intact. Having seen the action taken by Sonia, Jen can choose to CHARGE or to WAIT. The payoffs are as follows: if Sonia the Terrible chooses to SLASH and Jen CHARGES, the payoffs are (100, 20) to Sonia and Jen, respectively. If Sonia SLASHES and Jen WAITS, the payoffs are (10, 30). On the other hand, if Sonia chooses to NOT SLASH and Jen CHARGES, the payoff is (20, 15). If Sonia opts to NOT SLASH and Jen chooses to WAIT, the payoffs are (40, 10), respectively. What is the subgame perfect (or credible) equilibrium outcome? a. Sonia the Terrible chooses to SLASH; Jen the Brave chooses to CHARGE b. Sonia the Terrible chooses to NOT SLASH; Jen the Brave chooses to WAIT c. Sonia the…
The French autoroute network is composed of toll motorways with entrances marked as such. A motorist entering the network obtains a ticket from a toll booth and pays a toll when leaving the motorway. Given the number of vehicles traveling these routes, congestion at both entrances and exits is common. Suppose that four groups, each of 50 motorists, use an autoroute. The price each group is willing to pay, v, differs among groups and falls as the amount of congestion, c, increases in the following way: vij = vi max-cj; i, j = 0,..., 3, where vi max = 0.4 -0.1 * i euros per kilometer is the maximum group i is willing to pay to use the motorway and cj = 0.06 * j euros per kilometer is the loss in value as more groups use it. The marginal cost of using the autoroute, not including the marginal cost of congestion, is zero. a. If the toll charged for using the autoroute equals a motorist's marginal private cost-the price in a competitive market-how many vehicles per minute will use it? Which…