33. Consider the following situation. Armin and Jacques have a fetish for cannibalism. Jacques wants Armin to eat his fingers. So Armin, who is a surgeon, arranges for Jacques to be placed under anaesthesia, and safetly cuts off his fingers. Jacques and Armin then proceed to cook Jacques's fingers, fried in butter and spices, and to enjoy a delicious meal with Chianti. Which of the following statements is true? (A) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought. (B) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under Natural Law and Patristic thought, but morally acceptable under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (C) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under Natural Law, but morally wrong under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (D) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought.

33. Consider the following situation. Armin and Jacques have a fetish for cannibalism. Jacques wants Armin to eat his fingers. So Armin, who is a surgeon, arranges for Jacques to be placed under anaesthesia, and safetly cuts off his fingers. Jacques and Armin then proceed to cook Jacques's fingers, fried in butter and spices, and to enjoy a delicious meal with Chianti. Which of the following statements is true? (A) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought. (B) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under Natural Law and Patristic thought, but morally acceptable under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (C) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally acceptable under Natural Law, but morally wrong under Liberal Ethics and Patristic thought. (D) Armin and Jacques's actions are morally wrong under both Natural Law, Liberal Ethics, and Patristic thought.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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