3. Using the Cournot model, consider a market where demand for the good is given by the equation, P = 16 - Q. Assume that marginal cost is constant at 4. There are two, equal-sized firms whose outputs are 9₁ and 92, and there is no further entry. Total market output is q₁ + 92 = Q. Marginal revenue for each of the identical firms is given by MR₁ = 16-2q₁1 - 92 and MR₂ = 16-292 - 91. a. What is the best-response function for each firm? b. What is each firm's output? c. What is the market price? 91 = 92 = P=

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3. Using the Cournot model, consider a market where demand for the good is given by the equation, P = 16 - Q.
Assume that marginal cost is constant at 4. There are two, equal-sized firms whose outputs are 9₁ and 92, and there
is no further entry. Total market output is q₁ + q2 = Q. Marginal revenue for each of the identical firms is given by
MR₁
16-291-92 and MR₂ = 16-292-91.
a. What is the best-response function for each firm?
=
b. What is each firm's output?
c. What is the market price?
91 =
92 =
P =
d. Suppose Firm 1 asserts itself as the leader in this market, and acts as such. How will the output of the two firms
change?
91 =
92 =
e. Now, assume that there are no antitrust laws and the two firms can collude. What will be the market output?
What will the price be in the market?
Q=
P =
Transcribed Image Text:3. Using the Cournot model, consider a market where demand for the good is given by the equation, P = 16 - Q. Assume that marginal cost is constant at 4. There are two, equal-sized firms whose outputs are 9₁ and 92, and there is no further entry. Total market output is q₁ + q2 = Q. Marginal revenue for each of the identical firms is given by MR₁ 16-291-92 and MR₂ = 16-292-91. a. What is the best-response function for each firm? = b. What is each firm's output? c. What is the market price? 91 = 92 = P = d. Suppose Firm 1 asserts itself as the leader in this market, and acts as such. How will the output of the two firms change? 91 = 92 = e. Now, assume that there are no antitrust laws and the two firms can collude. What will be the market output? What will the price be in the market? Q= P =
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