3. There are three players in a public good game. Each player (i=1,2,3) has 100 dollars to contribute the amount of money ci, i=1,2,3, for a public good. Each player's payoff depend on the following: (i) The amount of her remaining wealth 100-ci, i=1,2,3, for spending in private good. (ii) The amount of public good is equal to the sum of contributions from all players. (iii) Each person cares about the amount of public good and her consumption of private goods. Based on the above assumption, each players ui-(100+ci)+(c1+c2+c3)(100-ci), i=1,2,3 (a) What is the amount of each player contribute to the public good for Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative simultaneous game? What is total payoffs for all players in the non-cooperative simultaneous game? What is the amount of each player contributes to the public for social optimum if there are no discrimination of all players? Hint: The social optimum is the maximum total payoff if all players cooperate together. You might think the total amount of contribution C=c1+c2+c3 and total payoff U=U1+U2+u3. What is the total payoff for all players in the cooperative simultaneous game? (b) (c) (d)

Advanced Engineering Mathematics
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Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes
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There are three players in a public good game. Each player (i=1,2,3) has 100
dollars to contribute the amount of money cı, i=1,2,3, for a public good. Each player's
payoff depend on the following:
(i) The amount of her remaining wealth 100-c, i=1,2,3, for spending in private good.
3.
(ii) The amount of public good is equal to the sum of contributions from all players.
(iii) Each person cares about the amount of public good and her consumption of private
goods.
Based on the above assumption, each players ui-(100+c)+(c1+c2+c3)(100-c), i=1,2,3
(a)
What is the amount of each player contribute to the public good for Nash
equilibrium for the non-cooperative simultaneous game?
.What is total payoffs for all players in the non-cooperative simultaneous game?
What is the amount of each player contributes to the public for social optimum if
(b)
(c)
there are no discrimination of all players?
Hint: The social optimum is the maximum total payoff if all players cooperate together.
You might think the total amount of contribution C=c1+c2+c3 and total payoff
U=u1+u2+u3.
(d)
What is the total payoff for all players in the cooperative simultaneous game?
Transcribed Image Text:There are three players in a public good game. Each player (i=1,2,3) has 100 dollars to contribute the amount of money cı, i=1,2,3, for a public good. Each player's payoff depend on the following: (i) The amount of her remaining wealth 100-c, i=1,2,3, for spending in private good. 3. (ii) The amount of public good is equal to the sum of contributions from all players. (iii) Each person cares about the amount of public good and her consumption of private goods. Based on the above assumption, each players ui-(100+c)+(c1+c2+c3)(100-c), i=1,2,3 (a) What is the amount of each player contribute to the public good for Nash equilibrium for the non-cooperative simultaneous game? .What is total payoffs for all players in the non-cooperative simultaneous game? What is the amount of each player contributes to the public for social optimum if (b) (c) there are no discrimination of all players? Hint: The social optimum is the maximum total payoff if all players cooperate together. You might think the total amount of contribution C=c1+c2+c3 and total payoff U=u1+u2+u3. (d) What is the total payoff for all players in the cooperative simultaneous game?
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