3. There are three identical firms in the market research industry. The demand is 1- Q, where Q = q1 + q2 + q3. The marginal cost is zero. a. Compute the Cournot equilibrium b. Show that if two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly), the profit of these firms decreases. Explain why and use a table to show the changes. C. Show the result on profits if all three firms were to merge

3. There are three identical firms in the market research industry. The demand is 1- Q, where Q = q1 + q2 + q3. The marginal cost is zero. a. Compute the Cournot equilibrium b. Show that if two of the three firms merge (transforming the industry into a duopoly), the profit of these firms decreases. Explain why and use a table to show the changes. C. Show the result on profits if all three firms were to merge

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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The diagram below shows the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost of a monopolist. 120 110- 100- 90- A 80- 70 60- 50- 40- 30- 20 10 O @_ 0 1 2 3 16 4 Profit-maximizing output: Profit-maximizing price: $ 5 7 units MR 6 MC T 7 8 a. What price and output would prevail if this firm's product was sold by price-taking firms in a perfectly competitive market? 9 Quantity D T 10 11 (11, 0) 14 15 b. Determine the profit-maximizing output and price for the monoplist. Price: $ 68 Output: 5 units c. Calculate the deadweight loss of this monopoly.
Consider the payoff matrix below representing two firms engaged in Bertrand Competition. Firm A is player 1 and Firm B is player 2. High price Low price High price 10, 12 -1, 13 Low price 12, 2 0, 3 What is Firm A's dominant strategy? Question 14Answer a. High price b. Low price c. Firm A does not have a dominant strategy
1.) Suppose you have a 10 identical firm Cournot Oligopoly. You don't have a demand equation but you do know that the market elasticity of demand is equal to -0.5 and MC = $4. What is market price? $4.00. none of the available options. $10.00 $5.00. 2.) Refer to the previous question. Suppose 2 firms leave the market. What is the new price? $5.33. $8.00. $4.00. none of the available options.
Provide a real -world example of a market that approximates each oligopoly setting, and explain your reasoninge) Cournot oligopoly modelf) Stackelberg oligopoly modelg) Bertrand oligopoly model
Consider the payoff matrix below representing two firms engaged in Bertrand Competition. Firm A is player 1 and Firm B is player 2. High price Low price High price 10, 12 -1, 13 Low price 12, 2 0, 3 What is Firm A's dominant strategy? Question 14Answer a. High price b. Low price c. Firm A does not have a dominant strategy
According to the kinked demand curve theory of oligopoly each firm thinks its demand curve at prices above the existing price is a. less elastic than at prices below the exisiting price since price increases will be matched. b. more elastic than at prices below the exisiting price since price increases will be matched. c. less elastic than at prices below the exisiting price since price increases will not be matched. d. more elastic than at prices below the exisiting price since price increases will not be matched.
Assume that the market for oil is made up of two firms: Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also assume that New England has dozens of breweries and each of these make beers with different tastes, colors, and aromas. Which of the following statements is true? The market structure for oil is an oligopoly, and the one for beer is monopolistic competition. The market structure for oil is monopolistic competition, and the one for beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is monopolistic competition.
1. Perloff Chapter 14, Exercise 3.13 3.13 A duopoly faces an inverse market demand function of p = 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 20. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is 40. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price in (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. (Hint: See Solved Problem 14.10.) M
1. which compete in quantities (Cournot -Nash equilibrium = C) 2. which compete in quantities with the first firm (the Leader) choosing the output first (Stackelberg competition = S). 3. which collude and choose quantities in order to maximize the joint profits (behave like two plants of a multiplant monopoly = M).
Explain the general meaning of the profit payoff matrix below for oligopolists X and Y. All profit figures are in thousands. a. Use the payoff matrix to explain the mutual interdependence that characterizes oligopolistic industries. b. Assuming no collusion between X and Y, what is the likely pricing outcome? c. In view of your answer to 3b, explain why price collusion is mutually profitable. Why might there be a temptation to cheat on the collusive agreement?
2. Consider the following game: Soapy Inc. and Suddies Inc. are the only producers of soap powder. They collude and agree to share the market equally. If neither firm cheats on the agreement, each makes $1 million profit. If either firm cheats, the cheat makes a profit of $1.5 million, while the complier incurs a loss of $0.5 million. If both cheat, they break even. Neither firm can monitor the other's actions. a) Construct the payoff matrix. b) What is the dominant strategy? c) What is the nash equilibrium for this game?
Suppose the figure to the right represents the market for a particular brand of shampoo, such as L'Oreal, Lancome, or Maybelline. Assume the market is monopolistically competitive and is in long-run equilibrium. How much excess capacity does the firm have? The monopolistically competitive firm's excess capacity is thousand bottles of shampoo. (Enter your response as an integer.) C Price and cost (per bottle) 2.00- Q 1.80- MC Q ATC 1.60- 1.40- 1.20- 1.00- 0.80- 0.60- 0.40- 0.20- 0.00+ 0 2 MR D 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Quantity (shampoo bottles in thousands)