1. Model the foregoing decision problem as a cooperative transferable utility game (N, v) that is the minimum of two inessential games and compute and describe the core of (N, v) and its vertices. 2. Describe and compute the nucleolus and the prenucleolus of (N, v). 3. Describe and compute the Shapley value of (N, v).

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Suppose that each wind turbine needs an area of one acre and produces electricity that can be sold for
one money unit. Our partial market has six agents 1,...,6. Agent i, i = 1, 2, 3, has i acres of land (i.e.,
Agent 1 has one, Agent 2 has two, and Agent 3 has three acres) and no turbine. Each of the remaining
agents 4, 5, 6 has two wind turbines, but no land. The payoff of a coalition is the number of turbines that
the members can run. For instance, if Agent 3 agrees with one turbine owner to produce energy, then
two wind turbines can run and the profit of two units is generated, but if the same agent convinces two
or three of the turbine owners to produce energy exclusively on her land, then the resulting profit would
be three units of money.
1. Model the foregoing decision problem as a cooperative transferable utility game (N, v) that is the
minimum of two inessential games and compute and describe the core of (N, v) and its vertices.
2. Describe and compute the nucleolus and the prenucleolus of (N, v).
3. Describe and compute the Shapley value of (N, v).
4. Assume now that each of the landowners has exactly one acre of land and nothing else is changed.
Describe the core, the nucleolus, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value in this case.
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose that each wind turbine needs an area of one acre and produces electricity that can be sold for one money unit. Our partial market has six agents 1,...,6. Agent i, i = 1, 2, 3, has i acres of land (i.e., Agent 1 has one, Agent 2 has two, and Agent 3 has three acres) and no turbine. Each of the remaining agents 4, 5, 6 has two wind turbines, but no land. The payoff of a coalition is the number of turbines that the members can run. For instance, if Agent 3 agrees with one turbine owner to produce energy, then two wind turbines can run and the profit of two units is generated, but if the same agent convinces two or three of the turbine owners to produce energy exclusively on her land, then the resulting profit would be three units of money. 1. Model the foregoing decision problem as a cooperative transferable utility game (N, v) that is the minimum of two inessential games and compute and describe the core of (N, v) and its vertices. 2. Describe and compute the nucleolus and the prenucleolus of (N, v). 3. Describe and compute the Shapley value of (N, v). 4. Assume now that each of the landowners has exactly one acre of land and nothing else is changed. Describe the core, the nucleolus, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value in this case.
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