2) Authentication Phase: - Device will make an authorization request (Authreq, DID) - Server will go to Database get relevant challenge (C_DID) know the relevant "golden" response, create Nonce (h) - Server Encrypt this challenge and Nonce and send to Device Device will decrypt this challenge with its private key. - Device will create response (R) and with Nonce send to server back. 3) Hamming Distance (HD) is the noise. We are comparing "golden" response + noise (+ HD) compare with Response (R) so let's "old proven" is okay, I can change this ratio later. Please can you help me with the questions below: Why protocol is secure ? How well this could work and so on? Mean discussion and comment on this protocol Thanks in advance 1) Enrollment Phase: - First Device will send its Device identification (DID) to Server - Server will send its Public key - PUF produce a "golden" response with challenge - Device (D) will send "golden" response with DID + Device Challenge (C_DID) encrypted with Device Public key - Server will take this (C_DID, s, DID) Pub_DID Decrypted with its private key and store it.

2) Authentication Phase: - Device will make an authorization request (Authreq, DID) - Server will go to Database get relevant challenge (C_DID) know the relevant "golden" response, create Nonce (h) - Server Encrypt this challenge and Nonce and send to Device Device will decrypt this challenge with its private key. - Device will create response (R) and with Nonce send to server back. 3) Hamming Distance (HD) is the noise. We are comparing "golden" response + noise (+ HD) compare with Response (R) so let's "old proven" is okay, I can change this ratio later. Please can you help me with the questions below: Why protocol is secure ? How well this could work and so on? Mean discussion and comment on this protocol Thanks in advance 1) Enrollment Phase: - First Device will send its Device identification (DID) to Server - Server will send its Public key - PUF produce a "golden" response with challenge - Device (D) will send "golden" response with DID + Device Challenge (C_DID) encrypted with Device Public key - Server will take this (C_DID, s, DID) Pub_DID Decrypted with its private key and store it.

Database System Concepts

7th Edition

ISBN:9780078022159

Author:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Publisher:Abraham Silberschatz Professor, Henry F. Korth, S. Sudarshan

Chapter1: Introduction

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1PE

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Similar questions

Here's how to secure your bike: Only things with a higher number may be locked again after being unlocked. Locks may be unlocked at any moment. All the locks are X-locks. Demonstrate how serializability is not ensured by the protocol.
Consider the case of Alice sending a message, m, to Bob. Both Alice and Bob use public key cryptography and each has a public and private key as described in the text. The figure attached below shows the operations that Alice must perform to provide confidentiality, authentication, and integrity when sending a message to Bob over the network. We can use either symmetric key or public key cryptography to encrypt a message. For our purposes, either technique will encrypt the message, and applying both doesn't make it "more secure". Also, we can assume that the session key would remain a secret so the fact that it is discarded does not make it "more secure". Why do we use a session key, Ks, instead of relying only on public key Cryptography? In other words, why do we use both public key and symmetric key cryptography?
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2. Recall the concept of Physically Unclonable Functions, which are an importantcomponent of hardware based security. Here is a simple scenario and simple protocol usingPUFs for authenticating a tag. In the protocol below, the Reader stores ALL possiblecombinations of Challenge-Response pairs for every tag it needs to authenticate. Duringauthentication, the Reader broadcasts the ID of the tag, and a greeting (Gn ). Every tag maysee this message, but only the one with the right ID will process the message. The right tagwith the ID in the message will then feed the greeting to its PUF and compute the responseSn. The response is then sent to the Reader. This should be clear from the Figure below. Forthe next round of authenticating the same Tag, the process repeats with a new Greeting(G n+1 ). Since the Reader has the responses, authentication is straightforward. Recall thatChallenges and Responses are typically 128 or 256 bit strings for RFIDs.From the protocol, and class, it should be…
Https is a protocol used to secure websites from being tampered with by other parties without proper authorization. it bridges the gap between sender and receiver.Using protocols like secure socket layer/TLS, HTTPS encrypts data sent over the internet, making it unreadable to anybody who shouldn't have it.This prevents a "man in the middle" assault on the system.Such assaults intercept messages before they reach their intended recipient.It then transmits the revised information to the user.It guarantees the server's authenticity, too.
See the procedure for securing below: After unlocking, only higher-numbered items can be sealed. Anytime may be used to unlock locks. Used exclusively are X-locks. Demonstrate how the protocol cannot guarantee serializability.
There are two main justifications for using layered protocols, and both are persuasive. To back up the assertions you make, you must provide an example.
Samantha uses DSA with public parameters (p, q, g) = (22531, 751, 4488). She chooses the secret signing key a = 674. (b) Samantha signs the document D = 244 using the random element k = 574. What is the signature?
If the shared key is "SECURITY" and the result of DES round 15 is "IT? 7b/," what is the ciphertext?
Consider the ElGamal signature scheme. Let Bob’s private key be Kpr= (d) = (67) and the corresponding public key Kpub = (p, α, β) = (97,23,15). Calculate the Elgamal signature (r, s) for the following messages: x=17 and kephemeral= 31 x=17 and kephemeral= 49 x=85 and kephemeral= 77
Recall the concept of Physically Unclonable Functions, which are an importantcomponent of hardware based security. Here is a simple scenario and simple protocol usingPUFs for authenticating a tag. In the protocol below, the Reader stores ALL possiblecombinations of Challenge-Response pairs for every tag it needs to authenticate. Duringauthentication, the Reader broadcasts the ID of the tag, and a greeting (Gn ). Every tag maysee this message, but only the one with the right ID will process the message. The right tagwith the ID in the message will then feed the greeting to its PUF and compute the responseSn. The response is then sent to the Reader. This should be clear from the Figure below. Forthe next round of authenticating the same Tag, the process repeats with a new Greeting(G n+1 ). Since the Reader has the responses, authentication is straightforward. Recall thatChallenges and Responses are typically 128 or 256 bit strings for RFIDs.From the protocol, and class, it should be…
Each of the following is a true/false statement about a tweakable block cipher (TBC). Place a checkmark next to each true statement. In the questions mentioning E', let E' be a random instance of a TBC and E'(T,X) be the result of using E' with tweak T and input X. Group of answer choices: (1)For TBC security both the current key and tweak in use must be kept secret from adversaries. (2)Each time a new tweak is given to a TBC, the TBC behaves like a new random permutation. (3)When a TBC is used once per tweak its outputs may be considered (4)A TBC is a prominent part of the design of OCB. (5)If X1 ≠ X2, then always E'(T,X1) ≠ E'(T,X2) (6)If T1 ≠ T2, then always E'(T1,X) ≠ E'(T2,X)