0 logging firms use a forest to collect timber. Each firm i must choose how many trees to cut, g, The benefit of cutting a ree is 1000-2G per tree, where G is the total quantity of trees cut in the forest. The marginal cost of cutting a tree is 10G. Firms do not face any fixed costs. In a Nash Equilibrium, O Each firm cuts 125 trees O Each firm cuts 125/10 trees O Each firm cuts 125/4 trees Each firm cuts 5 trees

0 logging firms use a forest to collect timber. Each firm i must choose how many trees to cut, g, The benefit of cutting a ree is 1000-2G per tree, where G is the total quantity of trees cut in the forest. The marginal cost of cutting a tree is 10G. Firms do not face any fixed costs. In a Nash Equilibrium, O Each firm cuts 125 trees O Each firm cuts 125/10 trees O Each firm cuts 125/4 trees Each firm cuts 5 trees

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. Consider a finitely repeated game with a unique Nash equilibrium in each stage game. What is the subgame-perfect outcome for such a game?
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