Writing Assignment 1
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William Rainey Harper College *
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PHI-101
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Philosophy
Date
Dec 6, 2023
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docx
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In this essay, I argue that Descartes’ argument for the truth rule is unsound, for if we accept its
premises, then the very concept of truth ceases to retain meaning. I will prove this claim by first
demonstrating that what constitutes a clear and distinct perception concerns our degree of
intellect. Second, that this premise and the truth rule both being true causes a logical
contradiction. I propose a simple thought experiment that shows how Descartes’ truth rule allows
for the possibility of two individuals of differing intellectual capacities to have vastly different
yet clear, distinct, and consequently “true” perceptions.
Descartes assumes the task of building back up all knowledge he formerly held in his 3
rd
Meditation. He starts with the only thing he deems certain, that he is a thinking thing, and
realizes that his certainty of this rests solely on a clear and distinct perception of what he is
asserting (Descartes, 1641). “Clear” and “distinct” are technical terms. A perception is clear if it
is present to the attentive mind, while it is distinct if, in addition to it being clear, it’s so sharply
separated from all other perceptions that nothing about it is unclear (Descartes, 1641, p. 9). In
arriving at certainty based on a perception’s clarity and distinctness alone, he lays down the
following general rule known as the truth rule: Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be
true is true (Descartes, 1641, p. 9).
The first premise of Descartes’ argument for the truth rule is
if I know I exist and I have a
clear and distinct perception of God, then I know God exists
(Khoury, 2021). He claims this is
true because if it were not, God would be a deceiver for creating him such that he is “deceived
even in those matters that seemed most obvious (Descartes, 1641, p. 10).” But that’s inconsistent
with the very idea of God, according to Descartes. For, he clearly and distinctly perceives the
idea of God as a supreme and perfect being, “infinite, unchangeable, omniscient, omnipotent and
the creator of everything that exists except for himself (Descartes, 1641, p. 12).” Thus, whatever
one clearly and distinctly perceives to be true,
must
be so.
So far, the gist of Descartes’ argument is as follows: p1) if I know I exist and I have a
clear and distinct perception of God, then I know God exists;
p2) God is necessarily not a
deceiver; hence, my clear and distinct perceptions are true
.
One might ask, why must God be a
deceiver if even our clear and distinct perceptions deceive us? Descartes responds by stating that
it’s owing to “a spontaneous impulse to believe [them] (Descartes, 1641, p. 11).” In other words,
he believes—and so he assumes
—
clear and distinct perceptions
compel
belief. It’s precisely this
implied premise that refutes his truth rule.
As a thought experiment, call to mind two individuals, Jim and Tim. Jim has spent his
entire life on a secluded island run by officials aiming to redefine the word “redness” as the
property of being blue. Imagine that all inhabitants of this island consequently believe redness is
the property of being blue (e.g., anything blue in color has redness to it). Tim recognizes the
standard definition of redness. Suppose we gave both individuals a standard red apple. Jim might
say something like, “Thanks for the bluish apple!” and Tim would look upon Jim as if he were
either blind, plain stupid, or being sarcastic. Jim would nevertheless possess the same clarity and
distinctness about his perception of the apple as Tim (i.e., Jim truly perceives a bluish apple), but
only the latter’s perception is true.
From our experiment, I gather several truths. First, that intellect admits of degrees. One
can understand more or less about perception. Tim understands more about the perception of the
apple than Jim. Second, that intellect is the faculty responsible for clear and distinct perceptions.
Tim and Jim can only and innately perceive what they understand (i.e., what their intellect
deduces from the stimuli). Third, if the faculty responsible for clear and distinct perceptions
admits of degrees, then what constitutes a clear and distinct perception concerns our degree of
intellect. The truth rule tells Jim he has every reason to call Tim looney and vice versa. Lastly, if
the third claim and the truth rule are both true, then the concept of truth ceases to retain its
meaning. It’s impossible for Jim and Tim’s perceptions to both be true if what it means for
something to be true is that it accords with actuality.
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Works Cited
Khoury, A. (2021).
Module 1 lecture part C
[Lecture]. Canvas @ASU. Retrieved
Module 1:
Learning Materials: PHI 329: History of Modern Philosophy (2021 Fall - B) (asu.edu)
Descartes, R. (1641).
Meditations on First Philosophy
: Meditations 1-3. (J. Bennett, Trans.)
Retrieved
EMT - René Descartes (earlymoderntexts.com)