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5. Backward induction-V.? Find the SPE of the extensive-form game in figure 13.11. Player 1's payoff is the top number, whereas player 2’s payoff is the bottom number. 6. Prisoner’s Dilemma.? Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in example 12.5 from chapter 12. (a) Suppose now that player 1 chooses whether to stay silent or confess first, then player 2 observes player 1’s choice and responds by staying silent or confessing. Find the SPE of this game. (b) Suppose now that player 2 chooses whether to stay silent or confess first, then player 1 observes player 2’s choice and responds by staying silent or confessing. Find the SPE of this game. Sequential and Repeated Games 349 Player 1 W X W X Y Y Z 1 7 3 8 6 5 - 8 2 5 2 1 3 7 Figure 13.11 Backward induction-V