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Uploaded by kelasimon
To: McKela L. Simon
From: Supervisory Attorney
Leigh Budwell
Date: Dec. 16, 2023
Re: Baumgardner v. Stuckey, 735 A.2d 1272 (Pa. Super. 1999)
Issue
(1) Whether the Court erred in unnecessarily interpreting otherwise self-explanatory and
sufficiently clear language in the covenants at issue?
(2) Whether the Court erred in its factual construction and interpretation of the terms of the
covenant?
(3) Whether the Court erred in finding that the storage of an admittedly commercial vehicle
did not violate the residential restriction terms of Paragraph One of the covenants?
Facts (separately identify the key facts)
Richard L. and Marcia H. Baumgardner (the Baumgardners) appeal from a final decree
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County denying their motion for post-trial
relief. We reverse and remand.
On June 17, 1988, Gordon D. Stuckey, a truck driver, purchased a home in the Sheffield
Manor property development located in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania. From 1989 to present,
Stuckey has intermittently parked his truck-tractor on his *1273 property within Sheffield
Manor, and since 1991, he has also parked one or more trailers at that residential site.
Moreover, the record reveals not only that Stuckey has used the site to store truck-tractors
and trailers, but also that he has performed repairs on truck-tractors at that same location.
The development in which Stuckey’s property is located is governed by a restrictive
covenant, recorded on December 2, 1983, which provides in pertinent part:
1. LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE: No lot shall be used except for residential
purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot
other than for residential purposes and private garages or carports
Rule of law
It is a general rule of contract interpretation that the intention of the parties at the time of the
contract is entered into governs: Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co., 406 Pa. 188, 176 A.2d 400
(1962). This same rule also holds true in the interpretation of restrictive covenants: Baederwood,
Inc. v. Moyer, 370 Pa. 35, 87 A.2d 246 (1952), and McCandless v. Burn, 377 Pa. 18, 104 A.2d
123
(1954). However, in Pennsylvania, there is an important difference in the rule of interpretation as
applied to restrictive covenants on the use of land. It is this. Land use restrictions are not favored
in the law, are strictly construed, and nothing will be deemed a violation of such a restriction that
is not in plain disregard of its express words: Jones v. Park Lane For Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268,
120 A.2d 535 (1956); Sandyford Pk. C. Assn. v. Lunnemann, 396 Pa. 537, 152 A.2d 898 (1959);
Siciliano v. Misler, 399 Pa. 406, 160 A.2d 422 (1960); and, Witt v. Steinwehr Dev. Corp., 400 Pa.
609, 162 A.2d 191 (1960).
Case law
1) Whether the Court erred in unnecessarily interpreting otherwise self-explanatory and
sufficiently clear language in the covenants at issue?
(2) Whether the Court erred in its factual construction and interpretation of the terms of the
covenant?
(3) Whether the Court erred in finding that the storage of an admittedly commercial vehicle
did not violate the residential restriction terms of Paragraph One of the covenants?
Gordon D. Stuckey, a truck driver, purchased a home in the Sheffield Manor property
development located in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania. From 1989 to present, Stuckey has
intermittently parked his truck-tractor on his
property within Sheffield Manor, and since 1991,
he has also parked one or more trailers at that residential site. Moreover, the record reveals not
only that Stuckey has used the site to store truck-tractors and trailers, but also that he has
performed repairs on truck-tractors at that same location
The development in which Stuckey's property is located is governed by a restrictive covenant,
recorded on December 2, 1983, which provides in pertinent part:
1. LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE: No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No
building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than for
residential purposes and private garages or carports
On July 1, 1997, the Baumgardners, acting in their capacity as members of the Architectural
Control Committee of Sheffield Manor Development, filed a complaint in equity against
Stuckey, alleging that he had violated the foregoing restrictive covenant by parking a tractor-
trailer on his own property. The Baumgardners requested injunctive relief and attorney's fees and
costs. A non-jury trial was held on this matter; the trial court issued an opinion and decree nisi,
holding that the foregoing restrictive covenant did not prohibit Stuckey from parking his tractor-
trailer on his property. A post-trial motion was filed and denied, and a final decree was entered
against the Baumgardners. This appeal followed.
Statutory Law:
1.
Preliminarily, we note that appellate review of an equity matter is limited to a
determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. Soderberg v. Weisel ,
687 A.2d 839
(Pa.Super. 1997); Marchetti v.
Karpowich ,
667 A.2d 724
(Pa.Super. 1995). The scope of review of a final decree in
equity is limited, and the decree will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the
evidence or demonstrably capricious. Soderberg , supra ;
Hostetter v. Hoover ,
547 A.2d
1247
(Pa.Super. 1988). However, "conclusions of law or fact, being derived from nothing
more than the chancellor's reasoning from the underlying facts and not involving a
determination of credibility of witnesses are reviewable." Spankle v. Burns ,
675 A.2d
1287
-88 (Pa.Super. 1996) (quoting Krosnar v. Schmidt Krosnar McNaughton Garrett
Co. ,
423 A.2d 370, 375
(Pa.Super. 1980)).
2.
In the case at the bar, Stuckey has been in the business of using a tractor-trailer to
transport goods over the past ten years; this activity is clearly commercial in nature.
During that same time he has intermittently stored a truck-tractor and/or trailers on his
residential property while the said equipment was not in use. We find that the storage of
such equipment must be deemed commercial in nature, as the tractor and trailers are an
integral part of Stuckey's commercial business and are "neither incidental to, nor
customary in, a residential area." Galliford , supra . Accordingly, we hold that Stuckey's
storing of his truck-tractor and/or trailers was a clear violation of the restrictive covenant
requiring Stuckey use his property for solely residential purposes.
Order reversed. We remand for the sole purpose of determining whether the Baumgardners
are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Baumgardner v. Stuckey, 735 A.2d 1272 (Pa. Supr. 1999)
Jones v. Park Lane For Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268,
120 A.2d 535 (1956)
Marchetti v. Karpowich ,
667 A.2d 724
Sandyford Pk. C. Assn. v. Lunnemann, 396 Pa. 537, 152 A.2d 898 (1959)
Soderberg v. Weisel ,
687 A.2d 839
(Pa.Super. 1997);
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