BThomas_CRJ552_MOD7 (Ring v. Arizona)
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CRJ 552
Criminal Advocacy & Judicial Procedure
Jury Instructions and Sentencing
TITLE AND CITATION
:
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 585 (2002)
TYPE OF ACTION
: Review by the U.S. Supreme Court of a lower court ruling the Defendant was
convicted before the Superior Court, Maricopa County, No. CR95-01754(A), Gregory H. Martin,
J., of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and he appealed.
FACTS OF THE CASE
:
On November 28, 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the Dillard's department store at
Arrowhead Mall in Glendale, Arizona. Tr. 57, 60–61 (Nov. 14, 1996). Courier Dave Moss left the
van to pick up money inside the store. Id., at 61, 73–74. When he returned, the van, and its driver,
John Magoch, were gone. Id., at 61–62.
Later that day, Maricopa County Sheriff's Deputies found the van—its doors **2433 locked and its
engine running—in the parking lot of a church in Sun City, Arizona. Id., at 99–100 (Nov. 13, 1996).
Inside the vehicle they found Magoch, dead from a single gunshot to the head. Id., at 101.
According to Wells Fargo records, more than $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were
missing from the van. Id., at 10 (Nov. 18, 1996).
Prompted by an informant's tip, Glendale police sought to determine whether Ring and his friend
James Greenham were involved in the robbery. The police investigation revealed that the two had
made several expensive cash purchases in December 1994 and early 1995. E.g., id., at 153–156
(Nov. 14, 1996); id., at 90–94 (Nov. 21, 1996). Wiretaps *590 were then placed on the telephones
of Ring, Greenham, and a third suspect, William Ferguson. Id., at 19–21 (Nov. 18, 1996).
In one recorded phone conversation, Ring told Ferguson that Ring might “cu[t] off” Greenham
because “[h]e's too much of a risk”: Greenham had indiscreetly flaunted a new truck in front of his
ex-wife. State's Exh. 49A, pp. 11–12. Ring said he could cut off his associate because he held
“both [Greenham's] and mine.” Id., at 11. The police engineered a local news broadcast about the
robbery investigation; they included in the account several intentional inaccuracies. Tr. 3–5, 13–
14 (Nov. 19, 1996). On hearing the broadcast report, Ring left a message on Greenham's
answering machine to “remind me to talk to you tomorrow and tell you about what was on the
news tonight. Very important, and also fairly good.” State's Exh. 55A, p. 2.
After a detective left a note on Greenham's door asking him to call, Tr. 115–118 (Nov. 18, 1996),
Ring told Ferguson that he was puzzled by the attention the police trained on Greenham. “[H]is
house is clean,” Ring said; “[m]ine, on the other hand, contains a very large bag.” State's Exh.
70A, p. 7.
On February 14, 1995, police furnished a staged reenactment of the robbery to the local news,
and again included deliberate inaccuracies. Tr. 5 (Nov. 19, 1996). Ferguson told Ring that he
“laughed” when he saw the broadcast, and Ring called it “humorous.” State's Exh. 80A, p. 3.
Ferguson said he was “not real worried at all now”; Ring, however, said he was “slightly
concern[ed]” about the possibility that the police might eventually ask for hair samples. Id., at 3–4.
Two days later, the police executed a search warrant at Ring's house, discovering a duffel bag in
his garage containing more than $271,000 in cash. Tr. 107–108, 111, 125 (Nov. 20, 1996). They
also found a note with the number “575,995” on it, followed by the word “splits” and the letters “F,”
“Y,” and “T.” Id., at 127–130. The prosecution asserted that *591 “F” was Ferguson, “Y” was
“Yoda” (Greenham's nickname), and “T” was Timothy Ring. Id., at 42 (Dec. 5, 1996).
Testifying in his own defense, Ring said the money seized at his house was startup capital for a
construction company he and Greenham were planning to form. Id., at 10–11 (Dec. 3, 1996).
Ring testified that he made his share of the money as a confidential informant for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and as a bail bondsman and gunsmith. Id., at 162, 166–167, 180 (Dec. 2,
1996). But an FBI agent testified that Ring had been paid only $458, id., at 47 (Nov. 20, 1996),
and other evidence showed that Ring had made no more than $8,800 as a bail bondsman, id., at
48–51 (Nov. 21, 1996); id., at 21 (Nov. 25, 1996).
The trial judge instructed the jury on alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony
murder. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, with 6 of 12 jurors voting to acquit, but
convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann.
§ 13–1105(A) and (B) (West 2001) (“A person commits first degree murder if ... [a]cting either
alone or with one or more other persons the person **2434 commits or attempts to commit ...
[one of several enumerated felonies] ... and in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or
immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes the death of any
person. ... Homicide, as prescribed in [this provision] requires no specific mental state other than
what is required for the commission of any of the enumerated felonies.”).
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of a fact raising the defendant's maximum
penalty. See
Jones
v.
United States,
526 U. S. 227
;
Apprendi
v.
New Jersey, 530
U. S. 466.
The State responded that this Court had upheld Arizona's system in
Walton
v.
Arizona,
497 U. S.
639
, 649, and had stated in
Apprendi
that
Walton
remained good law.
ISSUE:
Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty?
DECISION:
Yes. The Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury.
REASONING:
The Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment
requires that they be found by a jury.
RULE OF LAW:
Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone,"
the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.
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