Convoy STEX Order Aug 2022

UNCLASSIFIED Copy no. ___ of ___ copies THE BASIC SCHOOL QUANTICO, VIRGINIA CONVOY STEX General Situation . The student will be acting as the Motor Transport Officer (MTO) for Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/7 while deployed with the 13th MEU. The government of Centralia requested US assistance in their efforts to deny the Centralian Revolutionary Force (CRF) the ability to conduct offensive operations in the region surrounding the capital city of Barrett. While the MEU has been operating ashore in Centralia for the last three months, your Motor Transport Section has been running resupply convoys to Combat Outposts (COPs) around the city to support your battalion. Due to the high operational tempo, you split your section into two task-organized units; you command A Convoy and your Plt Sgt commands B Convoy. Your convoy (A Convoy) is composed of 30x personnel (including attachments), 3x UAH Gun Trucks, 1x 6x6 MRAP, and 3x long-bed MTVRs. All vehicles are mounted with a turret and you have 2x M2 .50 cals, 4x M240Gs, and 1x MK-19 for use on the convoy. Two of your UAHs are also equipped with VRC-110s that are 50w capable. You will only have (5) PRC-152s for all of your other vehicles. Orientation . North is depicted. We are currently located at the Battalion’s Forward Operating Base (FOB) at the intersection of Route Red and Route Brown. Although the 13th MEU is the first friendly unit to operate in and around the city of Barrett, there is a U.S. Army camp (Camp Victory) located 30 km to our south. Camp Virginia is located roughly 60km east of our Bn FOB near the coastline, which is where Combat Logistics Battalion 13 (the 13 th MEU’s LCE) is staged to provide bulk combat service support. The outlying area around the city of Barrett is mostly farmland tended by the locals. Due to numerous irrigation canals, wheeled movement off of the routes any more than about 10m will severely restrict movement. The city of Barrett itself is a dense urban sprawl, characterized by urban canyons and shanty towns along Route Green. Visibility along the routes in the open desert varies from 1-2km; however, it is drastically reduced to about 100m when traveling through the built-up urban areas. There are several routes that have been used to travel through our Bn’s AO which encompasses the city and its surrounding areas. All routes are open to both military and civilian traffic. Civilian traffic is heaviest from 0600- 0900 and 1600-1900. Route Red is an improved surface road in relatively good condition that passes through open desert terrain. Traffic along Route Red is limited to 50kph. Route Green is another improved surface road that runs directly through the heart of the city and is also limited to 50kph. The distance from the FOB to COP 1 via Routes Red and Green is approximately 30km. The portion of Route Green along the Barrett Market is in poor shape and pockmarked with numerous large potholes from recent CRF IED activity. The area surrounding the market is an insurgent stronghold that has been largely ungovernable by local forces. As a result of the MEU’s recent assault, the CRF increased the frequency and lethality of their attacks throughout the AO with particular emphasis on this area. Additionally, sporadic sniper and other small arms fire is routinely reported IVO the slums just east of CP 15. Route Black is an unimproved surface that runs north from CP 4, parallels Barrett River for about 20 Km, then runs back south and connects with Route Green IVO CP 11. The distance from the FOB to COP 1 using Route Black is about 50km. Due to runoff from the river, Route Black has deep potholes and thick mud in many places. Because of its 1 UNCLASSIFIED Administrative Instructions Students must come to the Convoy STEX prepared with the following: 2. A detailed operations order. 3. A prepared map over-lay detailing primary and alternate routes. 4. A prepared manifest detailing number of PAX to vehicles and placement of CSWs and comm. assets. Students should be able to use this STEX to refine their understanding of combat orders specific to motorized convoy operations. The orders developed will not be the same as the orders used in the actual FEX.

UNCLASSIFIED poor condition, convoys only average about 10-15kph along the majority of the route. However, no significant enemy activity has been reported along this route for the past month. Route Gold runs along the southern boundary of your AO and is another unimproved surface. It directly bisects several large hill formations in the southeastern corner of the AO and visibility along this portion of the route is limited to less than 200m. The distance from the FOB to COP 1 using Route Gold is about 40km. Due to the route’s conditions, convoys can travel no faster than 30kph. The CRF have used the Barrett hills IVO CP 11 and CP 16 as IED ambush positions in the past, though not as frequently as the area IVO the market. These have primarily been pressure plate IEDs and the enemy is assumed to be emplacing them under the cover of darkness. Route Brown is an improved surface road that runs east out of the FOB and ends midway along Route Green just west of CP 15. Traffic along Route Brown is limited to 50kph. The distance from the FOB to COP 1 taking Route Brown to Route Green is approximately 25km. The Barrett River is not fordable; however, five bridges cross over it and are available for coalition use. The bridges at CP 4, CP 5, and CP 12 are all pre-existing structures and each has a weight limit of 30 tons (60,000lbs) for two-axle vehicles and 40 tons (80,000 lbs) for three-axle vehicles. The bridge at CP 10 has a weight limit of 15 tons (30,000 lbs) for two-axle vehicles and 20 tons (40,000 lbs) for three-axle vehicles. Lastly, the bridge at CP 8 is a pontoon bridge erected by combat engineers. It was damaged a few weeks ago but has since been repaired (see After Action Report (AAR)). Although this bridge supports all wheeled vehicles, vehicles can only pass over it one at a time. There have been sporadic rain showers over the last 48 hours. The weather is currently cloudy with a 70% chance of rain. The temperature will be will be in the low 50’s for the next week. Astro data for tomorrow is as follows: sunrise at 0634, sunset at 1807, moon will set at 1909 and will not rise until 0700 the next day. Overnight illumination will be 5% tomorrow evening. A considerable number of civilians live in the City of Barrett; however, become more dispersed as you move along the MSRs leaving the city of Barrett. Civilians in the area are generally friendly to U.S. forces operating in the area; however, it is becoming more common for CRF forces to be seen operating in civilian attire in an attempt to blend in with the local populace. Key infrastructure in the AO include religious centers, schools, hospitals, and community centers, and should not be targeted for any reason. 1. (U) Situation a. (U) Enemy (1) (U) Composition/Disposition/Strength. The CRF have been operating in fire team (+) to squad (-) size units within our AO. They possess a mix of AKs, RPKs, RPGs, 82mm mortars, and IEDs. Over the last couple of weeks additional enemy personnel disguised as civilians are thought to have entered our AO. See attached AARs for latest enemy activity. (2) (U) Capabilities and Limitations. The EN CRF is capable of defending IVO Downtown Barret utilizing choke points and canalization within the urban environment. They are limited by their lack of communication capability to effectively employ IDF within the city. They are capable of being reinforced up to a squad (+) size force from the city of Barret but are limited by the distance their reinforcements need to traverse, which will cause reinforcements to take approximately 1 hour. The EN is capable of attacking using complex ambushes with IEDs, small arms, and limited IDF but are limited by their inability to mass above the fire team level. They are capable of withdrawing by blending in with the local populace and using the footpaths to within the hills to the southeast of Barrett. They are limited by the slow rate of movement through the foothills due to the steep and narrow nature of the foot trails. The EN is capable of delaying our movement along MSRs through blocked ambushes and IEDs but are limited by unreliable communication assets. (3) (U) Enemy Most Likely Course of Action. I believe the EN’s mission is to disrupt our resupply operations IOT degrade our combat power and force us to dedicate more resources to securing MSRs. Currently the EN is hiding amongst the civilian population and emplacing IEDs along MSRs under the cover of darkness. On contact, the EN will attempt to delay our convoys by utilizing a blocked ambush or complex ambush triggered by an IED. Upon realizing they are overwhelmed with our firepower they will withdraw back to the interior of Barrett or deep into the hills. b. (U) Friendly 2 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED (b) (U) Purpose . IOT allow friendly forces to move unimpeded through our AO. (c) (U) Method . There are two targets planned to accomplish this EFST. 1 . (U) Priority: K Battery: Convoy A, Convoy B, E Co., F Co., G Co. 81s: Convoy A, Convoy B, F Co., E Co., G Co. 2 . (U) Allocation: Convoy commanders are allocated two preplanned targets. 3 . (U) Restrictions: No dud-producing munitions along MSRs. (d). (U) Effect . EN is suppressed and unable to delay convoy operations. c. (U) Tasks (1) (U) A Convoy . You are the ME. NET 0800, protect needed resupplies during tactical convoy operations to COP 1 IOT provide CSS to E Co. After delivering needed supplies, interdict the enemy along your return route IOT create a safer route for follow-on forces. Return NLT 1200. You will have 1x Corpsman and 1x radio operator attached to your convoy effective immediately. (2) (U) Convoy B . You are the SE1. Upon Convoy A’s return, protect needed resupplies during tactical convoy operations to COP 2 IOT provide CSS to F Co. After delivering needed supplies, interdict the enemy along your return route IOT create a safer route for follow-on forces. Return NLT 1600. You will have 1x Corpsman and 1x radio operator attached to your convoy, effective immediately. (3) (U) EOD Team . You are the SE2. NLT 0800, BPT neutralize any IEDs along the routes IOT enable the convoys to accomplish their mission. (4) (U) Recovery Team . You are SE3. NLT 0800, BPT exfiltrate friendly equipment along the routes IOT enable the convoys to accomplish their mission. d. (U) Coordinating Instructions (1) (U) Timeline 0700 Order complete. Manifests/Overlay submitted. COC coordination complete. 0800 Convoy A Departs 1200 Convoy A Returns 1200 Convoy B Departs 1600 Convoy B Returns (2) (U) Priority of Rehearsals . Convoy Commanders will develop. (3) (U) Lost Vehicle/Marine Plan . Convoy Commanders develop and brief a lost Vehicle/Marine Plan for your convoys. (4) (U) No Comm Plan . Convoy Commanders, because you are operating independently you will conduct a radio check with the CP prior to departing the FOB and develop your own lost-communications plan IAW with your SOM. (5) (U) MOPP Level . MOPP Level Ready. (6) (U) Air Defense Warning Condition . White. The enemy has limited UAS capability that they may attempt to use to call for fire or for recon. 4 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED (7) (U) Rules of Engagement (ROEs) . A considerable number of civilians live in the City of Barrett; however, become more dispersed as you move along the MSRs leaving the city of Barrett. Individuals carrying a weapon are NOT declared hostile. Engage only Hostile Forces and Combatants. A Hostile Force is any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorists, with or without national designation, that has committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or has been declared hostile by appropriate U.S. authority. Hostile forces may also be called Enemy Combatants. Hostile Act (HA): an attack or other use of force against U.S. forces. Some examples of possible hostile intent are an individual burying a suspicious cylinder along a road (likely improvised explosive device), an unknown armed group massing in your area of operation, or an unknown vehicle speeding to catch up with your convoy. Positive Identification (PID)* is required to engage. *Positive Identification (PID): A reasonable certainty that your target is a legitimate military target. *PID does not require 100% certainty. You must have clear line of sight to target and know what is behind it. 4. (U) Administration and Logistics a. (U) Administration (1) (U) Enemy Prisoners of War . All EPW’s will be treated IAW STRESS. Ensure EPWs are segregated by rank, separating the officers from enlisted. Convoy Commanders ensure EPWs are turned over to the Military Police Detachment upon return to the FOB (2) (U) CASEVAC . All convoys will depart the FOB with a corpsman. Routine casualties will be transported with the convoy back to the FOB for treatment. Priority and Urgent casualties will be immediately CASEVAC’d by ground back to the FOB for follow-on transportation to higher echelon of care as needed. Air support for MEDEVAC/CASEVAC is currently unavailable. Convoy Commanders: develop and back-brief an effective Casualty Evacuation Plan. b. (U) Logistics (1) (U) Ammunition . All Marines will have a standard fighting load before stepping off from the FOB: (8) magazines 5.56mm for all M16 service rifles and (2) Drums 5.56 per M249. In addition, all M203 grenade launchers will have (3) HEDP and (3) Illum 40mm rounds. Convoy Commanders ensure you’re vehicle mounted weapons draw necessary ammunition. (2) (U) Chow and Water . All Marines will step off from the FOB with (2) DOS chow. All Marines will step off from the FOB with (2) full canteens and (1) full camelback. (3) (U) Communications . Two vehicles within each convoy will have VRC-110s, the other vehicles will have 1x PRC-152 each. (4) (U) Casualty Transport . Each vehicle will have (1) pole-less litter. (5) (U) EPW Detention . Each vehicle will carry (8) flex cuffs. (6) (U) Pyro . All squads must draw (2) RSC, (2) GSP, (2) YSMK, (2) GSMK, (2) VSMK, and (2) WSC). (7) (U) Resupply . The pallets of resupplies for both E Co and F Co are currently staged in the FOB at the motor pool. A forklift is available to load them onto your MTVRs, but will not depart with you unless requested. The resupplies for each company will completely fill the beds of 2x of your MTVRs. 5. (U) Command and Signal a. (U) Signal (1) (U) Signal Plan (a) (U) Convoy Commanders . Develop and brief a signal plan for your convoys. 5 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED After Action Report 617th Military Police Company Raven 24 4 Janurary, Camp Victory to COP Bastion 1. Trip Data a. Depart time 0500 b. Return time 1315 c. Total dispatch hours 8 hr 15 min 2. Distance a. Depart mileage 7265 b. Return mileage 7385 3. Cargo/Passenger a. Cargo (1) 4 pallets sandbags (2) 4 pallets MREs (3) 4 pallets repair parts b. Passengers 12 4. Order of March a. MRAP, 3 personnel b. MRAP, 3 personnel c. HMMWV, 5 personnel d. HMMWV, 3 personnel e. MTVR, 3 personnel and cargo f. MTVR, 3 personnel, 12 passengers g. HMMWV, 4 personnel h. HMMWV, 3 personnel 5. Remarks a. Mission: Conduct resupply convoy from Camp Victory (south of Bn FOB) to COP Bastion (east of COP 1) IOT provide CSS and personnel to forward units. b. Route: North along Route Red, cross the bridge IVO CP 4 and travel east along Route Green. c. Convoy departed Camp Victory with all gear and personnel at 0500 and travelled to COP Bastion without incident. A small barrier plan east of the bridge at CP 4 slowed us down a bit but all vehicles were able to maneuver through without problems. There was a significant amount of civilian traffic but we were able to maintain a fairly consistent speed of 40kph. We conducted actions on the objective and offloaded all cargo and personnel in 45 minutes. On the return trip we took the same route back. The convoy hit an IED at 0900 as we were passing through the market. Our fourth vehicle was hit resulting in a mobility kill. Approximately 10 seconds after the IED strike, small arms fire opened up on the lead vehicles in the convoy from the south side of the road. The crew served weapons on the second and third vehicles returned fire. Once our gunners were able to effectively suppress the multiple ambush positions, the enemy ceased fire and withdrew south, quickly disappearing. We believe they were operating as a Sqd (-). We were not able to pursue. The gunner in the hit HMMWV had minor abrasions from shrapnel. The driver and vehicle commander did not lose consciousness. We called the Marines at COP 2 and requested support to control our cordon of the IED blast site. They sent a three vehicle patrol that linked up with the convoy commander and then sent out foot patrols north and south of the market to attempt to gain information. We called Godfather at the BLT FOB and they dispatched an EOD team to conduct a post-blast analysis on the IED as well as a recovery team to evacuate our down HMMWV. They arrived at approximately 1100 and EOD determined that the IED was command detonated. They believe the triggerman was in a building south of Route Green. At 1200 the recovery team finished rigging our vehicle for tow and we continued with the mission back to Camp Victory without further incident. 7 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED After Action Report CLB-13 Irish 2 Janurary, Camp Virginia to Bn FOB 1. Trip Data a. Depart time 0100 b. Arrival time 0830 c. Total dispatch hours 7 hr 30 min 2. Distance a. Depart mileage 2357 b. Arrival mileage 2549 3. Cargo/Passenger a. Cargo (1) 50x civilian tractor trailers (TTs) with drivers 4. Order of March a. MRAP, 3 personnel b. MRAP, 4 personnel c. HMMWV, 5 personnel d. MTVR, 3 personnel e. 25x civilian TTs f. HMMWV, 3 personnel g. HMMWV, 3 personnel h. 25x civilian TTs i. HMMWV, 5 personnel j. MTVR Wrecker, 2 personnel k. HMMWV, 3 personnel l. HMMWV, 3 personnel 5. Remarks a. Mission: Conduct resupply convoy from Camp Virginia (east of COP 1) to BLT FOB IOT provide bulk logistics supplies to support FOB operations. b. Route: West along Route Green, cross over the bridge at CP 4, south along Route Red to FOB. c. Convoy departed Camp Virginia at 0100 after manifesting 50x civilian tractor trailers and 50x drivers. Travelling west along Route Green we maintained a rate of march of about 50kph. Upon entering the built up areas around Barrett, we slowed our rate of march to 40kph. At the western edge of the city, a barrier plan had been set up that we had not encountered before. The military vehicles did not have trouble negotiating the barrier plan but the civilian tractor trailers were not able to make it through. The convoy backed up and turned around on Route Green at one of the openings in the median. We proceeded back east along Route Green to CP 11 and turned south onto Route Gold. The convoy travelled along the road without incident and crossed the bridge at CP 8 one vehicle at a time. Actions at the bridge took over an hour. We arrived at the FOB at 0830. Tractor trailers were unloaded and vehicles were refueled prior to departure for Camp Virginia. 8 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED COC Coordination -Ensure you read the AAR from the Army convoy that was hit yesterday. The CRF continue to conduct complex ambushes consisting of IEDs and small arms fire. -C Co at COP 3 has had patrols out north and west along Route Brown and has had no enemy contact in the last three days. They will be conducting an operation in the hamlet east of their COP from 0700 until 1100 on March 6th. QRF support from C Co will be limited during that time. -B Co at COP 2 will be conducting dismounted patrols east and west along Route Green from 0500-0800 on the morning of March 6th. QRF support from COP 2 will also be limited at that time. -A Co elements at COP 1 have been conducting mounted patrols of the Barrett Hills area IVO CP 16 and to the Eastern edge of the city IVO CP 15. Aside from a few small arms attacks around CP 15, enemy contact has been limited over the last few days. Their current vehicle readiness is at 65% which has significantly degraded their ability to conduct mounted patrols. -EOD, QRF, and recovery support will be coordinated through Godfather at the BLT FOB. Coordination with receiving unit at COP 1 Upon receiving your order, you reached out to the A Co XO at COP 1 to ask some questions. You verified that only two MTVRs will be able to fit into the COP at one time and that the rest of your vehicles will need to post security around the perimeter. The COP has two sentries, one at the western sector and one at the eastern sector. There are no refueling assets available at the COP. The XO told you that the most important items your convoy was delivering were the repair parts that are needed to get two of his vehicles back into the fight. He let you know that they would be doing an operation tomorrow afternoon that would require both of those vehicles to be fully operational and to make sure the parts arrived as early as possible. The XO requested that you call their COC when you are approximately 10km away from COP 1 to coordinate linkup. 10 UNCLASSIFIED