GeorgeMason-LoRe-Neg-1---Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Debates-Round-1

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than 140 metres since US Congress directed NASA to really start properly looking for them in 2005 . We're up to 18,000 on just 3,500 since then: NASA estimates there are over 10 million NEOs larger than the Chelyabinsk asteroid , and 300,000 objects larger than 40 metres , " that could pose an impact hazard and would be very challenging to detect more than a few days in advance ". The big ones — larger than one kilometre across — are those that have the potential to severely disrupt life on Earth as we know it. The dinosaurs found out the hard way 65 million years ago when a 10-kilometre asteroid hit the Yucatan peninsula . But NASA says it's found and catalogued almost all of those, and none are on a collision course with Earth. NASA's NEOWISE survey, for example, has been tracking, and improved its ability to track, asteroids for four years now: That's where the other half of the report is focused — on improving tracking methods, data processing and processes for identifying hazardous asteroids and the best way to deal with them. Because while we are close to 100% certain that no extinction-level asteroids we've spotted are on a collision course with Earth, we're not 100% sure we've spotted all the extinction-level asteroids . As the NEO report admits , there is some chance that " large comets from the outer solar system could appear and impact the Earth with warning times as short as a few months ". Extinction. Ian Johnston 17 , "Asteroid that killed the dinosaurs created endless night and 18-month winter as it rained fire", Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/asteroid-kill-dinosaurs-fifth- mass-extinction-endless-night-winter-18-month-rain-fire-ice-age-a7904491.html It is a vision of hell on Earth . The sun disappeared behind a cloud of smoke that encircled the planet , turning day into night and causing temperatures to plummet as fire rained down from above . And if that wasn’t bad enough , the massive asteroid that struck the planet 66 million years ago – wiping out the dinosaurs and many other species in the fifth mass extinction of all life – set off earthquakes , giant tsunamis and volcanoes . Even after the dust cleared nearly two years later , chemical reactions in the upper atmosphere would have wrecked the protective layer of ozone so that the sun’s rays would have irradiate d anything left alive by the strong ultraviolet light.

OFF Underground Basing CP The United States should adopt a strategy of deep underground missile basing for 370 of its 400 ICBMs, leaving each ICBM with a respective boring machine for exit launch and a seismic monitor that sends signals to Russia and keep the remaining 30 ICBMs within their current hardened silos; The CP buries the sponge, making it invulnerable . That solves the aff ( prevents accidents , ICBM vulnerability , and strategic stability ) but maintains deterrence against both Russia and North Korea . Oelrich 21 [Ivan Oelrich was Vice President of the Federation of American Scientists, analyzed military manufacturing for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and is a non-resident scholar of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and non-resident fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, “Deep thoughts: How moving ICBMs far underground will make the whole world safer”, April 28, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/deep-thoughts-how-moving-icbms-far- underground-will-make-the-whole-world-safer/] IanM Deep underground basing. An other option considered for ICBMs at the time of the MX deployment was to dig tunnels deep underground , probably by boring more or less horizontally into the side of a mountain or mesa . Then , even if the Soviets (or, today, Russians ) knew where the missiles were buried , they could not destroy the missiles under a kilometer of rock even with powerful nuclear bombs . Entry and exit points would be detected during construction or later with overhead satellites and those could be bombed and destroyed. Thus , a necessary part of the scheme was to bury the missile s along with their boring machines . After a nuclear attack , the boring machines could be aimed toward any of a range of exit points and start drilling away. The Russians would not know where to attack , because even the crews inside the mountain would not have decided on an exit point before they started digging out. If one loved acronyms but hated the idea, then the proposal was called Deep Underground Missile Basing. The United States has built many different types of submarines, and, while they are fabulously expensive, the country does have experience with their design, construction, and operation. The United States has never used underground missile basing, so the technical challenges have never been worked out in detail. But it is probably true that digging a hole into rock , even a deep one, is technically easier and cheaper than building a nuclear submarine . Maintaining and operating a tunnel in rock is definitely cheaper than maintaining and operating a nuclear submarine. Potential technical challenges were not , however, the primary constraint that doomed consideration of underground basing. The key, insurmountable shortcoming to the basing scheme was that the missiles could not be launched rapidly but only after days of digging . The Air Force would have rejected the idea on that criterion alone, whatever other technical merits or drawbacks, because the United States has always maintained a war-fighting strategy that allows at least the possibility of a first strike against the Soviet Union/Russia to reduce damage from a possible attack from them, and that requires ready-to-fire missiles. Yet today , with hopes of much-reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, the inability to launch quickly may be the principal asset of underground basing . When making decisions about future nuclear weapons, a useful design criterion would be to build weapons such that it is physically impossible to do anything stupid quickly ,

Deeper reductions in US and Russian nuclear forces will happen because both face budget crunches . Russia ’s is compounded by the low price of oil , international sanctions , and a contracting economy . If deeper cuts eventually happen by unilateral , reciprocal steps, it will be because relations between Washington and Moscow remain in the dumps for a long time. It would be far better , however, if deeper cuts happen bilaterally under New START. Why? Because nuclear risk-reduction succeeds most when pursued in parallel with treaty obligations . A strong foundation allows for more ambitious construction projects. It’s worth waiting a bit for this better outcome. How long a wait? Moscow and Washington aren’t obliged to begin negotiations on deeper cuts until, perhaps, the year before New START obligations are set to expire in February 2021 – in other words, toward the end of the next administration. Negotiations could be resumed earlier, depending on Moscow’s budget squeeze and the state of play in U.S.-Russian relations. New START and its monitoring provisions could be extended into 2026 to accommodate prolonged negotiations or deeper cuts. The Senate agreed in advance to this possibility when it provided advice and consent to ratify New START. A second tranche — and maybe even a third — of bilateral reductions under New START can compensate for the Treaty’s initial, modest cuts. Maintaining the New START framework and its monitoring provisions for as long as possible could also help lay the foundation for multilateral negotiations over numerical limitations for the Big Boys and leveling-off for the arsenals of mid-sized nuclear weapon states. This transition to multilateral nuclear arms control, which Moscow and defense hawks in the United States have called for, will be hard to pull off under the best of circumstances. It will be harder in the absence of formal restraints on US and Russian force levels. Acknowledging the virtues of a short waiting game for the next tranche of strategic force reductions is one thing; paying the bills to recapitalize excess force structure is another. US funding streams for a new bomber , a new ICBM ( or an upgrade to the Minuteman), and a lesser-than-full replacement for the Trident boat s are sufficient to hold Mr. Putin’s attention – when he is not otherwise focused on US conventional long-range strike capabilities and missile defense upgrades. The next administration’s challenge will be to incentivize the Kremlin to accept deeper cuts without mortgaging the Pentagon’s budget on weapon systems that haven’t been used in combat since 1945 — and ought never to be used again. If waiting and negotiating seem too tiresome, and the expected result too modest, then the alternative is to de-link from Russia and pursue far deeper, unilateral cuts . This may seem like a shortcut, but the odds are it won’t be a successful one. Concessions result in Russian invasion of Eastern Europe . Goldberg 22 [Jonah Goldberg holds the Asness Chair in Applied Liberty at the American Enterprise Institute, where he is also a senior fellow, “Making Concessions to Putin Will Only Whet His Appetite for More”, January 12, 2022, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/making-concessions-to-putin-will-only-whet-his- appetite-for-more/] IanM Putin’s appetite is bigger than just Ukraine . According to draft treaties released by Russia , Putin wants a s phere o f i nfluence where smaller nations along its “ near abroad ” would have to defer to Russia’s priorities . They would be barred from ever joining NATO , and countries that joined NATO after 1997 would be barred from hosting or training with NATO troops or military assets. These demands are almost surely a nonstarter , and rightly so. Giving in to them would undermine NATO , reward military blackmail and leave our Eastern European allies vulnerable to a regime that has already established it is willing to invade neighbors for its own aggrandizement—most recently in the 2014 military seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. But Putin is a master of asking for the whole store so he can settle for a shopping cart full of free goodies. And it sounds like the White House is considering concessions, including delaying military assistance to Ukraine.

that during the Cold War, the US government tried to covertly overthrow foreign regimes sixty-four times, and in forty-four of these attempts it supported authoritarian forces. It’s not an exaggeration to say that in the second half of the twentieth century, the U nited S tates organized its society and foreign affairs around its supposedly existential struggle with the Soviet Union . This is why, after the Eastern Bloc’s collapse in 1989-1991, a “Cold War nostalgia” gripped, and continues to grip, the American elite. At least with the Soviet Union, Americans knew where they stood. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the American Empire was left without a raison d'être. In the interregnum of the 1990s, the nation’s elites endeavored to answer a fundamental question: what does an empire without an enemy look like? (As this suggests, few concluded that the United States should, say, abandon its foreign military bases and reduce its military budget.) The answer most people settled on was that the United States should become the “world’s policeman,” the “indispensable nation” that used its overwhelming power to “protect” foreign populations whenever they were threatened (or at least, whenever they were threatened by a country not allied to the United States). Thus the nation intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the dramas of the 1990s couldn’t compare to the dramas of the Cold War, when a clear and present danger hovered over American civilization. 9/11 was a godsend for an increasingly adrift American Empire. The emergence of a “radical Islamic threat” allowed American foreign policymakers to return to the Schmittian logic that had triumphed during the Cold War: similar to the evil Soviets, elites argued, evil “jihadists” promoted a totalizing ideology and wanted to dominate the entire globe. The United States we live in today, with its domestic surveillance, its permanent mobilization, and its endless wars, is the natural outcome of a way of thinking that divides geopolitics into good versus evil. Though anxieties about Islam permeated US culture in the 2000s, by the 2010s it became clear that this most recent threat du jour didn’t have the staying power of the Soviet Union — the “jihadists” just weren’t powerful enough to truly threaten the United States. It’s partially for this reason that we’re now witnessing attempts to stoke a “New Cold War” with China, which, if initiated, would provide the foreign policy establishment with the logic it needs to justify the ever-increasing expenditures that undergird the American Empire. Since it began in the mid-twentieth century, champions of the US empire have defended its existence by referencing a series of enemies whose supposed power made it necessary for Americans to dominate the world . As such, one of the most important projects to which leftists can dedicate themselves in 2020 and beyond is threat deflation — persuading their fellow citizens that we ’re actually extremely safe and have nothing to fear from terrorists , or Russia, or China , or whomever the next enemy is . While this won’t be enough to end US imperialism, it’s a crucial first step in building the public consensus necessary to begin drawing down the American Empire . Indeed, it’s especially important to move beyond a Schmittian framework given that the U nited S tates needs to cooperate with Russia and China to solve global problems like climate change, inequality, and —as is particularly apparent at the moment— pandemics . Americans act like it’s always the 1930s , a decade in which there were clear good guys and bad guys. Today, we must recognize that it’s almost never the thirties — the future of humanity might very well depend on it . Vote neg to accept insecurity by rejecting the 1AC---that creates an interrogation of epistemological failures Philippe Bourbeau 15 , Associate Professor, holder of the Canada Research Chair in Immigration and Security, in the Department of Political Science at the University Laval, Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia, Juha A. Vuori, Professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, Adjunct Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere, 11/16/15, “Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 257- 259 Securitization and desecuritization ¶ The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been ‘less security, more politics’, and the development of ‘possible modalities’ for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a, 52): it is

OFF Farm Bill DA Farm bill passes now and solves food security because of stable crop insurance programs . Kevin Cramer 9/1 , North Dakota Senator, "A strong farm bill supports national security," https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/patriotism-unity/a-strong-farm-bill-supports- national-security, NT-AS At the end of September, Congress must reauthorize or extend the farm bill . This bipartisan bill is critical to promoting prosperity in American agriculture and feeding the world . Our farmers and ranchers not only feed Americans, but they also feed people around the globe . Much of our international influence comes from this seemingly simple but essential daily necessity: food . The United States is a world leader in agricultural exports , and North Dakota is a net exporter, meaning we grow much more than our state of roughly 775,000 people consumes. You need North Dakota durum wheat for your pasta in Manhattan, edible beans for food aid in Sudan, and soybeans for hog meal in China. With so much of our products going to feed a hungry country and world, it is all the more important we pass a strong farm bill to support our producers . Agriculture is a capital-intensive and risky business. In North Dakota, 90% of the state’s land mass is tied to farms and ranches, and the average cash expense per farm was $955,496 in 2022 . The farm bill exists to strengthen our agricultural influence by providing stability despite external market fluctuations . This is especially important when producers are forced to spend more money to get a crop in the ground or contend with increased costs of feeding and raising livestock. It should concern every consumer, from low-income and middle-class Americans to coastal elites. Crop insurance programs in the farm bill are a vital resource , not a bailout, for when the going gets tough . Without it, producers would be unable to overcome the impact of a catastrophic summer storm or flooded fields during harvest . Commodity support programs such as Agricultural Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage help prevent poor market conditions from causing widespread farm bankruptcies. Effective risk management programs are cornerstones of the farm bill , providing more certainty, reducing the need for emergency disaster relief, and ensuring our nation remains an agricultural powerhouse . This significant point of geopolitical influence and domestic security is all done at a bargain to taxpayers. Crop insurance, commodity programs, and other agriculture support structures in the farm bill represent a tiny fraction, just 0.23% , of projected overall spending over the next decade. Despite the risks and additional challenges nature throws at them, there are no better stewards of the land than our producers. Why would they not be good stewards? Agriculture is a generational, family-based business. Producers have an inherent interest in taking care of their land and ensuring its productivity for generations to come. They know how to balance conservation and productive land use better than any bureaucrat in Washington. Farmers and ranchers fundamentally recognize the importance of healthy land because it is the foundation for their livelihoods. Across North Dakota, we painstakingly nurture and grow the crops to feed millions. You might not believe those of us in this rectangular blank spot in the middle of North America are deeply connected with the rest of the globe. But I would wager we know it better than most. From soybeans to barley and everything in between, we know diplomacy is more than Washington bureaucrats in perfectly pressed suits and fancy shoes; it’s also farmers in denim and muddy boots. I have the privilege of being the first North Dakotan to serve on an Armed Services Committee in Congress. I know how important it is to maintain our leadership abroad. When international trade is interrupted by major weather events or wars, such as the conflict in Ukraine, American producers step up to the plate to fill the gaps. American food security is national security and critical to maintaining our position abroad. Now more than ever, we have to ensure our farmers have the resources they need to be leaders in feeding the world. I will always support strong defense investment and spending, but a balanced foreign policy strategy includes more than tanks and weapons of war. It’s an incredible bargain to taxpayers to spend a tiny fraction of what we spend on defense preventing wars in unstable places. We have a lot more influence abroad when we recognize the strategic importance of our commodities such as energy and food.

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Turn---1NC Eliminating the sponge collapses deterrence, makes conventional wars more likely and nuclear war inevitable . Kroenig et al 21 [Dr. Matthew Kroenig is the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Mark J. Massa is an assistant director of Forward Defense at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Christian Trotti is an assistant director of Forward Defense at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “The Downsides of Downsizing: Why the United States Needs Four Hundred ICBMs”, Atlantic Council 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30754] IanM The Case for Four Hundred ICBMs The currently planned land leg of four hundred ICBMs better advances US national interests than a force of three hundred ICBMs. This section will explain how the land leg supports the major goals of US nuclear strategy and why decreasing its size would undermine these objectives. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls on the US nuclear arsenal to serve four critical roles: deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assurance of allies and partners; achievement of US objectives if deterrence fails; and capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.6 These are long-standing goals of US nuclear strategy. The 2010 NPR also emphasized strategic deterrence, reassuring allies and partners, and fielding an effective arsenal.7 Further, the 2010 NPR stated that “[r]etaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities,” a clear indication that hedging is also a long-standing bipartisan element of US nuclear strategy.8 Moreover, the 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy required US nuclear forces to “achieve U.S. and Allied objectives if deterrence fails” and to maintain “significant counterforce capabilities.”9 The US ICBM force contributes to each of these roles, and reducing the size of the land leg would jeopardize each of them. Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack Nuclear deterrence is most reliable when an adversary has no doubt that a nuclear attack on the United States would fail to destroy the US nuclear arsenal and would result in an unacceptably costly counterattack . To eliminate the ICBM leg in a first strike, an enemy would need to destroy 450 ICBM silos . Because scholars estimate that two offensive warheads are necessary to destroy a n intended target , defeating the ground leg would require the use of approximately nine hundred offensive warheads.10 This is equivalent to 60 percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal , making such an attack unattractive to Moscow. Moreover , the large number of nuclear weapons required renders such an attack impossible for adversaries with smaller arsenals , such as China or North Korea . Cutting the land leg by one hundred missiles would undermine ICBMs’ contribution to nuclear deterrence . A smaller ICBM force would make a nuclear counterforce attack on the United States more thinkable . Employing standard assumptions, a Russian offensive against a diminished ICBM force would require two hundred fewer Russian warheads . This makes such an attack easier to contemplate. Moreover , Russia could retarget these unused warheads to destroy additional US cities or hold back for a threatened “ third strike ” in an attempt to deter US retaliation . In addition , US officials estimate that China will double the size of its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade .11 ICBM reductions could soon, therefore, place a disarming first strike within reach of Beijing. Moreover , if the United States had fewer nuclear weapons due to a smaller land leg, nuclear deterrence might also be threatened because US adversaries might be more willing to initiate and escalate militarized challenges against the United States and its allies. Nuclear deterrence has long been conceptualized as a game of nuclear brinkmanship. Although nuclear states cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, they can credibly threaten to risk one by initiating and escalating crises .12 A state’s willingness to stand firm in these crises depends , in part, on its vulnerability to nuclear war. Recent social-science research shows that

states that are more vulnerable to a nuclear exchange are more likely to be targeted with military threats from nuclear-armed states and less likely to achieve their basic goals in a nuclear crisis .13 Accordingly , reducing the size of the US ICBM force would simultaneously increase US vulnerability and decrease adversary vulnerability to nuclear coercion , thereby shifting the balance of resolve toward US adversaries . Adversaries might be more willing to challenge, and stand firm in crises against, the United States, and Washington might be more eager to seek offramps in a crisis. This resulting shift in the balance of resolve could also increase the risk of nuclear war . The most plausible pathway to nuclear war in the contemporary international security environment stems not from a bolt-from-the-blue strike but from escalation of a conventional conflict . US adversaries might employ nuc lear weapon s in the event of a conventional conflict in Eastern Europe , in the Indo-Pacific , or on the Korean Peninsula .14 If adversaries are more likely to initiate and escalate crises against a United States with a smaller ICBM force, as argued above, then there is also a greater risk that Washington will find itself in dangerous crises that could spiral out of control and result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange .

Turn---1NC Eliminating ICBMs and shifting to SLBMs creates actual ‘use or lose’ fears. Turns case and causes nuclear war . Oelrich 21 [Ivan Oelrich was Vice President of the Federation of American Scientists, analyzed military manufacturing for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and is a non-resident scholar of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and non-resident fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, “Deep thoughts: How moving ICBMs far underground will make the whole world safer”, April 28, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/deep-thoughts-how-moving-icbms-far- underground-will-make-the-whole-world-safer/] IanM It is fair to ask what benefits ICBMs offer ed that have made them seem an essential part of the triad up until now , so we would know what the US would lose by giving them up . One advantage is cost. The missiles are expensive, but once in their concrete silos the costs to maintain them and support their crews, even in a high state of alert, is less than the comparable operating cost of either bombers or submarines. In additions, the ICBMs and bombers together present ed the Soviets/ Russia ns with an attack coordination problem that made it impossible to destroy both on the ground through surprise . And finally, being land-based, ICBMs offered more secure and reliable communication links than either airborne or seaborne forces. In contrast, SLBMs get the nod because, being carried on submarines, they are thought to be invulnerable while at sea and most analysts believe that they will remain so for the foreseeable future. Survivability is certainly a big plus for SLBMs, but there is far more to consider before putting the bulk of US nuclear forces on submarines. The stability of the nuclear balance between the US and the Soviet Union , and later, Russia, has been a central theme in debates about nuclear weapons even if these concerns had limited effect on actual procurement and deployment decisions. In principle , stability is simple . If both sides are in the position where a first strike is difficult and uncertain , and the other side is expected to have enough nuclear weapons that survive a first strike to respond effectively , then there will never be enough of an advantage to going first to warrant starting a nuclear war . Both sides will wait for the other to make the first move, and thus neither side will go first, and the war never starts. When submarine-based missiles were first introduced, they seemed to be the perfect stabilizing weapons. The first US SLBM, the Polaris, was carried on a nuclear-powered submarine that the Soviets could not find and thus could not attack with or without surprise so the Soviets would never be tempted to try a first strike. The Polaris missiles had a short range, a modest payload, and poor accuracy, making them on all counts terrible weapons to use in a surprise first strike against Soviet land-based missiles. Even with their limitations, however, if the Soviets had attacked, these undersea missiles could have reliably inflicted devastating damage on Soviet cities and industry, deterring any attack in the first place. Today’s US SLBMs have inherited much of the cachet they earned during their early use in the Cold War, although they are now entirely different weapons. The submarines carrying the missiles remain undetectable, but the missiles themselves have far greater ranges . This means that the submarines have a wide choice of launch points and can exploit weaknesses in Russian early warning radar systems and can cover all of Russia’s territory . The payloads are much larger , and nuclear weapons are now much more advanced , so the warheads of an SLBM can have explosive yield of equivalent to hundreds of kilotons of TNT. Advances in guidance mean these powerful warheads are extremely accurate . Finally , SLBMs can fly so-called “ depressed” trajectories , just above the atmosphere, dramatically reducing their flight times and any Russian warning time . Maneuverable warheads can further increase accuracy and defeat Russian defenses . There is at least one unofficial report of a US submarine-launched missile having been tested with a combination of depressed trajectory and maneuverable warhead .

All of this together means that today’s US SLBMs provide the ideal foundation for a disarming first strike against Russia , able to attack their mobile missiles while still in their garrisons , decapitate command centers , catch bombers on the ground , and take out defense radars . The United States sustains a particularly bad understanding how threatening its nuclear weapons appear to other nations , specifically Russia . One reason for this is the constant use of euphemism . Discussion in the United States, even among those arguing against nuclear weapons, generally refers to nuclear weapons as the “ deterrent” force . The follow-on to the current ICBM is, in fact, officially called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. From a Russian perspective , however the US nuclear arsenal looks not at all like a retaliatory force for deterrence but a force finely tuned specifically for a disarming first strike against Russia’s central nuclear systems . (Some US analysts, accepting this, assert that convincing the Russians they will lose a nuclear war is, indeed, a very good deterrent.) SLBMs are a key part of that capability. That is not the end of the problems with SLBMs . Always the first advantage of SLBMs to be cited is their invulnerability . Yet submarines are not tough targets ; they are invulnerable because they remain invisible in the vastness of the ocean. In port , submarines are extremely vulnerable . The incentive to strike first in a nuclear war does not come because striking first presents a good outcome and responding second is terrible. It will almost always be the case that going first is a terrible outcome, but it could be appreciably less terrible than being second. Thus , a terrible outcome could still be an incentive to strike first . And being able to destroy a sizable proportion of the US nuclear strike force when it is in port and vulnerable contributes to that incentive . As a result, the submarine force must always operate at a high tempo to keep as many ships at sea as possible, both during times of calm and times of crisis because the last thing the United States would want it to present Russia with a lucrative target during a crisis that is about to disappear , creating a now-or-never choice about a first strike . This high-tempo requirement also makes the submarine missile fleet expensive year-in, year-out. Moreover, nothing reveals a submarine’s position more quickly than having a ballistic missile break the surface of the water . An enem y can be certain that , at least at that moment, there is a submarine under that point . A counter-barrage with a wide spread of nuclear weapons could have some chance of destroying the launching submarine . It is not clear that Russia will have the ability to detect the point of a launch or that it could instantly launch nuclear-armed missiles against the target area, but the very possibility might limit the ability of US submarines to launch partial loads . If launching does reveal their positions and make them vulnerable , then each submarine could be forced into an all-or-nothing attack.

AT: Hacking---1NC No cyber impact – attribution , restraint , and capabilities . Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe] More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks . We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives , capabilities , and intentions . We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe . There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible , which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills . One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the U nited S tates’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons . Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare . State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion . The U nited S tates has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equal ly catastrophic retaliation . Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war . This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation , something that has also never occurred . The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations , and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states . Attackers, particularly among the U nited S tates’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation . The U nited S tates has two opponents ( China and Russia ) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the U nited S tates. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the U nited S tates . Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has no t yet developed this kind of capability .

AT: Cost Savings---1NC Cutting won’t save much but will increase short-term costs. Kroenig et al 21 [Dr. Matthew Kroenig is the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Mark J. Massa is an assistant director of Forward Defense at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Christian Trotti is an assistant director of Forward Defense at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “The Downsides of Downsizing: Why the United States Needs Four Hundred ICBMs”, Atlantic Council 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30754] IanM Rebutting budgetary arguments for three hundred ICBMs Those in favor of reductions in the ICBM force believe that the nuclear triad, and the ground leg specifically, are unaffordable and ripe for cuts. Yet a further examination reveals that proponents of cutting ICBMs have neither their strategic priorities nor their budgetary facts straight. Nuclear weapons are the Defense Department’s top priority and merit the modest fraction of the defense budget allocated to them. Critics argue that the U nited S tates can save money by cutting the size of the ICBM force , but nuclear weapons are relatively inexpensive and nuclear deterrence remains the highest priority of the Department of Defense (DoD).48 The United States plans to spend roughly 6 percent of the US defense budget on nuclear modernization, and several recent secretaries of defense have called nuclear deterrence the department’s top priority.49 When asked to comment on the cost of nuclear modernization, former Defense Secretary James Mattis explained that “America can afford survival.”50 Appeals for cost saving in the nuclear arsenal have been considered before but were rejected as a “ hunt for small potatoes .”51 Indeed, since the 1950s, successive US administrations of both parties have recognized that nuclear weapons provide “more bang for the buck,” allowing the United States to pursue its grand strategy with modest expenditures. While reasonable people can disagree, it seems appropriate that the Department of Defense spends the planned 6 percent of the defense budget on strategic deterrence. Cutting the GBSD program will result in insignificant long-term savings but would increase short-term costs. The land leg is the wrong place to look for cost savings in the defense budget. It is the cheapest leg of the nuclear triad . According to the most recent C ongressional B udget O ffice (CBO) estimate , in the thirty years between 2017 and 2047, the United States is slated to expend $313 billion on the sea leg , $266 billion on the air leg , and $149 billion on the land leg . These sums cover the development, fielding, operations, and sustainment of the current and planned next generation of nuclear capabilities.52 Thus, as one of us has argued elsewhere, “[i]f cost savings are a top priority , then the ICBM force should not be the first leg on the chopping block .” 53 A second problem with the critics’ budgetary argument is that cutting the size of the ICBM force by a quarter would not result in a 25 percent discount on the price tag. Much of the cost of the program is in designing and testing of the new missile , not the materials and labor required to produce each subsequent missile . The first missile in the GBSD program , therefore , will be significantly more expensive than the four hundredth . Reducing the missile order by 25 percent would result in less-than-linear cost savings. Indeed , a closer budgetary analysis reveals that cutting the size of the ICBM force would not save much money . The CBO has reported on the potential cost savings from cutting one hundred planned ICBMs and two planned SSBNs. CBO estimates that this posture would save ten billion dollars over ten years and thirty billion dollars over thirty years.54 It is not clear what share of this billion dollars per year in savings is due to ICBM cuts. Assuming the savings are proportional to the costs of the two legs , then annual savings from ICBM cuts would come to roughly $300 million , or less than one percent of planned nuclear modernization costs .55 To put this

number in perspective, consider that Americans spend $5.4 billion annually on legal marijuana and $4.9 billion annually on Doritos, Cheetos, and Funyuns.56 Moreover , any cost savings would depend on how US military planners decide to allocate the ICBM reductions across the force. Would they shut down an entire missile wing? Or would they maintain all of the current missile wings with more empty missile silos? The latter option would make more strategic sense but would not reduce costs by much. There are currently fifty empty silos spread out among three US ICBM fields.57 Because adversaries presumably do not know which silos are empty, an enemy counterforce strike would still need to expend two nuclear warheads per silo on the fifty empty silos. Thus, the most strategically advantageous way to cut to three hundred ICBMs would be to leave an additional one hundred silos empty. Missile silos cannot be left empty and un-crewed for long, and, even if doing so was possible, the lack of deception may enable adversaries to determine which silos were empty. With missiles pulled at random from the three wings and rotated, the wing crews would still need to staff the same number of launch-control centers, maintain the same number of silos, pay for the same amount of perimeter security, and fund the same command structure for the wing. In sum, operating costs would not be noticeably reduced. Shutting down an entire missile wing , on the other hand, could result in greater cost savings over time, but it would also increase short-term costs just as the bow wave of nuclear modernization costs approaches. These costs include removing the missiles, transporting and storing the warheads , demolishing structures , and filling the silos with gravel . An additional cost is the potential for environmental cleanup . Like many military or industrial sites in use for decades, the missile wings have accumulated environmental damage as the result of diesel- fuel spills , noxious fire retardants , toxic missiles fuels, and the usage of other chemicals. These environmental issues would need to be resolved before the land of a former missile wing could be returned to the surrounding municipality. Environmental remediation would increase costs in the short term. Nuclear modernization costs are expected to come to a bow wave—that is, a peak—in fiscal year 2022.58 Accordingly, it would be inconsistent both to criticize ICBM modernization for exacerbating the bow wave of nuclear modernization cost and to call for the deactivation of an ICBM wing , which also increases short-term costs.

AT: Bioweapons---1NC Won’t get close to extinction Farquhar et al. 17 – *director of the Global Priorities Project, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford, **Global Priorities Project, ***Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, ****PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism, *****Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, ******Director of Research at FHI [Sebastian Farquhar*, John Halstead**, Owen Cotton-Barratt***, Stefan Schubert****, Haydn Belfield*****, Andrew Snyder-Beattie******, 2017, Global Priorities Project 2017, “Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance”, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf ] AMarb Recent developments in biotechnology may, however, give people the capability to design pathogens which overcome this trade-off. Some gain- of-function research has demonstrated the feasibility of altering pathogens to create strains with dangerous new features, such as vaccine- resistant smallpox40 and human-transmissible avian flu,41 with the potential to kill millions or even billions of people. For an engineered pathogen to derail humanity ’s long-term future , it would probably have to have extremely high fatality rates or destroy reproductive capability (so that it killed or prevented reproduction by all or nearly all of its victims), be extremely infectious (so that it had global reach), and have delayed onset of symptoms (so that we would fail to notice the problem and mount a response in time).42 Making such a pathogen would be close to impossible at present. However, the cost of the technology is falling rapidly,43 and adequate expertise and modern laboratories are becoming more available. Consequently, states and perhaps even terrorist groups could eventually gain the capacity to create pathogens which could deliberately or accidentally cause an existential catastrophe.

AT: Disease !---1NC Disease can’t cause extinction Dr. Toby Ord 20 , Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126 Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity ’s future? 10 The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible . Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity ’s longterm potential .15 [FOONOTE] In addition to this historical evidence, there are some deep er biological observations and theories suggest ing that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality , the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence . However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction of their hosts. [END FOOTNOTE] In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover . The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization . It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted . But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We

have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.

Accidents---1NC

ICBMs Safe/No Accidents---1NC No accidents from ICBM “hair-trigger ” alerts. Praiswater 20 – [Major Shane Praiswater, Ph.D., is a former military analyst at the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a fellow at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, "Why We Need a New ICBM," Defense One, 12-7-2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/12/why-we-need-new-icbm/170547/] nl ICBMs , despite the fears of some , are not on a “ hair-trigger ” alert . They are not recallable after launch, but there is no way to employ an ICBM without presidential orders and a thorough verification process. While it is true that ICBMs are frighteningly responsive given authorization, the missiles are targeted against open oceans on a daily basis . Targeting the missiles would occur on the lower rungs of an escalation ladder , in which case , the de-escalating deterrent value of ICBMs would balance any concerns about rushed strategic decisions . It is the existence of ICBMs , on both sides of a conflict , that prevents national leaders from acting too rashly in highly chaotic situations . Checks are built into the system. Kehler 17 (C. ROBERT KEHLER, retired US Air Force General appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the authority to use nuclear weapons, November 14, 2017, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111417_Kehler_Testimony.pdf, accessed 7/18/18) Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) US nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of US nuclear weapons , and the President’s ability to exercise that authority and direction is ensured by the people , procedures , facilities , equipment , and communications capabilities that comprise the Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS). The NCCS has been designed with resilience , redundancy , and survivability to ensure that an adversary cannot hope to neutralize our deterrent by successfully attacking any of its elements and thereby “ disconnecting ” the President and other civilian and military leaders from one another or from the nuclear forces — even in the most stressing scenarios . These features enhance deterrence and contribute to crisis stability . NCCS capabilities and procedures are designed to enable the authorized use of nuclear weapons while also prevent ing their unauthorized , accidental , or inadvertent use . Operations and activities involving US nuclear weapons are surrounded by layers of safeguards . While many of the specifics are highly classified , general methods range from personnel screening and monitoring to codes and use controls . In addition, sensors and communications links that contribute to nuclear decision making are specially certified , and tests and exercises are frequently held to validate the performance of both systems and people . Before I retired in late 2013, we had also begun to evaluate networks and systems for potential or actual cyber intrusions . Other factors contribute to the prevention of unauthorized , inadvertent , or accidental use . “ Today’s triad of nuclear forces is far smaller and postured much less aggressively than its Cold War ancestor ”. ii Not only are the long-range bombers and supporting aerial tankers no longer loaded and poised to take off with nuclear weapons ( unless ordered back into a nuclear alert configuration ), but ballistic missiles are aimed at open areas of the ocean . Also, while the possibility of a massive surprise nuclear attack still exists (and must be deterred), decision time is longer in many other potential nuclear scenarios that may prove more likely in today’s global security environment . As I mentioned earlier, the decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision requiring an explicit order from the President . The process includes “ assessment , review , and consultation …(via) secure phone and video

conferencing to enable the President to consult with his senior advisors , including the Secretary of Defense and other military commanders .”iii Once a decision is reached, the order is prepared and transmitted to the forces using “procedures…equipment, and communications that ensure the President’s nuclear control orders are received and properly implemented…”.iv The law of war governs the use of US nuclear weapons. Nuclear options and orders are no different in this regard than any other weapon. Here, US policy as articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provided important context regarding the consideration of US nuclear use (i.e., extreme circumstances when vital national interests are at stake). The 2010 NPR also restated the “negative security guarantee” (i.e., the US will not consider using nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations). In addition, the legal principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality also apply to nuclear plans, operations, and decisions . Legal advisors are deeply involved with commanders at all steps of the deliberate and crisis action processes to offer perspective on how force is to be used as well as the decision to use force . The decision to use nuclear weapons is not an all or nothing decision . Over the years, successive Presidents have directed the military to prepare a range of options designed to provide flexibility and to improve the likelihood of controlling escalation if deterrence fails. Options are clearly defined in scope and duration and the President retains the ability to terminate nuclear operations when necessary. Military members are boun d by the Uniform Code of Military Justice ( UCMJ ) to follow orders provided they are legal and come from appropriate command authority . They are equally bound to question (and ultimately refuse) illegal orders or those that do not come from appropriate authority . As the commander of US Strategic Command, I shared the responsibility with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military and civilian leaders to address and resolve any concerns and potential legal issues on behalf of the men and women in the nuclear operating forces during the decision process. It was our duty to pose the hard questions, if any, before proceeding with our military advice. Nuclear crew members must have complete confidence that the highest legal standards have been enforced from target selection to an employment command by the President.

AT: Accidental War---1NC Accidental war is a fallacy . Lowther and Williams 23 [Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He spent more than two decades in uniform and as an Air Force and Army civil servant working on nuclear issues, and Lt. Col. Derek Williams is a B-52 Weapons System Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program,”WHY AMERICA HAS A LAUNCH ON ATTACK OPTION”, July 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/why-america-has-a-launch-on- attack-option/ ] IanM The Fallacy of Accidental Launch In addition to suggesting that a significant portion of the intercontinental ballistic missile force would survive a Russian nuclear strike, Montoya and Kemp argue that “ there are many historical examples of early-warning systems generating false alarms or computer -generated messages pretending to be actual warnings . When combined with a launch on warning posture, these glitches create real risks of accidental war.” What they fail to mention is that in every example , all of which are decades old , redundant safety measures ensured that any one failure in the system did not lead to an actual failure with nuclear weapons. The U.S. military expects the humans operating the nuclear arsenal and its command and control system to make mistakes . While the military strives for perfection, everything from the weapons themselves to the crews that maintain and operate them are designed to mitigate error. This is done through the safety measures built into the weapons , training of crews , the personnel reliability assurance program, operational procedures, and a command and control system comprised of layers specifically designed to prevent the very accidental war Montoya and Kemp fret about. In every instance of a mistake or error that detractors can provide , the simple fact is that the redundancy built into the system worked . In 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, the U nited S tates never experienced an accidental detonation or miscalculation leading to war. Arguments suggesting that because part of the system failed, the entire system failed willfully ignore that the system , which is much better today than when the last accident occurred four decades ago , was specifically designed to account for the inevitable mistakes that would happen. The same is true of errors in the systems that comprise American integrated tactical warning and attack assessment. Where one layer failed, another layer succeeded. This layering of systems is sometimes referred to as Reason’s Accident Causation Model, or the Swiss cheese model. There may be holes in one slice of cheese (system), but no hole runs all the way through the entire block of cheese (system of systems). If slices of Swiss cheese are like the layers of redundancy, each slice may have holes in different places, but none of the holes line up perfectly on every slice. Thus, a hole (mistake/error) in one slice is covered in another slice. In the aviation world, the crew resource management model builds redundancies into the system to prevent human error when it comes to the combat crews flying nuclear-armed bombers. Similar approaches are in effect across the nuclear enterprise to prevent the kind of accidents Montoya and Kemp fear. Nowhere in the system does safety rely on a single point of failure. Multiple failures must occur, both mechanical or technical and human, before an accidental detonation or nuclear war can happen. It is certainly worth pointing out that no system is perfect. There is always some level of risk , even if it is very small. In reality, every human or technical error that occurred in the past was carefully analyzed and used to make the system safer . It is for good reason that the U nited S tates has been accident-free for four decades . To continue this safety record, America must invest in people, weapons systems, and nuclear warhead production infrastructure.

Regularly building new nuclear warheads that continue to enhance safety and use control is the most reliable way to ensure the least possible risk. No impact ---they’d go in the ocean . Dodge 21 [Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, “ICBMs and Their Importance for Allied Assurances and Security”, January 12, 2021, https://nipp.org/information_series/dodge-michaela-icbms-and-their-importance-for-allied-assurances- and-security-information-series-no-475-2/] IanM Others argue that if Russia and the United States do not de-alert , the chances of an accidental launch will increase .[15] Yet there is no evidence to support the proposition that an alert posture increases the risk of accidental launches. In fact, even in the extremely unlikely circumstance of an accidental launch , U.S. ICBMs are not targeted against Russia (or other countries) during normal, everyday operations— and have not been since 1994 . Rather they are aimed at broad ocean areas that minimize the risk to populated land masses .

AT: Russia Arms Control---1NC Russia circumvents negotiations —trusting Putin’s goodwill is useless after Ukraine. Teft et al 23 [John Tefft is a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and an adjunct member of RAND Corporation, B ruce McClintock is a former U.S. defense attache to Russia, lead of the RAND Space Enterprise Initiative, and a senior policy researcher at RAND, Khrystyna Holynska is a Ph.D. student in the Research, Analysis, and Design stream at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant policy researcher at RAND, “From Gatherer of Lands to Gravedigger: A Political Assessment of Putin's War on Ukraine,” written 02/13/2023, https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/02/from-gatherer-of-lands-to- gravedigger-a-political-assessment.html] GMU stolz A year after Russia invaded Ukraine it may be difficult to accurately predict the war's lasting impact on the international order , but there are steps the United States and the West could take to help sculpt the outcome: remain committed to Ukraine, strike a balance between support and escalation, and begin to consider the best long-term future of Russia and how the West can support it. In 2015 Arkady Ostrovsky, Russia editor of The Economist, published The Invention of Russia, from Gorbachev's Freedom to Putin's War. In the concluding chapter of this brilliant account of the course of modern Russia, Ostrovsky puts Vladimir Putin squarely in the Russian historical tradition of using “aggression and territorial expansion as a form of defense against modernization”: “ Putin has portrayed himself as a gatherer of Russian lands and restorer of the Russian empire . In fact, he is likely to go down in history as its gravedigger.” The war in Ukraine may have taught Putin and the Russian people that using military force, especially a military with serious deficiencies, has its limits when faced by a people fighting an inspired battle to save their country. War and an imperial ideology are not substitutes for the hard work of modernizing your nation. Every country, especially Russia, needs to focus on adopting sensible economic reform, diversifying its economy, and preparing its young people to compete in the new competitive, highly technical world we live in. Instead, Putin has resisted necessary economic reform and forced a huge number of Russia's best and brightest young people into exile , fleeing conscription and a Russia few of them believe in. In doubling down in his effort to take Ukraine, Putin is mortgaging Russia's future to satisfy his imperialistic dreams. Ukraine is enduring a brutal winter of war. Having failed on the battlefield, the Kremlin has launched missile and drone assaults on Ukraine's electrical, water, and heating systems. Russia is trying to bring Ukraine to heel by destroying civilian infrastructure to make life so miserable during the winter that Ukraine's people will press their government to sue for peace. The price has been horrific. Tens of thousands of Russian soldiers killed. Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and innocent Ukrainian civilians killed. Damage to Ukraine's housing and infrastructure in the hundreds of billions of dollars. UNHCR reported that, as of January 31, 2023, 8 million of 44 million Ukrainians have been recorded as refugees across Europe, with many more displaced internally or to places other than Europe. Nevertheless, by nearly all accounts the Ukrainian people are not ready to give in. Anger at Russia only grows with every new missile assault. So too does the determination of the Ukrainian people to oust Russia. Ukraine has surprised the world with its resolve, ingenuity, and battlefield successes, reclaiming an estimated 55 percent of the Ukrainian territory Russia seized when it launched its invasion . Putin's policy toward Ukraine has largely been a story of failure over the past two decades . He directly supported Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election and was quick in congratulating him with a “landslide victory.” The Ukrainian people , outraged by substantial electoral corruption, demanding a revote which Yanukovych ultimately lost to Viktor Yushchenko. In the wake of Ukraine's 2013–2014 “Revolution of Dignity,” Putin invaded and annexed Crimea and launched a campaign of subversion in Donbas . Over 14,000 people died and 1.4 million were displaced, but Putin was stymied in his attempt to annex the Donbas region and gain control of Ukraine's government through the February 2015 “trojan horse–style” Minsk accord. Finally, he launched the massive, catastrophic three-pronged invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In invading Ukraine, Putin violated i nternational law and effectively tore up numerous long-standing Russian commitments to maintain Ukrainian and European security. As in 2014, Putin again violated one of the core rules that has for the most part preserved European peace for over 70 years—using military aggression to forcibly change the borders of sovereign European states. Putin's revanchist campaign has also caused major collateral damage in international energy and food supplies . This carnage has been brought about by Vladimir Putin's obsession to become one of Russia's historic “gatherers of lands,” as Ostrovsky wrote years ago and as Putin himself hinted in recent remarks. He wants to go down in history with Tsars Alexei III, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin as rulers who expanded the boundaries and political influence of mother Russia. Instead of taking steps to build a modern state integrated into the global economy, Putin is trying to turn back the clock to a bygone mythical era of Russian power. It is much more likely that Putin's legacy will be as a ruler whose strategic mistake of invading Ukraine will diminish Russia, its influence, and its way of life for decades to come. Today, Russia stands at an inflection point. It is a pariah in

much of the world, with the West remaining steadfast in its military and economic support for Ukraine. By publicly abandoning the fiction of a “special military operation” and forcibly drafting soldiers into the army, Putin symbolically crossed his own “Rubicon.” He had previously sought to minimize the cost of the conflict in Ukraine and shield it from the view of the Russian people through a careful propaganda campaign. Russia hid the truth of its battlefield losses . Now, with husbands and sons conscripted into the armed forces, and many being killed on the battlefield, the Kremlin can no longer pretend that this war is not affecting life in Russia itself. Groups of soldiers' mothers are beginning to speak out just as they did during the Chechen wars of the 1990s. The Kremlin is trying to liken the war to the defense of the Russian homeland during World War II. The problem is that Russia started this war, and most informed Russians know it. Russia is on the road to economic ruin. It has survived the war so far through careful macroeconomic management and continuing revenue from oil and gas sales. Western sanctions have had some effect, particularly cutting Russia off from critical high-tech imports from the West. Russia has lost its reputation as a reliable supplier of energy. Some 80 percent of Europe's pipeline gas imports from Russia have already been replaced. Many of Russia's best and brightest, especially those in high-tech sectors, have fled Russia to avoid conscription or seek a better opportunity abroad. Before the war Putin prioritized stability, tightening his control and foreswearing reforms recommended by his economic advisors. Ironically, the invasion of Ukraine is increasing the very instability that Putin had sought to avoid at all costs. Political dissension is starting to rise. The Putin regime has clamped down hard on liberal opponents of the war, such as Ilya Yashin, but permitted right-wing opponents to speak openly and critically of Russia's military failure—as long as they do not criticize Putin himself. Undoubtedly his hardline supporters and advisors certainly share his frustration at Russia's strategic failure in this war. But multiple sources indicate Russian elites are starting to contemplate Russia losing the war in Ukraine. We do not know how this war will end. As the conflict bogged down in the mud of a harsh Ukrainian winter, the stakes rose on all sides. Now, Ukraine and the world are closely monitoring what many believe to be the signs of an upcoming major offensive. Some believe it is already underway as Russians rush before the arrival of new Western military equipment, while Ukrainians are more inclined to expect that, knowing Russia's love for symbolism, a massive campaign is likely to start closer to the first anniversary of the 2022 invasion. Putin seems determined to continue, although he has never confronted a challenge like this during his rule of Russia. He continues to nourish deep grievances against the West on a range of issues, and Western support for Ukraine has likely only aggravated his anger. It will be easy for him to see himself again as a victim of Western power. With Putin increasingly cornered, losing ground in Ukraine, and facing mounting questions at home, there are many questions with no obvious answers. How long will the Russian elite continue to support a war without an end in sight, and with Russia's economic and social position at home deteriorating? When will Russian leaders realize that Russia's future depends on modernization of the nation, and not living off imperial dreams that will never be achieved? This war raises an important question: “What does this mean for the United States?” First, it will be important for America to persevere in supporting Ukraine for the long haul. Putin hopes to outlast the West's resolve even if he cannot break Ukraine's will. This century-shaping conflict is a test of wills. Ever since Zelenskyy famously said that he needed ammunition, not a ride, Ukraine's president continues to emphasize that U.S. support is crucial, helping not just to defend the country but to “get to a turning point” on the battlefield. Russian armed forces are repeatedly beaten, but they also learn and adapt. Ukrainian resolve and Western support are two factors crucial for Ukraine's ability to withstand Russia's brutal attacks. Throughout the past year, Russian media repeatedly predicted a near and imminent end of Western military aid. In reality, the limits of what the West and the United States are ready to supply to Ukraine are being extended and include military systems that previously were not even considered, such as those that could help Ukraine retake Crimea. Each such decision is celebrated in Ukraine and provides an additional boost to Ukrainian morale. U.S. leaders from both sides of the aisle will be pressed to continue to reiterate that this unprecedented aid to Ukraine is not “some altruistic project.” Ukraine's ability to counter Russian aggression will likely make a long-lasting impact not just on Russia, but on other revisionist states. Stability in Europe is a vital U.S. national security interest that may be served best through stopping Putin. Second, an overall positive outcome is more likely if the United States finds a way to continue to strike the balance between support for Ukraine and a commitment to avoid direct escalation with Russia. While pledging to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” the Biden administration will also need to avoid closing the door to negotiations with Russia, even as it adds new and more-sophisticated weapons to Ukraine's arsenal. The administration clearly wants to maintain nuclear stability in the current war and has signaled a readiness for new nuclear arms control negotiations. Putin may like to cut a deal with the American president. The Russian autocrat has long wished to negotiate a “Yalta II” type of accord where the superpowers impose a settlement on the Ukrainians. He may want to force the United States to recognize Russia's hold on its periphery. The United States will likely seek to avoid being pulled into the trap of ceasefire negotiations while also reassuring Russia that it does not intend to threaten Russia, or Putin personally. Putin has effectively closed off prospects for serious negotiation . On September 30 he called for Ukraine to cease fire immediately and return to the negotiating table. In the same breath, he ruled out a fundamental precondition for any successful talks by remaining determined to force Ukraine to accept his territorial seizures and capitulate. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Kyiv needs to take into account the “new realities” of Russia's annexations. Not surprisingly, President Zelenskyy has ruled out negotiations on that basis. The Ukrainian people would never accept it after so much sacrifice to defend their country. Western leaders agreed they would not force a deal on Ukraine. Sustainable peace would require a careful balancing to continue supporting Ukraine while deterring Putin from further escalation . Such escalation will likely come at enormous cost to Russia and to Putin himself. However, this war of choice has turned into an existential threat to the regime's survival. The decisions by Russia's elite might gradually turn the tide. But even if Putin eventually steps down years from now, Putinism and its supporters might remain powerful for some time to come. A process of abandoning Putin's imperialistic dreams in favor of a strategy of economic modernization will likely extend well into a post-Putin era in Russia. Third, the United States should work closely with European allies to consider the best possible Russian future for the next century and how the West can support but not decide that future. The extremes for the West to contemplate are a Russian collapse and a Russia that becomes so isolated that it follows the course of post–World War I Germany—rising up again years later to create yet another international crisis. Even if the war ends with a military victory by Ukraine or through negotiation, rebuilding the European (and international) security order

that Putin has tried to destroy will be a monumental task. The road to restoring Western relations with Russia will be long and difficult. Trust has been shattered .

AT: China Arms Control---1NC Arms control with China will fail ---newest, best analysis. Logan and Saunders 23 [Dr. David C. Logan is Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, “Discerning the Drivers of China’s Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data”, July 26, 2023, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force- development-models-indicators-an/] IanM Assessing the Explanatory and Predictive Power of Competing Models Based on a thorough review of the secondary literature , Chinese primary sources , and new open- source data , we test the predictions of each model against China’s current and projected nuclear force structure and the assessed values of the observable indicators. We find strong evidence for the secure second-strike , nuclear shield , and Great Power status models . We find weak support for the bureaucratic politics model. We find that the theater deterrence and nuclear superiority models have the least support. Implications for China’s Nuclear Force Development China is likely to continue to increase the overall size of its nuclear forces to increase their survivability , to deter U.S. military threats and intervention, and to bolster its status by differentiating itself from second-tier nuclear states. Great Power status drivers might eventually encourage China to seek both quantitative and qualitative parity with U.S. and Russian nuclear capabilities. A decision to seek quantitative parity might be constrained by the increased costs and operational risks that accompany a larger nuclear force, tradeoffs with conventional force modernization, and political costs given China’s desired image as a peaceful power different from the superpowers. A decision to deploy low-yield or tactical nuclear forces would signal a significant shift in Chinese thinking about the military and political utility of these weapons. Implications for U.S. National Security Policy China is determined to maintain a survivable second-strike capability . The United States should anticipate that China will respond to advances in U.S. offensive nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile defense systems and factor these responses into its investment decisions. A Chinese nuclear shield intended to deter U.S. intervention and nuclear use would place a greater premium on the local conventional military balance and force U.S. policymakers to make difficult choices about allocating defense dollars across nuclear and conventional forces. U.S. nuclear force development will set the benchmark for what it means to be a nuclear Great Power; China is likely to seek to match or outpace perceived U.S. technological advances to showcase its status as an aspiring superpower. China will likely remain reluctant to enter arms control negotiations if it views such agreements as constraining its efforts to enhance force survivability or limiting its prestige by locking it into an inferior position vis-à-vis the United States and Russia.

AT: Russia Miscalc---1NC Deterrence solves . Putin fears US involvement. Vershbow 23 [Alexander Vershbow is a former US ambassador to Russia and South Korea, a former deputy secretary-general of NATO, and a distinguished visiting fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, “How the United States and NATO can deal with Russian nuclear coercion in Ukraine”, June 23, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/06/how-the-united-states-and-nato-can-deal- with-russian-nuclear-coercion-in-ukraine/] IanM But even in that case, it will always be a lot easier for Putin to threaten nuclear escalation than to carry it out in practice . The effects on Russian troops and civilians of even a low-yield nuclear strike or “ demonstration” shot could be quite severe and unpredictable , given the vagaries of the weather . Although Putin was uncharacteristically reckless in launching this war of aggression, he is unlikely to want to risk the “catastrophic consequences ” promised by the U nited S tates , even if his back is up against the wall . Those consequences may primarily involve massive conventional strikes on Russian forces and military infrastructure in Ukraine; but the United States has not ruled out a limited nuclear response in kind if Russia breaks the nuclear taboo that has been in place since 1945. Moreover , for Putin to violate the nuclear taboo would only increase Russia’s political isolation and potentially elicit opposition from Russian miliary commanders that could threaten Putin’s grip on power. Using nuclear weapons would increase the likelihood that the U nited S tates and NATO would be drawn directly into the conflict , which Putin has been keen to avoid from the very outset of the war . It could prompt calls within NATO to expand tactical nuclear weapon deployments in Europe beyond the limited steps called for in the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) . A new NPR may be needed in any case to redress the imbalance between US and Russian non-strategic capabilities that will be exacerbated by deployments in Belarus, and to counter China’s looming nuclear buildup. The probability of miscalc is low . Bugos 23 [Shannon Bugos is a senior policy analyst at the Arms Control Association, “Russian Use of Nuclear Weapons Still Unlikely, U.S. Says”, June 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023- 06/news/russian-use-nuclear-weapons-still-unlikely-us-says] IanM Ahead of a widely expected counteroffensive by Ukraine in its war with Russia, the U.S. intelligence community continues to assert that the likelihood of Russia n President Vladimir Putin using nuclear weapons in the war remains low. “ It is very unlikely ” that Russia would employ nuclear weapons , D irector of N ational I ntelligence Avril Haines told Congress during a May 4 hearing. Gen. Scott Berrier, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who also testified at the hearing, agreed with Haines, but added that, “in the nature of conflict, there is always that possibility” of nuclear weapons use. The assessment followed Russia’s suspension in February of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control agreement still standing. (See ACT, March 2023 .) Moscow has conditioned a resumption of the treaty and its associated activities, such as on-site inspections and detailed data exchanges, on Washington withdrawing support from Kyiv. “ Russia’s decision to suspend the [ New] START may be reversible ,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in an April 20 statement. “However, for this, the United States must show political will and abandon its aggressive policy of undermining the security of our country, taking practical steps towards a real de-escalation.”

Despite the Russian suspension , the U nited S tates has continued to provide broad unclassified data on its strategic nuclear arsenal . In this year’s first biannual data exchange, Washington reported that it deploys 1,419 warheads on 662 delivery vehicles, roughly the same data as in September. (See ACT, November 2022 .) “ The U nited S tates continues to view transparency among nuclear weapon states as extremely valuable for reducing the likelihood of misperception , miscalculation , and costly arms competitions ,” the State Department said in a statement accompanying the publication of the data on May 12. Russia and the U nited S tates have emphasized that they will continue to adhere to an ongoing 1988 Soviet-U.S. agreement that requires the two nations to exchange notifications of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs ) and s ubmarine- l aunched b allistic m issiles. Russia also expressed its intention to continue adhering to a 1989 Soviet-U.S. agreement that requires advance notification of major strategic exercises .

2NC

PIC Counterplan solves the entire case and avoids our Asteroid Deflection DA ---that outweighs —extinction—nuclear deflection is key. Cooper 13 Necia Grant Cooper, Los Alamos National Lab. “Killing Killer Asteroids” https://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/pdf/NSS_April_2013.pdf Whew! We can all temporarily breathe a sigh of relief. However, the likelihood that one day a killer asteroid will be on a collision course with Earth is very high . Under a 2005 congressional mandate, government-sponsored surveys using ground and space-based telescopes have discovered 9,500 n ear- E arth o bjects; 1,300 of these, are deemed potentially hazardous. New asteroids and comets can be expected to enter Earth’s neighborhood as the gravitational pull of passing stars and collisions between asteroids do their work to alter the orbits of these (mostly) Solar-system residents. Also, we know with certainty from many fields of study that 63 million years ago, a 6-mile-diameter asteroid collided with Earth , striking Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula, releasing 10 million megatons of energy, creating a huge crater, and cau sing the extinction of the dinosaurs, a major change in climate, and the beginning of a new geological age . Any nearEarth object greater than a half-mile in diameter can become a deadly threat , potentially causing a mass extinction of us. Disrupting a Killer Asteroid These facts keep many professional and lay astronomers busy monitoring the sky. Recognizing the risk, astrophysicists are working on ways to intercept a killer asteroid and disrupt it in some way that will avert disaster. Los Alamos astrophysicist Robert Weaver is working on how to protect humanity from a killer asteroid by using a nuclear explosive. Weaver is not worried about the intercept problem. He would count on the rocket power and operational control already developed by NASA to intercept a threatening object and deliver the nuclear device. NASA’s Dawn Mission has been able to place a spacecraft in orbit around Vesta, a huge almost-planet-size asteroid in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter, and the NASA Deep Impact mission sent a probe into the nucleus of comet 9P/Tempel. In other words, we have the tech nology to rendezvous with a killer object and try to blow it up with a nuc lear explosive . But will it work? Weaver’s initial set of simulations on Los Alamos’ powerful Cielo supercomputer demonstrates the basic physics of how a nuc lear burst would do the job . The simulations suggest that a 1-megaton nuclear blast could deter a killer asteroid the size of Apophis or somewhat larger. By far the most detailed of Weaver’s calculations is a 3D computer simulation of a megaton blast on the surface of the potato-shaped Itokawa asteroid. Visited by Japan’s Hayabusa asteroid lander back in 2005, Itokawa is a conglomerate of granite rocks, a quarter of a mile long and about half as wide, held together by self-gravity (the gravitational attraction among its constituents). Weaver used the most modern , sophisticated Los Alamos codes to predict the progress of a megaton nuclear blast wave from the point of detonation through the asteroid . We’re entering a new cycle now – two cycles ago was the K-T impact that put an end to the dinosaurs – it increases the risk by an order of magnitude DG 16 – Daily Galaxy, via Copernicus Complex and Cardiff University, citing Caleb Scharf, director of the multidisciplinary Columbia Astrobiology Center at Columbia University, and Cardiff researchers, “The Last Time the Sun Was In This Exact Spot, Dinosaurs Ruled the Planet”, https://dailygalaxy.com/2016/10/our- solar-systems-226-million-year-milky-way-orbit-the-last-time-the-sun-was-in-this-exact-spot-dino/

Is there a genocidal countdown built into the motion of our solar system? Research at Cardiff University suggests that our system's orbit through the Milky Way encounters regular speedbumps – and by "speedbumps," we mean "potentially extinction-causing asteroids ." Our orbit through the Milky Way is not a perfect circle or an ellipse , since the galaxy itself is a landscape of undulating concentrations of mass and complex gravitational fields. As Caleb Scharf observes in The Copernicus Complex , " none of the components of the galaxy are stationary ; they, too, are orbiting and drifting in a three-dimensional ballet . The result is that our solar system , like billions of others, must inevitably encounter patches of interstellar space containing the thicker molecular gases and microscopic dust grains of nebulae . It takes tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of years to pass through one of these regions. "This may happen only once every few hundred million years," Scharf adds, "but if modern human civilization had kicked off during such an episode, we would have barely seen more than the nearest stars— certainly not the rest of our galaxy or the cosmos beyond. But could our planetary circumstances have been that different and still produced us? Would more changeable orbits in a planetary system , or bad weather, or passage through interstellar clouds, also thwart the emergence of life in some way ? " Phenomena such as these could be bad news , causing hostile surface environments on a planet. So it’s a possibility that the planetary requirements for forming sentient life like us will necessarily always present the senses and minds of such creatures with a specific cosmic tableau, a common window onto the universe." The visualization of the orbit of the Sun (yellow dot and white curve) below around the Galactic Center (GC) in the last galactic year. The red dots correspond to the positions of the stars studied by the European Southern Observatory in a monitoring program. If future research confirms a Milky Way galaxy-biodiversity link, it would force scientists to broaden their ideas about what can influence life on Earth. "Maybe it's not just the climate and the tectonic events on Earth," says UK paleontologist Bruce Lieberman. "Maybe we have to start thinking more about the extraterrestrial environment as well." The surge in cosmic-ray exposure could have both a direct and indirect effect on Earth's organisms, said Lieberman. The radiation could lead to higher rates of genetic mutations in organisms or interfere with their ability to repair DNA damage, potentially leading to diseases like cancer. William Napier and Janaki Wickramasinghe at Cardiff University completed computer simulations of the motion of the Sun in our outer spiral-arm location in the Milky Way that revealed a regular oscillation through the central galactic plane, where the surrounding dust clouds are the densest. The solar system is a non- trivial object, so its gravitational effects set off a far-reaching planetoid-pinball machine which often ends with comets being hurled into the intruding system. The sun is about 26,000 light-years from the center of the Milky Way Galaxy , which is about 80,000 to 120,000 light-years across (and less than 7,000 light-years thick). We are located on on one of its spiral arms, out towards the edge . It takes the sun -and our solar system- roughly 226 million years to orbit once around the Milky Way. In this orbit, we are traveling at a velocity of about 155 miles/sec (250 km/sec). Many of the ricocheted rocks collide with planets on their way through our system , including Earth. Impact craters recorded worldwide show correlations with the ~ 37 million year-cycle of these journeys through the galactic plane – including the vast impact craters thought to have put an end to the dinosaurs two cycles ago . Almost exactly two cycles ago, in fact . The figures show that we're very close to another danger zone , when the odds of asteroid impact on Earth go up by a factor of ten . Ten times a tiny chance might not seem like much, but when "Risk of Extinction" is on the table that single order of magnitude can look much more imposing .

Underground Basing CP solves accidents and crisis stability. Oelrich 21 [Ivan Oelrich was Vice President of the Federation of American Scientists, analyzed military manufacturing for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and is a non-resident scholar of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and non-resident fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, “Deep thoughts: How moving ICBMs far underground will make the whole world safer”, April 28, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/deep-thoughts-how-moving-icbms-far- underground-will-make-the-whole-world-safer/] IanM Underground missile basing , on the other hand, makes quick launch physically impossible , and visibly so . Russia could be provided additional assurance that the United States is not planning a surprise attack by putting a seismic monitor near the burial site (manned or unmanned; there are unmanned seismic stations scattered over the world to monitor, for example, possible clandestine underground nuclear tests) that could easily and reliably detect the work of the boring machines and a few times per day send a signal that no digging is taking place . If the United States ever did want to dig out, it could turn off the monitor—but then the lack of signal would be a warning to the Russians. Thus, the Russians could be continually reassured that the weapons were not being prepared for a surprise attack. The CP makes it much harder to launch. Oelrich 21 [Ivan Oelrich was Vice President of the Federation of American Scientists, analyzed military manufacturing for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and is a non-resident scholar of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and non-resident fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, “Deep thoughts: How moving ICBMs far underground will make the whole world safer”, April 28, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/deep-thoughts-how-moving-icbms-far- underground-will-make-the-whole-world-safer/] IanM What if the United States wants to be able , perhaps only in extreme circumstances , to launch missiles quickly , even, perhaps, in a first strike ? For example, while wanting to reassure Russia , the U nited S tates may want to maintain the ability to launch a disarming preemptive strike first against , say, North Korea’s nuclear missiles as they are being prepared for launch. This question exposes the near universal logical error in discussions of land-based missiles: the all-or-nothing basing assumption. The United States does not need to decide between putting land- based missiles in vulnerable silos or deep underground . There is no reason not to do both . If the United States needs to have a dozen or so missiles ready to launch on an hour’s notice to deal with an imminent threat from North Korea , those missiles can sit in silos . In limited numbers , these ready-to-launch missiles pose no first strike threat to Russia . To be able to retaliate against a large nuclear-armed country, which today means China or Russia, to deter them from striking in the first place, would take more missiles and nuclear weapons. But those could be safely based deep underground. That wrecks US nuclear deterrence AND causes war with revisionist powers . Praiswater 20 – [Major Shane Praiswater, Ph.D., is a former military analyst at the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a fellow at Johns Hopkins’ School

of Advanced International Studies, "Why We Need a New ICBM," Defense One, 12-7-2020, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/12/why-we-need-new-icbm/170547/] nl The arguments for keeping a nuclear triad . America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force is fading. 400 Minuteman IIIs — the remnant of a fleet deployed in the 1970s — will by mid-decade need too much maintenance to threaten the largest strikes contemplated by deterrence strategists. Refurbishing these aging missiles would cost more than replacing them, so the Air Force has given Northrop Grumman a $13.3 billion contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new ICBM that might cost nearly $100 billion. The GBSD program has its fair share of critics. Arms control advocates question whether the Air Force needs to replace the current ICBM fleet at all. Some prefer to just upgrade the Minuteman III, while others would rid the United States of ICBMs altogether. Stealthy Ohio-class submarines, whose own replacements are on their way, carry more than twice as many warheads as the current Minuteman fleet, while bombers bearing cruise missiles offer the flexibility of taking off without committing to delivery. Isn’t this deterrence enough? Sadly, no. New technology and enemy efforts are likely to end the missile submarine’s half-century of invulnerability, while advanced air defenses have already reduced U.S. bombers’ ability to strike. ICBMs remain key to effective nuclear deterrence, and fortunately, GBSD is far cheaper than extending the Minuteman. Even better, its acquisition gives arms control advocates an effective bargaining chip in any future negotiations over eliminating ICBMs. After all, if Russia or China held an absolute strategic advantage with their modernized ICBMs versus America’s obsolete Minuteman, why would they cede it? Arms control negotiations and nuclear modernization are not mutually exclusive. If tensions with Russia and China cool, perhaps the United States and its adversaries will find it beneficial to reduce the number of ICBMs via a mutually beneficial and verifiable agreement. However, the United States cannot afford to mortgage the security of its citizens and allies on hope, particularly when Russia and China intend to challenge the United States. GBSD offers the best of both worlds in that it maintains deterrence at the most efficient price A failure to modernize the ICBM fleet would leave the U nited S tates vulnerable as its adversaries reinforce their nuclear triads. Russia committed to updating its triad in 2018 , and China is feverishly working to bring its nuclear submarines and bombers to a level commensurate with U.S. forces . Especially given the uncertain future facing New START – the 2010 U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reduction treaty set to expire in February 2021 – and America’s increasingly fraught relations with Beijing and Moscow, GBSD is critical to deterrence and fiscal responsibility. Arguments that the United States could make do a nuclear “dyad” underestimate America’s adversaries and overstates the ability of U.S. bombers and submarines to deter a nuclear conflict without ICBM support . As it stands, Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization plans already seek to overcome America’s present military superiority . Russia, for example, has committed 5 percent of its “2027 military vision” budget to procure 300 additional ICBMs and s ub- l aunched b allistic m issile s , enough to overcome any missile defenses the United States might install. China has also rapidly expanded its nuclear arsenal , most notably by developing the DF-41 mobile ICBM, the JL-3 sub- launched ballistic missile, and a stealth bomber. Beijing has shown no interest in arms control measures that might bring transparency to its nuclear capabilities and programs. There is also increasing evidence that China seeks to equal, if not surpass , U.S. nuclear capabilities . China’s desire to surpass the United States on a global scale is no joke , and assessing Beijing’s true nuclear capacity is impossible without an arms agreement. Even if China does not currently have the ability to strike 400 American ICBM sites (as Russia does), the United States must assume that is China’s eventual goal. China’s official language has already evolved from maintaining a minimum deterrent to seeking “nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security.” The Defense Intelligence Agency also stated last year that Beijing is likely to more than double its stockpile in the next decade. These actions, and the bellicose language of Premier Xi Jinping, imply that China will inevitably bring its forces to a level commensurate with Russia’s. Moving to a dyad or delaying the deployment of GBSD would leave the U nited S tates at a severe strategic disadvantage . Hopes that Russia might voluntarily limit its stockpile seem overly optimistic , and China would welcome the U.S. adoption of such a self-imposed restriction. The risk of conflict with either state would increase , as confidence in their nuclear advantage might embolden aggression in Eastern Europe or the Pacific . The elimination of any triad component risks making a first-strike strategy conceivable for Russia or China , heightening the odds of a limited conflict turning into a massive nuclear exchange .

China and Russia are revisionist which turns arms control AND maintaining a strong international order is key to stability. Kim 23 , David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution with a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. (Patricia, 2-28-2023, “The Limits of the No-Limits Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/limits-of-a-no-limits- partnership-china-russia ) On February 4, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin , at the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. After talks, the two sides released a joint statement declaring that China and Russia’s bilateral partnership was greater than a traditional alliance and that their friendship would know “ no limits .” Twenty days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Putin’s brazen gambit immediately cast scrutiny on Beijing; many observers perceived that it had backed Putin’s offensive or, at best, willfully ignored it. Russia’s tight embrace of China since then comes as no surprise , given its dire need for partners in the face of global isolation . More striking is Beijing’s steadfast refusal to distance itself from Moscow , despite the costs to its global image and its strategic interests . Even as Russia has become a pariah, Beijing has not paused bilateral exchanges and joint military exercises or dialed down its public exhortations on deepening strategic coordination with its friend to the north. Beijing’s resolve to maintain ties with Moscow is partly practical. Chinese leaders want to keep their nuclear-armed neighbor and former rival on their side as they look ahead to intense , long-term competition with the U nited S tates . But China’s alignment with Russia is not only a matter of realpolitik. Beijing sees Moscow as its most important partner in the wider project of altering a global order that it perceives as skewed unfairly toward the West . In this order, according to the Chinese and Russian line, the United States and its allies set the rules to their advantage, defining what it means to be a democracy and to respect human rights while retaining the power to isolate and punish actors for failing to uphold those standards. Beijing and Moscow purport to seek a “fairer,” multipolar order that better takes into account the views and interests of developing countries. Such revisionist aspirations undoubtedly resonate in the global South and even in some quarters of the developed world. But Xi’s designation of Putin as a key ally in the push for a less Western-centric world has ultimately set Beijing back in accomplishing its objectives. China’s association with a revanchist Russia has only drawn more attention to its own aggressive posture toward Taiwan . The perception of a hardening Chinese-Russian axis has , in turn, reinforced ties among U.S. allies and partners . And China’s proximity to Russia has undermined the c redibility of Beijing’s claims of being a champion for peace and development . In short, the Chinese-Russian alignment has proved far more threatening to the U.S.-led order in its conception than in its operation . To be sure, the partnership can still cause damage —for instance, by shielding the likes of Russia and North Korea from punitive measures at the United Nations and enabling their continued aggression . But Beijing’s and Moscow’s conflicting priorities and the latter’s generally dismal prospects limit the pair’s ability to revise the existing global order in a truly coordinated and radical way. Western leaders should nevertheless accept that efforts to push Beijing to cut its ties with Moscow are likely to fail. In the near term, the United States and its allies should focus instead on preventing the partnership from veering down a more destructive path by taking advantage of Beijing’s strong interest in the preservation of global stability. More broadly, Washington and its allies should recognize that China and Russia are channeling real disaffection with the existing international order in many parts of the world—and should get to work bridging the gap between the West and the rest. FRIENDS IN NEED Since Xi’s rise to power in 2012, Russia has become one of China’s key partners with the steady strengthening of economic, political, and military ties. Moscow and Beijing may have started off as allies in the early days of the Cold War, but decades of rivalry and mistrust followed a split over ideological differences that emerged in the late 1950s. Beijing and Moscow have been brought together again in the twenty-first century by shared grievances with the West and the clear parallels they perceive in their respective situations, with Russia accusing NATO of encirclement and China feeling hemmed in by U.S. alliances in Asia. Chinese and Russian leaders also share a fear of “color revolutions”—popular uprisings

that have ousted autocratic governments around the world, including in former Soviet states—which they allege are Western-sponsored attempts at regime change. Last year’s rhetoric about a friendship with “no limits” followed an earlier upgrade to relations in 2019 , when China and Russia announced they had forged a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” during Xi’s visit to Moscow . China accords this deliberately long moniker to relations with no other state. And by invoking “ a new era ” (a phrase Xi coined to reflect China’s bid for national rejuvenation in a shifting geopolitical landscape ), the label also underscored the two states’ intention to work hand in hand during a period of strategic opportunity . In recent decades, China has shunned formal alliances f or both pragmatic and ideological reasons and has criticized the U nited S tates’ vast alliance network as a “vestige of the Cold War.” But Beijing has increasingly resorted to semantic gymnastics to talk about its alignment with Russia. Chinese statements regularly insist that the bilateral partnership is “not an alliance” and “not targeted” against any third party while also making the case that China and Russia’s relationship “surpasses” traditional alliances. Even before the joint statement in February 2022, Beijing had stressed that no areas of cooperation were off limits and that the partnership would stand firm in the face of international headwinds. Hard military ties have grown alongside this rhetorical camaraderie since the first joint Chinese-Russian military exercise conducted in 2005. Since 2012, the two sides have engaged in increasingly ambitious and frequent training , including naval exercises in the East China and South China Seas and joint engagements with third parties, such as Iran, South Africa, and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a China-led grouping of states. In late 2021, China and Russia made headlines by holding their first joint naval exercise in the western Pacific, during which their vessels sailed through key waterways around Japan. Economic ties, too, have deepened in the last decade, with the two sides signing dozens of agreements outlining cooperation on energy, infrastructure, agriculture, finance, and technology. Bilateral trade has grown in volume over the last two decades, but it has also become increasingly unbalanced, with China’s economy rapidly eclipsing Russia’s. As of 2021, China accounted for 18 percent of Russia’s total trade, while Russia only accounted for two percent of China’s. Russia’s top exports to China are natural resources, such as gas, oil, and coal, that may be important today but will become less so as Beijing turns more toward renewable energy sources. China’s top exports to Russia, however, are largely manufactured goods, such as machinery and electronics. Russia depends overwhelmingly on the more advanced Chinese economy for technology imports, from semiconductors to telecommunications equipment. WOULD-BE REVOLUTIONARIES This material relationship sits alongside an intensifying ideological alignment . China and Russia both seek to challenge what they perceive to be a Western-dominated global order that allows the United States and its allies to impose their interests on others. The two countries have frequently protested the primacy of “ Western values ” in international forums and have argued for a conditional understanding of human rights and democracy, defined “in accordance with the specific situation in each country.” In their joint statement from February 2022, China and Russia insisted that they, too, are democracies and took a swipe at “certain states” for using the “pretext of protecting democracy and human rights” to sow discord among other countries and intervene in their internal affairs. Beijing and Moscow accuse Washington of unfairly using its economic power, including the privileged position of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system, to impose punitive measures on its rivals. China and Russia have both pushed back on Western sanctions, despite employing economic coercion themselves against others. Beijing has argued that sanctions levied outside the auspices of the UN violate states’ “right to development,” a framing that has its roots in the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests to prioritize the “right to subsistence” above civil liberties and political freedoms. Although China no longer struggles with concerns about basic subsistence, Beijing has criticized high-tech export restrictions and other decoupling measures adopted by the United States and its allies as unfairly constraining China’s development and “right to rejuvenation.” Beijing has also used this language to object to Western sanctions on Russia regardless of its offenses, claiming that the sanctions infringe on Russia’s economic rights and have damaging side effects on developing countries. In the global South, China continues to market itself as an apolitical champion for development, a position that Russia supports. The two have extolled the virtues of Chinese projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, a vast infrastructure development program, and the more recently announced Global Development Initiative, a still vaguely defined scheme seen as a successor to the BRI that, according to Beijing, brings development “back” to the center of the global agenda. Such initiatives, along with Chinese messaging about development, have found receptive audiences in the global South, given that many low-income countries want rapid development but remain averse to international scrutiny on their domestic governance.

Xi and Putin have met in person 39 times since 2012. Over the years, Beijing and Moscow have advanced various measures to weaken U.S. control of the international economy . They have cooperated to create alternative financial institutions and mechanisms to dent the dollar’s dominance and blunt the impact of Western sanctions. This effort has gained greater urgency since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent cutting off of major Russian banks from the SWIFT international payment system. Since Beijing and Moscow agreed in 2019 to boost the use of national currencies in cross-border trade, the Russian central bank has significantly reduced its dollar holdings and increased its investment in Chinese yuan. About a quarter of Chinese-Russian trade is now settled in renminbi and rubles, and this percentage will increase following the announcement last fall that China will begin to pay for Russian gas half in renminbi and half in rubles. Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to reduce the dominance of the dollar have been warmly welcomed in friendly groupings such as the SCO and the BRICS, which brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. At the heart of China and Russia’s ideological alignment is a common desire to weaken the vast U.S.-led alliance architecture in Europe and Asia. The two countries accuse Washington and its allies of violating the principle of “indivisible security” by advancing their security interests at the expense of others’. The Kremlin has employed this argument to justify its war in Ukraine and to redirect blame for the conflict on NATO. And this narrative has caught on in many parts of the global South, thanks in part to Chinese state media amplifying Russian talking points. In Asia, Beijing has pointed to the strengthening of the U.S. alliance network—including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a security partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, a partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as evidence of the U.S.-led containment of China. But Beijing faces an uphill battle in challenging the U.S. presence , given that many Asian governments are concerned about China’s aggressive behavior and welcome the U nited S tates’ balancing role in the region . Despite seeking to change elements of the current global order, Beijing and Moscow do not wish to revise all elements of the existing architecture. They continue to stress that the United Nations and UN Security Council should play a leading role in the international arena. This position is unsurprising, given the privileges China and Russia enjoy as permanent members of the Security Council and their ability to rally developing world partners at the UN. DOUBLING DOWN Until February 24, 2022, when Russian troops stormed Ukraine, Beijing saw little downside to its burgeoning relationship with Moscow. It is unclear just how much Chinese leaders knew of Putin’s plans in advance. But they were likely taken aback when the Russian attack floundered and placed a heavy spotlight on China. Even so, Beijing has ultimately chosen not to distance itself from Russia . Chinese leaders have yet to explicitly condemn Putin’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine and have spoken in defense of Russia’s “ legitimate security concerns .” Chinese state media outlets have also amplified Russian propaganda and disinformation about the war in Ukraine . At the same time, China maintains that it is not a party to the conflict and that it supports peaceful negotiations, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. It has expressed concern about the “prolonged and expanded crisis” in Ukraine, including its negative spillover effects. China also abstained on three UN resolutions last year that condemned Russia’s invasion and annexation of Ukrainian territory. Chinese officials privately insist that these abstentions were a sign of Beijing’s disapproval of Russian behavior and that they went to great lengths to rebuff Moscow’s repeated requests that Beijing veto these resolutions. Chinese leaders have also made clear to their Russian counterparts that they oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and underlined their expectations that Moscow pursue a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. In the months following the invasion, Chinese banks and businesses largely complied with sanctions by curtailing shipments of restricted goods and suspending select operations in the Russian market, although last year, the U.S. Department of Commerce accused five Chinese firms of violating sanctions and the U.S. Treasury recently sanctioned a Chinese company for providing satellite imagery to the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization operating in Ukraine. To date, the Chinese government has not extended direct material assistance to Russia’s military efforts, although the Biden administration warned in February that Beijing may be on the cusp of supplying Moscow with lethal aid. Beijing has nevertheless made a point of maintaining normal trade ties with Moscow, and nonsanctioned sectors of bilateral trade have ballooned as a result. Just weeks before the Russian invasion, the two countries signed oil and gas deals worth nearly $120 billion and announced the lifting of Chinese restrictions on Russian wheat and barley imports. China replaced Germany as the largest importer of Russian energy last year, and Chinese-Russian trade reached a record-breaking $180 billion in 2022. China and Russia have also kept up their steady pace of diplomatic engagement. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, top Chinese and Russian officials have met 21 times since last February. Russian state media has reported that Xi may pay Putin a visit in Moscow this spring.

Perhaps most remarkably, Beijing and Moscow have maintained their steady pace of joint military exercises, even as the Russian military is bombarding Ukrainian cities. Last May, as U.S. President Joe Biden traveled in the region, Chinese and Russian bombers flew over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and into South Korea’s air defense identification zone. China participated in Russian exercises in the Russian Far East and in the Sea of Japan in September, and the two capped the year off with a major joint naval exercise in the East China Sea in late December. Their first joint military exercise of 2023 has been planned for February, coinciding with the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and will include South Africa, a BRICS partner. BLOWBACK China’s decision to double down on its alignment with Russia even after the latter’s naked aggression in Ukraine has raised grave concerns on the part of the United States and its allies . Polling by the Pew Research Center indicates that the percentage of Americans with unfavorable views of China, which was already at historic highs in 2021, increased further, from 76 percent to 82 percent, in 2022. Moreover, 62 percent believed the relationship between China and Russia is a “very serious” problem for the United States. Views of China have soured, particularly in Europe, dashing Beijing’s hopes that the European Union would adopt a more benign posture than that of the United States. Polling by the German Marshall Fund last September found that many Europeans preferred a “tougher” approach to China, even if such policies would come at an economic cost. Although Tokyo has long been wary of the threat posed by China, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fears of a similar scenario in Asia have inspired the recent, historic changes in Japan’s defense policies, including its moves to develop counterstrike capabilities, to double its defense budget, and to sign unprecedented security pacts with Australia and the United Kingdom. The most damaging consequence of Russia’s aggression for China is the heightened global awareness and sense of urgency about Taiwan . Preventing Taiwan from becoming “ the next Ukraine ” has become a topic of grave concern , not just in Washington but among U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, many of whom once viewed Taiwan’s fate as only vaguely relevant, if at all, to their own security or a matter too politically sensitive to discuss. A record number of lawmakers from countries including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have visited Taipei in the last year to express support for the island. Fears about Chinese and Russian revisionism have strengthened ties between NATO and the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies , as well. Last year, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea participated in a NATO summit for the first time. Leaders there jointly recognized the danger of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and called for greater coordination among like-minded European and Asian partners . Although negative views of China have spiked among developed democracies, that has not been the case in the developing world, especially among nondemocratic states. As a study published last fall by the Bennett Institute for Public Policy found, China’s and even Russia’s favorability ratings remain relatively high in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. BOUNDS IN THE BOUNDLESS Partnership with Russia has hurt China’s image in the West and has inspired more concerted coordination among the United States and its partners to the detriment of Chinese ambitions. But China will not forsake Russia anytime soon. Beijing must keep Moscow close as it looks ahead to decades of competition with Washington . It cannot afford to be distracted by tensions with a militarily formidable neighbor with which it shares a 2,600 mile border. In addition, Xi has invested a great deal in his relationship with Putin , the two having met a remarkable total of 39 times since 2012. The Chinese state cannot backpedal away from this personal commitment without suggesting that Xi , its “core leader ,” has erred . Nonetheless, Beijing’s behavior since February demonstrates that there are indeed some limits to its partnership with Moscow. Although China and Russia share revisionist goals and seek privileged positions for themselves at the top of the international hierarchy , the two countries do not always agree about how to achieve these objectives. Even as China grapples with a relative economic slowdown after decades of rapid growth and faces various challenges at home, it remains the world’s second-largest economy. It has much more to lose than Russia does from global instability and economic isolation. Chinese leaders and citizens know well that their country’s integration into the global economy, along with the flow of investments and people in and out of China, has fueled the country’s economic miracle. China still has great capacity to influence other countries through its economic offerings , such as investments , loans , and infrastructure and trade agreements , all of which have allowed Beijing to project power and promote its agenda globally in recent years . Russia, on the other hand, is a lopsided power that has significant military capabilities but dismal economic prospects. With fewer tools of influence at its disposal, Moscow has turned to brute force to achieve its aims and has become increasingly isolated as a result, with years of economic contraction looming. Chinese

leaders have staked their legitimacy on achieving their country’s revitalization, so they are less likely to emulate or join in the Kremlin’s violent revisionism. According to news reports in CNN and the German outlet Der Spiegel, China is negotiating the possible sales of strike drones and ammunition to Russia . These deals have yet to be concluded. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will allow these or other weapons transactions to move forward given heightened global scrutiny. If China does provide such assistance to Russia, it would come with colossal consequences for Chinese relations with the West. But at present, it seems unlikely that China will support Moscow militarily to the degree that the United States and its partners have assisted Kyiv. Military coordination between China and Russia is likely to remain more performative than geared to actual joint combat. In fact, Beijing is likely to refuse any direct Russian military assistance in the event of a war over Taiwan, given the deep nationalist sentiments that undergird its quest to consolidate rule over the island. Similarly, it is hard to imagine Moscow welcoming any operational presence of the People’s Liberation Army in its own backyard. Despite the official rhetoric of friendship, China and Russia ultimately lack close cultural and people-to-people ties that could inspire their citizens to die in war for each other—a high bar to meet even for countries that share such bonds. These factors suggest that the prospect of a joint Chinese-Russian military campaign remains remote for the time being. China and Russia’s partnership is real and likely to endure for the foreseeable future. But its strategic implications should not be overstated or underestimated. The fundamental differences between their respective outlooks, along with Russia’s growing limitations, will curb the alignment’s appeal and its ability to revise the existing global order, which requires exerting influence among both developing and developed countries. A limited partnership between the two countries can still be destabilizing, particularly if China serves as Russia’s economic lifeline and the pair continue to partner in protecting fellow autocracies and enabling their transgressions at home and abroad. The United States should neither expect the disintegration of this alignment nor resign itself to the further consolidation of Chinese- Russian ties . Instead, U.S. officials should appeal to Beijing’s fundamental interest in stability to push Chinese leaders to rein in Russian recklessness. Recent efforts by Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and others to press Xi to oppose the threat or use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine offer a good example of how Western powers can work with China to send the right signals to Moscow. The same approach should be used to advocate for a peace agreement that delivers justice for the people of Ukraine, once a road map for such an accord emerges. Skeptics may question whether attempting to work with Beijing will be worth the effort, given that it is unlikely to endorse tough measures that jeopardize its ties with Moscow. China will also seek credit for its cooperation, which should be given when due. It will attempt to link its willingness to cooperate with Western powers on Ukraine to concessions in other areas, such as easing export restrictions on Chinese companies or curbing diplomatic support for Taiwan. The United States and its partners will need to manage such demands by setting proper expectations with Beijing. China’s words and actions, as a member of the UN Security Council and as Russia’s most consequential ally and trade partner, will affect Moscow’s decisions in Ukraine and beyond. As such, securing China’s cooperation in working toward peace in Europe will be essential. The U nited S tates and its allies should also give serious thought to why Chinese and Russian accusations of Western hypocrisy and hegemony resonate in many parts of the world and to how they might address these grievances. They will have to grapple with tough issues, such as the damaging humanitarian consequences in the global South of the West’s mounting use of non-UN sanctions. And they will have to find ways to ensure powerful international institutions , including the UN Security Council , the G-20, and the vast array of international standard-setting bodies that shape the rules and norms on everything from global finance to AI research , can better account for the voices and priorities of developing states. To prevent further global division and the exploitation of this gap by China and Russia, the United States and its partners should foster enduring ties with developing countries and actively consider where alterations to the existing international order are necessary rather than ceding the ground to Beijing and Moscow. Don’t throw out the sponge ! ---AT: sponge isn’t effective anymore because Russia or others have more accurate missiles so would not have to expend as much of their arsenal and thus no longer fear the sponge Huessy 23 [Dr. Peter Huessy is a Senior Nuclear Weapons Analyst for the Atlantic Council and the Hudson Institute, “Nuclear Deterrence Without ICBMs? Might Not Work”, May 2, 2023, https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/nuclear-deterrence-without-icbms-might-not-work] IanM The central argument made is that the high accuracy of the D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile makes the ICBM force superfluous . Marsh claims the Navy Ohio class subs have enough warheads to

hold at risk all the Russian and Chinese forces necessary to preserve deterrence , despite the decision of every President since 1962 to deploy, sustain and modernize the US ICBM force, now consisting of 450 ICBM missiles and launch facilities. As Marsh claims, eliminating ICBMs can be done without “compromising US capability to destroy all current nuclear targets. But Marsh goes even further and resurrects a common ghost story that since ICBMs are in fixed silos, the Russian can target the missiles for destruction. In a crisis, it is assumed Russian might launch early to take them out, and a US President, worrying about not having the ICBMs available, would launch even quicker and get in the first punch. This would require a launch on warning posture, and to remedy such a situation, getting rid of the missiles no longer makes them a target. But Marsh admits the warning time for a sea-launched Russian missile could be as little as 5-10 minutes, so does he recommend the US launch its bombers and sea-launched ballistic missiles as well immediately upon an emerging crisis? No Marsha does not. But using his strange logic, the US would have to get rid of all targets in the US capable of being struck quickly by Russian warheads. In short, that would require the US to disarm and eliminate its three bomber bases and the two submarine bases as well as all 400 ICBM silos because after all these targets are all vulnerable. In reality, the US actually is not compelled to launch on warning. And any attacking force would know the likelihood of effectively wiping out all ICBMs simultaneously is close to zero . Why would the head of the Russia n Strategic Rocket Forces risk Armageddon and the destruction of Russian society as the US could retaliate with overwhelming nuclear force ? Could anything be more reckless or stupid? Even without the entirety of the US ICBM force, the US would have a retaliatory force of some eight submarines in transit or on patrol, plus up to 60 strategic bombers carrying five hundred or more gravity bombs or cruise missiles as well. With the ICBM force , an adversary does not know if the US would employ its ICBMs on warning , or after an attack. That uncertainty is a strong disincentive for any rogue state not to attack the United States, However, if one assumes the head of the Russian rocket forces is unstable and able or wants to launch an attack on just the US ICBM force, as Marsh apparently thinks is the case, would it not just be prudent to not risk such a worse case scenario? Actually, adopting such a posture would actually be highly imprudent. In fact, it would be downright reckless. While the D-5 has a high accuracy, about two-thirds of the fleet is on patrol or in transit, available to launch. The retaliatory warheads available would thus be only about 730. Here Marsh’s fuzzy math breaks down. Deterrence is not just holding at risk the weapons of the bad guys today but also tomorrow. The tomorrow Russian and Chinese target set is easily 805 individual missile silos , on top of which one would have to also hold at risk all leadership, bomber and submarine bases , plus deployments of hundreds of Chinese nuclear armed theater or regional nuclear systems, particularly IRBMs and MRBMs and potentially an equal number of like Russian systems as well including Chinese and Russian mobile ICBMs and those stored in tunnels and caves. Nuclear experts Rick Fisher of IASC and Mark Schnieder of NIPP have estimated that Russia and China both have or will have within the next decade some 1200 SNDVs or strategic nuclear delivery vehicles , including nearly 800-900 silo-based and mobile and underground ICBMs, 300 theater ballistic missiles, and at least 20 ballistic missile submarines and 200 strategic bombers. When combined, the target base is well in excess of 1000 , and when factored in, the mobile ICBMs on rail in Russia and China, many of which are underground, brings the target environment to where multiple thousands of US warheads would be needed to effectively hold at risk such Russian and Chinese targets. No matter how accurate 1000 warheads may be, they cannot take out targets requiring a multi— thousand warhead force . If just ten percent of the US warheads miss their targets , the US would be getting back in a counter punch some 100 missiles, and upwards of 1000 warheads on those missiles, or

20 nuclear bombs for every one of the 50 states in the US . How is that considered effective deterrence? To say nothing of having anything in reserve for deterring North Korea or Iran. Generally speaking, the US strategy assumes the US has at least two warheads for all the targets we need to hold at risk if retaliating from a limited escalate to deterring all the way up to a pre-emptive disarming first-strike attempt. The current American force of 1300-1800 deployed warheads is allowed by New START but was designed to deter the chief US adversary in Russia in 2010. A submarine only Ohio class fleet could build to nearly 2000 warheads plus additional bomber weapons but would be beyond the allowed New START numbers. But China has emerged as an additional central strategic adversary and is nuclear armed . With 360 new ICBM silos filled with for example the DF-41, ten-warhead missile, China could deploy some 4000+ warheads , still dwarfing US deployed forces and exceeding the entire US nuclear stockpile , deployed or otherwise. And Russia with 1900-2000 short and medium range, battlefield nuclear forces , must be added to the mix , making further future reliance upon just the current US nuclear deterrent the height of miscalculation, let alone a force at least one-third smaller. Both Representative Lamborn and Senator Fischer have called for a senior review of the US hedge strategy as it was put together in 2010 when the Chinese threat had not materialized and the full extent of the Russian buildup was not yet visible. Senior US military leaders have echoed their points. A force of submarines and bombers only could not build an effective hedge let alone a currently required deterrent. And when the US moves after 2032 to a fully Columbia class fleet of submarines, the total fast flying warhead deployment on alert would shrink further from near 1400 to near 1000, or actually no more than the current New START allowed level of submarine warheads, even though the US would still be facing the nuclear arsenals of our adversaries that is rapidly growing. An ICBM force remains critical to US security . ICBMs ensure that no cheap, small strike can disarm the U nited S tates. A submarine and bomber only Dyad would reduce the US target base to some five CONUS targets , (two sub and three bomber bases), plus six submarines at sea . An ASW technology breakthrough would thus put our entire nuclear deterrent at risk , but an ICBM force we have now prevents that from happening as no technology upgrade can put the US ICBM force at risk any more than current technology. Only dizzy nuclear math supports an alternative to our Triad. ICBMs serving as a sponge is vital to deterrence. Lowther and Williams 23 [Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He spent more than two decades in uniform and as an Air Force and Army civil servant working on nuclear issues, and Lt. Col. Derek Williams is a B-52 Weapons System Officer and graduate of Sandia National Laboratories’ Weapons Intern program, ”WHY AMERICA HAS A LAUNCH ON ATTACK OPTION”, July 10, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/07/why-america-has-a-launch-on- attack-option/ ] IanM If Russia were to maintain its nuclear forces at current levels , it would take more than its entire land- based i nter c ontinental b allistic m issile force to destroy America’s land-based i nter c ontinental b allistic m issile s . This requirement serves as an effective deterrent , since it makes an attack on American missile fields a high-risk option . Unfortunately, the New START Treaty that bound Russia to limits on operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons faltered amidst serious tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent decision to suspend the treaty’s implementation.

We believe Russia’s continued observance of New START Treaty limits is increasingly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin could rely more on nuclear weapons to compensate for his declining conventional performance in Ukraine . Should Russia do so and , on the worst day, choose to preemptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal in a crisis, President Putin has a range of options to employ against America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force . For this and other reason s discussed below, we believe that the U nited S tates should keep its intercontinental ballistic force “on alert” and maintain its “launch under attack” option to both ensure the force’s survivability in a conflict and deter adversaries from seriously contemplating a first strike. In a March 17 War on the Rocks article, “ Launch Under Attack: A Sword of Damocles ,” Natalie Montoya and R. Scott Kemp recommended eliminating the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile force’s launch under attack option based on the results of Montoya’s baccalaureate thesis (2021). Unfortunately, the recent article does not accurately reflect how the United States conducts nuclear deterrence operations. We are focusing on three aspects of the larger debate surrounding the advisability of a launch under attack option for the intercontinental ballistic missile force: intercontinental ballistic missile tactics, the accidental launch fallacy, and technical imperatives. We suggest that those, like Montoya and Kemp, arguing for a change in the alert posture of the intercontinental ballistic missile force are mistaken in their assessment of how such a move would affect American deterrence. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Tactics Montoya and Kemp’s article summarizes the findings of Montoya’s thesis, in which she uses publicly available data to develop simulations of Russian nuclear attacks on America’s intercontinental ballistic missile fields. The pair suggest that at least 100, and possibly up to 200, of the nation’s land-based ballistic missiles would survive a first strike and remain available to the president for a retaliatory strike. They argue that the option to launch the American land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force under attack is dangerous, provocative, and unnecessary because these missiles are survivable enough to absorb an attack and have the necessary retaliatory forces required. In fact, they argue that by absorbing a first strike, the advantage shifts to the United States because Russia has used the majority, if not all, of its nuclear forces to destroy only part of the American land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force. While not stated directly, the only way to demonstrate a commitment to end the launch under attack option and to prevent the president from executing this option is to de-alert the force. These actions would be dangerous and would undermine America’s response to the rapid nuclear breakout of China and Russian aggression. Montoya and Kemp are correct in suggesting that it is difficult to successfully eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in a first strike because of the total number of weapons required for this task. The 400 missiles, across 450 silos , with 45 launch control centers , and the ability to launch from the Airborne Launch Control System , make the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad a formidable challenge to a Russian first strike . These characteristics of the nation’s silo-based single-warhead missiles make them valuable; ensuring their destruction is a daunting task that enhances American deterrence . We disagree with Montoya and Kemp when they say that “the United States maintains a posture it calls “‘launch under attack,’ a doctrine that permits U.S. missiles to be loosed from their shelters after ‘ multiple, independent sensors ’ detect an incoming attack from an adversary.” According to the State Department fact sheet they cite, “The United States does not have a launch on warning doctrine [a term used interchangeably with launch under attack].” It is also important to distinguish between posture and doctrine. Using the terms correctly is important because force posture has a very specific meaning and is detailed in classified documents such as the “President’s Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons” and other documents that are used by the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the services to influence acquisition and operations. Joint and service doctrine establishes how, in the case of the former, the joint force will operate and, in the latter, how each service thinks about and conducts operations.

ICBMs are crucial to deterrence. Harris and Yanikov 23 [Brig. Gen. Glenn T. Harris is a researcher for the U.S. Air Force, and Maj. John Yanikov is a researcher at the U.S. Army, U.S. Strategic Command, “Improving Strategic Deterrence”, May 18, 2023, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2023/05/improving-strategic-deterrence/] IanM There is a reason that nuclear deterrence remains the most important mission within the U nited S tates military . U.S. Navy Adm. Charles Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the command in charge of deterring strategic attacks and providing a decisive response should deterrence fail, explained: “Every operational plan in the Department of Defense (DOD), and every other capability we have, rests on an assumption that strategic deterrence will hold. And if strategic deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, doesn’t hold, none of our other plans and no other capability that we have, is going to work as designed.” To ensure nuclear deterrence remains credible as the bedrock of U.S. national security, it must undergo critical modernization of its traditional triad weapons systems — ground, sea and air platforms that can launch nuclear weapons. In addition, evolving from the conventional operational approach to deterrence to a more robust concept of integrated deterrence will better help the U.S. maintain its credible nuclear capability for the foreseeable future and ensure stability across the globe. Under this concept, the capabilities of the nuclear triad are tied to and incorporated with other strategic capabilities such as cyber, space and missile defense, and even civilian academia, industry and allies, Nuclear deterrence results from the shared understanding among competitors that each has a ready and reliable ability to respond in kind to a nuclear attack. The key traditional component to maintaining nuclear deterrence is fielding viable weapons systems. Today’s U.S. nuclear triad consists of 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 60 nuclear-capable heavy bomber aircraft. Collectively, the U.S. triad seeks to ensure that no adversary believes it could launch a strategic attack , under any circumstance , that eliminates the U.S. ability to respond and inflict unacceptable damage . To this end, each leg of the triad provides unique and complementary attributes , making U.S. strategic forces responsive, survivable and flexible. Minuteman III ICBMs make up the most responsive leg of the nuclear triad. Since 1959, Minuteman missiles have remained on around-the-clock alert, providing a quick-to-respond component of America’s strategic deterrence program. The ICBMs are spread among 400 hardened , underground silos — with an additional 50 silos kept in “warm” status — assigned to multiple military bases , presenting a targeting problem for any adversary . The hardened and dispersed nature of U.S. ICBMs requires an adversary to commit to a massive attack against the U.S. homeland to have a chance of [ destroying ] disabling all ICBMs , thus enhancing deterrence . The Minuteman III arsenal capitalizes on a routine “ remove and replace ” update approach that has allowed it to achieve a 100% alert rate since it was first deployed. Secure communication systems provide the U.S. president and secretary of defense with highly reliable , virtually instantaneous direct contact with each launch crew . Launch crews in control centers perform continuous alerts with all remote missile launch sites. Should command capability be lost between a launch control center and a remote missile launch facility, specially configured E-6B airborne launch control center aircraft would automatically assume command and control of the isolated missile(s). Airborne missile combat crews would execute the president’s orders, making the land- based ICBM leg of the triad also survivable. It’s key to damage limitation Matthew Kroenig 18 , is associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, The Case for the US ICBM Force, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf, DOA: 10- 22-18, y2k Finally, ICBMs can save millions of American lives. This may be the most important role of US ICBMs. While many nuclear strategists focus exclusively on deterrence, policy makers must also consider what happens if , God forbid, deterrence fails .54 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review sets out “achiev(ing) US objectives should deterrence fail” as one of four major roles of US nuclear weapons. It explains that “US

nuclear policy for decades has consistently included this objective of limiting damage if deterrence fails.”55 The maintenance of an ICBM force greatly contributes to America’s damage limitation capability. To explain this point, consider hypothetical nuclear exchanges between the United States and Russia. First, imagine that Russia conducts a nuclear first strike against the United States. As stated above, it is believed that Russia’s nuclear strategy calls for counterforce strikes. In addition, it is also believed that, in the event of a large-scale nuclear exchange, Moscow would use remaining forces for countervalue attacks aimed to maximize destruction to the US homeland or as bargaining leverage to end the conflict on its terms.56 With a US ICBM force in place, Russia would need to allocate 900 nuclear warheads to destroying US ICBM silos . Again, this is why US ICBMs are sometimes referred to as a “warhead sink.” If , however, the US ICBMs were eliminated , these 900 nuclear weapons would be available to attack other targets , including countervalue targets affecting hundreds of additional US population centers . Conducting detailed nuclear exchange calculations, I estimate that a Russian nuclear first strike on the United States with an ICBM force in place would result in 70 million US casualties.57 With the ICBM force removed, this figure rises to approximately 125 million casualties. To argue, therefore, that the United States can safely eliminate ICBMs, one would have to maintain that it does not matter whether 55 million Americans live or die in the event of a Russian attack. This may be an acceptable cost to some, but the history of US nuclear strategy has shown that policy makers responsible for protecting American lives prefer a plan that limits damage if deterrence fails. They are not comfortable needlessly risking tens of millions of additional American lives in the event of enemy nuclear attack. Indeed, the United States could strengthen damage limitation by increasing its number of ICBMs. This would reduce the adversary’s warheads available for urban strikes, and the 2:1 shot ratio would force the opponent into an unfavorable cost position. The result is similar if we consider a situation in which the United States strikes first with a large-scale nuclear attack. This scenario is unlikely but possible, if, for example, Russia launched a major conventional attack, a major nonnuclear strategic attack, or a limited nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. With ICBMs, the United States possesses 400 nuclear warheads it can use in counterforce strikes on Russia’s nuclear forces. At two offensive warheads for every counterforce target, this would result in the destruction of up to 200 Russian nuclear weaponsrelated targets before those weapons could be used against US or allied territory. In contrast, if the U nited S tates eliminated its ICBMs, it would have fewer forces with which to blunt Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability . Indeed, if the United States were to eliminate ICBMs, Washington might need to consider abandoning counterforce targeting and the damage limitation element of its strategy altogether. Assuming, however, that the United States persisted with a counterforce targeting strategy even without ICBMs, the US ability to limit damage would be greatly reduced. By my calculation, a Russian second strike on the United States, following a US first strike that included ICBMs, would result in 28 million US casualties. In contrast, the same scenario without US ICBMs would cause 82 million casualties. The difference is once again approximately 50 million American lives. The United States can reduce its number of ICBMs as some critics suggest or eliminate them altogether, but for every US ICBM it cuts , it may expose additional American lives to the threat of direct nuclear attack . The existence of the ICBM force , therefore, can contribute to the goal of damage limitation. ICBMs are key to make subs and bombers effective deterrent Tom Nichols 16 is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School, Dumping America's ICBMs Would Be a Big Mistake, 10-5, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dumping-americas-icbms-would-be-big-mistake-17946? page=0%2C1, DOA: 10-25-18, y2k Perry makes a fair point that the accuracy of both the bomber and sub marine force is on par with its land-based counterpart. But this , in turn, means that if America were to “ride out” a strike on the ICBM force , the sub marines and bombers —as Perry admits— could do whatever tasks are left once the enemy has emptied its own ICBM force at us . The major virtue of the ICBM force , then, is not what it can do after an attack, but that that the enemy will have to take it into account before an attack , and consider the cost of starting an all-out nuclear exchange between the homelands. Moreover, if the ICBM force were targeted , the U nited S tates would still be able to attac k , with great speed and precision , not only the remaining enemy strategic force but important parts of enemy military infrastructure . Russia or China would then be the ones to face the fateful decision to attack cities , a situation they will inevitably bring on themselves the moment they initiate the conflict—which is exactly the realization that should deter them in the first place .

ICBMs are key to make the whole triad effective Tom Nichols 16 is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct at the Harvard Extension School, Dumping America's ICBMs Would Be a Big Mistake, 10-5, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dumping-americas-icbms-would-be-big-mistake-17946? page=0%2C1, DOA: 10-25-18, y2k Perry makes a fair point that the accuracy of both the bomber and sub marine force is on par with its land-based counterpart. But this , in turn, means that if America were to “ride out” a strike on the ICBM force , the sub marines and bombers —as Perry admits— could do whatever tasks are left once the enemy has emptied its own ICBM force at us . The major virtue of the ICBM force , then, is not what it can do after an attack, but that that the enemy will have to take it into account before an attack , and consider the cost of starting an all-out nuclear exchange between the homelands. Moreover , if the ICBM force were targeted , the U nited S tates would still be able to attac k , with great speed and precision , not only the remaining enemy strategic force but important parts of enemy military infrastructure . Russia or China would then be the ones to face the fateful decision to attack cities , a situation they will inevitably bring on themselves the moment they initiate the conflict—which is exactly the realization that should deter them in the first place . SLBMs do not solve . Russia votes neg . ---Key thing to remember---at any given time, there are only 8 nuclear subs at-sea ---everything else is at port , which is already easy to eliminate---that means there’s only 8 targets , an adversary would need to identify and strike ---SLBM location could be compromised or identified : 1---Walker spy ring revealed locations of US SSBNs to USSR---that data could be useful for decades 2---Can’t be 100% confident in the security of communications---hacks or leaks are inevitable 3---Hydroacoustic sweeps can identify subs within 2 days 4---Tech breakthroughs in surveillance like LIDAR prove Russia or China could have tech that makes it easy to identify subs ---SLBMs could be destroyed or neutralized easily: 1---ASBMs and ICBMs could destroy even if location is not precisely known because the shockwaves go 10’s of miles 2---Poseidon ---Russia’s new nuclear autonomous torpedo that could tail SSBNs from port to sea for years , and detonate on command---Russia’s deployed enough for 2 to trail every US SSBN 3---Super-EMP ---they exceed US hardening and could either 1) destroy the electronics in an SSBN to stop launches or 2) destroy the comms necessary to send launch orders to an SSBN Pry 19 [Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, served as Chief of Staff of the Congressional EMP Commission, Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, on the staffs of the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA, “Are U.S. Submarines Vulnerable?”, May 30, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/30/are_us_submarines_vulnerable_114464.html] IanM Espionage Threatens SSBNs

Old fashioned spy-craft and new-fashioned cyber-espionage could pose a mortal threat to U.S. submarines —as spying did during the Cold War. Cold War Soviet agent John Walker and his spy ring , for example, had access to information disclos ing positions of U.S. submarines that he provided to the USSR . Soviet double-defector KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko had Walker in mind when, in describing how the KGB scored against the U.S. Navy, he remarked: “We deciphered millions of your messages. If there had been a war, we would have won.” U.S. Navy Secretary, John Lehman, shared Yurchenko’s opinion of the damage done by the Walker spy ring: “Had we been engaged in any conflict with the Soviets, it could have had the devastating consequences that Ultra had for the Germans.” Then CIA Director, Admiral William Studeman, said the Walker ring betrayal of U.S. Navy secrets created "powerful war-winning implications for the Soviets" and "jeopardized the backbone of this country's national defense." Also, former CIA Deputy Director , George Carver , who spent much of his 24-year career working cryptography and communications , believed Moscow could continue exploiting the Walker data “ for years and even decades .” Carver: " The United States … can never be positive that it has locked all the barn doors … cannot be totally confident about the security of its communications , particularly its military and especially naval communications . And the damage thus was done … could significantly , if not irrevocably, tilt the very strategic balance on which our survival as a nation depends." Whether and to what extent Russia and China can find U.S. SSBNs is unknown. Maybe they are entirely in the dark. Or, maybe their spies know the location of every U.S. submarine. Oceans Transparent Already? During the Cold War and today, Moscow for decades spent vast resources on an enormous array of technologies , including satellites like EORSAT, trying to locate U.S. submarines hiding at sea. Today , Russia and China have hydroacoustic capabilities for locating SSBNs far more technologically sophisticated than those available to the USSR during the Cold War. Cold War defense analyst Roger Speed , then a consultant to the U.S. Navy , calculated Soviet ships sweeping the oceans with towed hydrophone arrays could locate U.S. SSBNs for destruction in two days . According to Speed’s book Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s: “The development of a line array of hydrophones that can be towed through the water represents a potential breakthrough in acoustic ASW technology….this new technology could pose a serious threat to SSBNs. If the detection range is…at least 50 nm, the SSBN patrol area can be searched in two days or less.” Modern technology is making possible miracles , such as rendering transparent the jungles of Guatemala . LiDAR ( Light Detection And Range ) in 2018 used airborne laser technology to penetrate Guatemala’s thick jungle canopy , discovering 60,000 previously unknown Mayan ruins, including hundreds of previously hidden Mayan cities and towns, revolutionizing archaeology and re-classifying the Maya as among the greatest civilizations. LiDAR’s revolution in surveillance technology is the product of collaboration between private sector Teledyne Optic Titan and the University of Houston — not great power nation states. We should not rule out the possibility Russia and China have achieved a tech nological breakthrough in locating submarines — which they would keep secret until wartime . If submarines can be found, they can be destroyed. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) ASBMs are a new technology that combines ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads having electro-optical, infrared , or other seekers to precisely target even moving vessels for destruction. China’s DF-26 and DF-21 pose long-range threats to U.S. aircraft carriers , outranging carrier aircraft, threatening to upset the balance of power in the Pacific.

Even Iran has developed ASBMs, the medium-range Khalij Fars (Persian Gulf) and short-range Fateh-110, that have been used successfully to target a ship, appearing to demonstrate an accuracy of 8 meters. ASBMs armed with nuclear warheads could destroy submarines , even if the SSBN location is not known precisely , just approximately . The underwater shockwave from a nuclear weapon would have a very large lethal radius , extending many kilometers against an SSBN. ICBMs too could be used to destroy SSBNs with a nuclear barrage of their ocean patrol area , even with considerable uncertainty about the submarine's location . A 1981 study by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment suggested the Soviets could conceivably attack submarines with ICBMs. President Reagan’s White House Science Advisor, George Keyworth, in a 1984 TV interview warned: "A…warhead such as the SS-18 carries ten of when dropped in the water…will destroy any submarine within a distance of about seven miles." According to Keyworth, if the Soviets could roughly locate U.S. submarines, “find out approximately where they are, not track them the way we did in the Second World War, but just know approximately if they are in that 100-mile by 100-mile square…then they can be destroyed in a preemptive attack.” My book Nuclear Wars: Exchanges and Outcomes (1990) calculated that Moscow , using only their SS-19 ICBMs , could destroy all U.S. SSBNs , if their at-sea locations are very roughly known , at a time when the U.S. had 36 SSBNs ( not as today 14 reducing to 12 SSBNs) . My calculations indicated our submarines will be most vulnerable if their locations are disclosed by launching even one missile for a limited nuclear strike—as is now planned for tactical nuclear scenarios employing the W76-2. Poseidon My report POSEIDON: Russia’s New Doomsday Machine (2018) warns that this new Russian nuclear autonomous “torpedo ” may be a secret weapon to destroy U.S., British and French SSBNs . Poseidon is a nuclear-powered robot submarine or torpedo, armed with a nuclear warhead described by various Russian sources as ranging from 2-200 megatons, the later by far the most powerful nuclear weapon ever built. The yield may be mission selectable. Moscow advertises Poseidon’s mission as a doomsday machine, designed to raise radioactive tsunamis to inundate the U.S. coasts, or to destroy U.S. ports, or to trail and destroy U.S. aircraft carrier groups. None of these missions makes sense for Poseidon, as Russia can already accomplish all of them by other existing means. The one mission that makes the most sense for Poseidon , not mentioned by Russia, is trailing and destroying at-sea SSBNs . Nuclear-powered , Poseidon could tail SSBNs for months or years , waiting outside ports for their target to resume patrols . Artificially Intelligent , Poseidon could be programmed to recognize the acoustic signature of its target submarine and detonate on command . The lethal radius of a 100- megaton warhead against submarines is over 100 kilometers. Russia plans to deploy 32 Poseidons . Perhaps not coincidentally, enough to assign two to tail each of 12 U.S . Columbia SSBNs and 8 Poseidons to target the 8 SSBNs of allies Britain and France . EMP Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Super-EMP weapons deployed by Russia , China , and probably North Korea can generate 100-200 kilovolts / meter , far exceed ing the U.S. military standard for EMP hardening —50 kilovolts/meter. Thus , across North America , even the best protected U.S. military forces — including the strategic Triad and its C3I— could be paralyzed. U.S. SSBNs at sea cannot launch without receiving an E mergency A ction M essage (EAM) from the president . The EAM includes an unblocking code to arm nuclear warheads. Thus, submarines cannot execute nuclear strikes without the EAM.