q3spr12 answers

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Nov 24, 2024

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THIRD QUIZ FNCE 238/738 February 27, 2012 WRITE ALL ANSWERS ON THE TEST. IF YOUR ANSWER CONTINUES ON THE BACK, MAKE A NOTE OF IT ON THE FRONT. 30 PTS / 25 MINUTES NAME:_____________________________________________ SECTION (10:30, 12, 1:30):__________________________________
1. (8 pts) You are an entrepreneur with two potential projects, A and B , which each cost 100, and which have the following payoffs in Depression ( D ) and Prosperity ( P ), each of which has probability ½: D P A 60 140 B 80 130 You want to raise money toward the cost of 100 by issuing a bond with face value 100, to be paid out of the project’s payoffs. Whatever the bond issue doesn’t raise, you will pay in yourself, and you get the equity claim on the project. You cannot commit to which project you will choose after issuing the bond. You are considering adding a clause to the bond contract which allows the bondholders to liquidate the project immediately after you choose it, and pay themselves off out of the proceeds. Would such a clause help? Does it depend on how much they can liquidate the project for? Be precise. The clause helps if it causes the manager to choose the higher-value project. Since the expected payoff of B is 105 and the expected payoff of A is 100, B is the higher-value project. If the bond has a face value of 100, then To Bond To Equity A ½(60)+½(100)= 80 ½(0)+ ½(40)=20 B ½(80)+ ½(100)=90 ½(0)+ ½(30)=15 So as it stands, equity will choose A (and thus pays in 100-80=20 for payoff of 20). However, if the project liquidates for between 80 and 90, then bondholders will liquidate if A is chosen but not if B is chosen, so the entrepreneur chooses B (and thus pays in 100-90=10 for a payoff of 15). If the project liquidates for less than 80 then it has no effect, and if it liquidates for more than 90 then bondholders always liquidate, so no value is created.
2. (8 pts) Metrobank has $100BB in deposits, and in 1 year its assets will be worth either $80BB, with probability ¼, or $120BB, with probability ¾. The government wants Metrobank to raise $20BB with an equity offering, so that its assets will cover its deposits no matter what. Would Metrobank do this voluntarily, or would they have to be forced? Explain. As it stands, Metrobank’s equity is worth ¼(0) + ¾(20) = 15. If it were worth 20 more, so that it is worth either 100 or 140 in a year, then the equity would be worth ¼(0) + ¼(40) = 30. So the new shares would be 2/3 of all shares, in order to be worth 2/3(30)=20, and the old shares would be the remaining 1/3, thus worth 1/3(30)=10. This is less than the 15 they are currently worth, so they would not voluntarily raise this equity. They would have to be forced.
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3. From the Feb. 21, 2012 Stamford Advocate: The Stamford office of Grubb & Ellis learned in one fell swoop on Tuesday that its parent company filed for bankruptcy and might have sold the Connecticut operation to the publicly traded financial firm BGC Inc. The Santa Ana, Calif.-based company said the downturn in the U.S. real estate market from 2007 to 2009 caused losses that severely strained its liquidity and hampered its ability to keep operating, according to a court filing. Grubb & Ellis failed to find a buyer outside the bankruptcy process, Chief Financial Officer Michael Rispoli said in the filing. As part of the deal, BGC will provide a loan of as much as $4.8 million to Grubb & Ellis to keep it operating during the bankruptcy process, Rispoli said. a. (4 pts) What might explain why Grubb & Ellis is being purchased this way? An out-of-bankruptcy purchase risks being viewed ex-post as a fraudulent conveyance Out-of-bankruptcy purchases can also bring hidden liabilities Going into bankruptcy and using the Section 363 auction procedure addresses both these risks: the asset is purchased free and clear of liabilities, and it won’t be viewed ex -post as a fraudulent conveyance b. (4 pts) Cons idering G&E’s considerable existing indebtedness, how can BGC expect to be repaid on this $4.8 million loan? The bankruptcy code allows post-petition borrowing to be treated as an administrative expense, thereby enjoying seniority over all pre-petition debt except the collateralized debt, up to the value of the collateral. (could also mention that if necessary, it can enter senior to the collateralized debt if the court views the collateralized debt as adequately protected).
4. (6 pts) The T. Rowe Price Tax-Exempt Money Fund reports a shadow price, as of 11/30/2011, of $1.0007/share. Why does T. Rowe track this shadow price, and what does it mean for investors who sold their shares on 11/30/2011? The shadow price is the true mark-to-market value per share, as opposed to the $1 share price at which investors come and go, as long as the buck isn’t broken. T. Rowe has to track the shadow price because if the mark-to-market value, rounded off to the nearest penny, ceases to be $1, then T. Rowe must break the buck. That the shadow price is not exactly a dollar on 11/30/11 means nothing to investors who sold their shares that day; they’ll get $1 for their shares. (For the investors who remain, it means a tiny gain, in that investors just left the fund for less than the true value of their shares, which inflates, by this small amount, the value per share for investors who remain).