Roberto Vargas_9.2 Case Study Analysis-Accident Research

pptx

School

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

335

Subject

Electrical Engineering

Date

Feb 20, 2024

Type

pptx

Pages

Uploaded by ConstableInternetParrot

American Airlines Flight 191, McDonnell Douglas DC 10- 10 Roberto Vargas BSAS 335 Instructor: Dr. Thomas L. Holmes Jr 9.2 Case Study Analysis: Accident Research

Introduction • American Airlines Flight 191 was an McDonnell Douglas DC 10-10 ( American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) • Departed from Chicago, O'Hare International Airport on May 25, 1979 The aircraft experienced a number 1 engine separation when the engine strut failed ( American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) • The aircrew followed engine failure processes outlined in there American Airlines operational handbook ( American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) • Not realizing they lost an engine which also meant they lost power and hydraulic power from the left engine ( American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) • This resulted to the plane crashing on land where 271 people aboard and 2 people on the ground perished ( American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) 2

Primary Causal Factors of the Accident • Engine separation • Engine and engine strut separation from aircraft in mid-flight • Causing damage to other components during separation • Hydraulic and electrical power • The loss of the number 1 engine also resulted in the loss of hydraulic power on the left wing • This also causes electrical power loss with the loss of the generator of engine 1 3

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version

Access to all documents
Unlimited textbook solutions
24/7 expert homework help

Contributing Factors of the Accident • Pilots not having proper procedures for engine separation • American Airlines Maintenance practices • Not following Maintenance manual procedures • Implementing improper methods of removing the engine pylon • Loss of hydraulic power and electricity led to the loss of control of the slat and flaps stalling the left wing 4 Loss control

Structural and Mechanical Factors Related to the Accident • Structural component failure • The aft attachment point failure allows the engine to separate with the loads applied in flight. • Cracking was later found around the attachment points of the aft bulkhead attachment point • Mechanical Failure • Hydraulically powered loss on engine separation • Electrical power loss due to one of the generator loss from the engine one • Mechanical movement of flight control changed due to loss of hydraulic and electrical inputs 5

Relevant Human Factors and Organizational Factors Related to the Accident 6 • McDonnell Douglas • Assuming how the engine would come off for servicing • Not putting in step procedures to ensure the engine came off the pylon before removing the pylon • American Airlines • Assuming that detecting the engine and pylon assembly as one unit was acceptable without talking to McDonnell Douglas • Using an uncertified piece of equipment to remove the engines

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version

Access to all documents
Unlimited textbook solutions
24/7 expert homework help

Outcomes of the Accident • NSTB recommendation (American Airlines DC-10-10, 1979) • 11 recommendation • Changing the type of certification procedures • Ensuring the equipment that transports critical components are designed to be used for those areas. • Issuing maintenance bulletins to discontinue maintenance practices • Revisions of the 14CFR 121.707 to identify major and minor repair • Change the operational procedures and instrumentation to change the stall margin • Instruction for proper handling of maintenance • Instruction for the maintenance review board. • Airworthiness Directive to inspect for damage on DC-10 pylons 7

Risk Mitigation or Reduction Strategies • Identify the possibility of a loss engine and procedures on how to handle it • American Airlines communicating to McDonnell Douglas their intention of removing the engine and pylon as a unit • McDonnell Douglas being clear on the procedural instruction on how to detach and re-attach the pylon and engine components • The FAA being clearer in their direction of conducting the service bulletin • Not using unapproved equipment or vehicles to conduct critical maintenance • Increase the frequency of inspection criteria of these vulnerable areas. 8

Conclusion • Preventable accidents with accidents in the past displaying similar results • Not taking it upon themselves to assume their maintenance procedures are correct without contacting the manufacturer • Aircraft with redundancies built in is a most • Training your pilots for situations like an engine separation and loss of systems need to be considered • Manufacturers bringing clarity and not assuming a step has been accomplished before another is. 9

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version

Access to all documents
Unlimited textbook solutions
24/7 expert homework help

References • McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 . Federal Aviation Administration. (n.d.). https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/N110AA • Middleton, G. (n.d.). Flight controls - flaps and Slats . Flight Controls :: Flaps & Slats. http://hibdz.skydiving.co.uk/757/757_tech/flight_controls/flaps_and_slats.htm • National Transportation Safety Board. (1979, December 21). American Airlines DC- 10-10, N110AA Chicago-O’ Hare International Airport Chicago, Illinois May 25, 1979 . Federal Aviation Administration. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-11/AAR79-17.pdf 10