taaffeEDMG230

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Jan 9, 2024

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Interstate 35w Bridge Collapse: ICS review Interstate 35w Bridge Collapse: ICS review Kevin Taaffe American Military University FSMT 230: Emergency and Disaster Incident Command Professor Robert Dawkins November 19, 2023, 1
Interstate 35w Bridge Collapse: ICS review On August 1, 2013, at approximately 1805 hrs., the Interstate 35w bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, MN, suffered catastrophic structural failure, resulting in a collapse of all eight lanes with 111 vehicles on the bridge deck at the time of collapse [CITATION Nat \l 1033 ]. The collapse resulted in 13 deaths and over 145 injuries. The first EMS and fire units from the Minneapolis Fire Department (MFD) and the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) were dispatched at 1807 hrs. Police officers from the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) arrived on the scene at 1810hrs and discovered that the entire span of the bridge had collapsed. Immediately, calls for mutual aid and additional alarms were sent statewide requesting any available resources to respond to the large-scale incident[CITATION Nat \l 1033 ]. The first fire crews arrived on-scene in Engine 19 at 1811hrs and began immediately implementing the Incident Command System, providing a size-up[ CITATION Hol07 \l 1033 ]. Battalion Chief 2 of the MFD assumed the Incident Command role seven minutes later. Immediately, two additional battalion chiefs were assigned division boss roles to retain an optimum span of control. The early response and initial execution of the ICS worked seamlessly together and set a solid framework for the expanding incident. As the incident response expanded and more resources arrived, the MFD Assistant Chief of Operations assumed command and initiated the stand-up of a command post. At this time, the Minneapolis police department set up its own command post in a separate strategic location. The IC evaluated multiple locations and determined that the 10 th Avenue bridge command post, the site of the original fire command post, would be used for Unified Command[ CITATION Hol07 \l 1033 ]. With unified command established, each responding agency had a common contact when arriving on the scene and awaiting assignment. The operations, logistics, and planning sections were assigned chiefs from 2
Interstate 35w Bridge Collapse: ICS review the MFD or a neighboring department early in the incident. The span of control for the operations section chief quickly grew beyond a manageable 5-7 direct reports. At this time, an EMS branch and geographic operations divisions were created to lower the span of control for the operations section chief. As the incident expanded, the incident commander and staff continued to expand the ICS to retain the optimal span of control in each of the assigned sections. The coordinated effort resulted in an efficient and safe rescue and recovery effort. In total, 31 ambulances transported 50 victims to local hospitals within the first hour after the incident[ CITATION Hol07 \l 1033 ]. The U.S Fire Administration report published lessons learned from the fire in their 2008 report, noting that the initial stand-up of separate command posts may have delayed Unified command and hampered communications between police assets and Fire rescue crews. Additional lessons learned from the incident addressed on-scene safety issues and the proper use of universally recognized triage tagging to avoid confusion. The report also found that the EOC needed to be bigger to handle the incident, and space became limited. Multiple successes are noted that far outweigh the lessons learned from this incident. In addition to the rapid response from robust mutual aid agreements, the use of new 800mhz ARMER radio systems, and surge capacity within the EMS system, the participation of a local leader in a FEMA Emergency Managers course was heralded as a significant contributing factor in the city and regions preparedness for this incident[ CITATION Hol07 \l 1033 ]. The response and effectiveness of the ICS in place for the August 1 st , 2013 bridge collapse continue to be used in training curricula around the U.S. The early establishment of command and efficient transfers of command and control as the incident grew showed the value of preplanning and training for incidents of all sizes. Additionally, the efforts to keep the span of 3
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Interstate 35w Bridge Collapse: ICS review control within divisions and branches at manageable levels contributed to the efficient success of responders at the incident. Recommendations made by the NTSB and US Fire Administration can be efficiently utilized in future incidents to enhance response and ICS capabilities. By doing so, continued positive outcomes should be expected. References: H.Cohen, H. S. (2007). I-35W Bridge Collapse and Response Minneapolis, Minnesota August 1, 2007. U.S. Fire Administration. NTSB. (2008). Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge. Washington D.C: National Transportation Safety Board. 4