Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)
Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)
16th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506893
Author: James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 6, Problem 1CQ
To determine

Explain the voter’s information on the candidate’s position on issues.

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Explanation of Solution

The public choice analysis uses the economic methods and tools to analyze political problems in an economy. This is the study of political decision making that affects the formation of government. According to this study, the political decision making in an economy will be directed by the rational ignorance effect. The voters will be uninformed on many issues due to the presence of rational ignorance effect. As a result, such issues will not enter into their decision making process. 

Otherwise, if voters have well information about the issues and the positions of candidates, then there is only zero chance of an individual vote to decide the city. Hence, it is very unlikely that voters will be well informed on issues and the positions of candidates. 

Economics Concept Introduction

Rational ignorance effect:   The rational ignorance effect indicates that the voters choose to remain uninformed. This is because the marginal cost of obtaining information is higher than the marginal benefit from knowing it. 

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