ECONOMICS W/CONNECT+20 >C<
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ISBN: 9781259714993
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Chapter 5.A, Problem 3ARQ
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Is the given statement is true or falls, why?
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1.15. Consider the Supreme Court as an electorate of 9 members thatvotes yes-or-no on a variety of issues. It is customary for this electorateto use the simple majority method, and since 9 is an odd number, no tiescan result when no justices are absent. Imagine the following alternativemethod for determining Supreme Court decisions. The decision is affirmative whenever at least 3 of the first 5 justices vote to affirm. Otherwisethe decision is negative. This is just the bloc voting method, where thejustices form blocs of size 5, 1, 1, 1, and 1. (This method emulates whatwould occur if the first 5 justices were to agree to always vote as a blocand to decide among themselves how the bloc should rule.)(a) Is this method anonymous?(b) Is this method neutral?(c) Is this method monotone?(d) If you were one of the 4 justices not among the first 5, why wouldyou complain about this voting method?
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- 1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?arrow_forwardIf the tax code exempts the first $20,000 of income from taxation and then taxes 25 percent of all income above that level, then a person who earns percent and a marginal tax rate of $50,000 has an average tax rate of percent. O 15, 25 O 25, 15 O 25, 30 O 30, 25arrow_forward1.12. Consider a weighted voting method with 5 voters assigned weights17, 15, 14, 12, and 7, respectively, with a simple majority of the weightedvotes sufficient for victory. Explain why this method is in effect the(unweighted) simple majority method.arrow_forward
- 4arrow_forwardMatch the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [ Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate is favored [ Choose ] when compared separately with every other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate wins an [ Choose] election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election.arrow_forwardEach one has ONE Senator who votes for their state and is elected only by the voters in their own state. Each Senator's vote is equal in the voting process. There are three projects being considered and each will only bring revenue into the one State in which it is built BUT all three projects, if built, will be built with Taxes paid by ALL of the population of all 5 states. District 1 is not considering a project at this time. District 2 is mostly urban and they want to build a Football stadium to attract tourists. District 3 is not considering a project at this time. District 4 wants to build a Space Exploration Research Center. District 5 wants to build an airport. The relevant Benefit (positive number) and Cost (negative number) to each district details are below: District I District II District III District IV District V O Regulatory Capture Logrolling Stadium ($) -30 80 -30 -30 -30 The Scenario outlined above is commonly known as: Kleptocracy Rent Seeking Airport ($) -25 -25 -25…arrow_forward
- Need help with this. THanks!arrow_forwardExplain how affirmative and negative majority votes can sometimes lead to inefficient allocations of resources to public goods. Is this problem likely to be greater under a benefits-received or under an ability-to-pay tax system? Use the information in Figures 17.1a and 17.1b to show how society might be better off if Adams were allowed to buy votes.arrow_forward1. A city has three equal-sized groups of people: (1) Type A people consistently prefer more public school expenditure; (2) Type B people prefer high levels of public school expenditure to low levels, and they prefer low levels to medium levels; (3) Type C people most prefer medium levels to low levels, and they prefer low levels to high levels. Will majority voting generate consistent outcomes in this case? (Hint: you should check if there are cycles in outcomes by changing the order of voting) A.True B. False 2. Suppose Florida government has asked you to design and evaluate the effectiveness of an education voucher program. What is wrong with simply comparing the educational performance of those receiving vouchers with those who do not receive vouchers? Explain.arrow_forward
- 4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.arrow_forwardM7arrow_forward- = 1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x 0 and x 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x₁ = .3 and x2 = .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates care only about being elected—they do not really care about their platforms at all! If there are two candidates, what is the pure- strategy Nash equilibrium? If there are three candidates, exhibit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (Assume that any candidates who choose the same platform…arrow_forward
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