Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Answer 1

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Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Suppose a production function for a firm takes the following algebraic form: Q= 2KL - (0.3)L², where Q is the output of sweaters per day. Now suppose the firm is operating with 10 units of capital (K = 10) and 6 units of labour (L = 6). What is the output of sweaters? A. 64 sweaters per day OB. 49 sweaters per day OC. 109 sweaters per day OD. 72 sweaters per day OE. 118 sweaters per day

3. Consider a course allocation problem with strict and non-responsive preferences. Isthere a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof? If so, state the mechanismand show that it satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness. {hint serial dictatorship and show using example}4. Consider a course allocation problem with responsive preferences and at least 3students. Is there a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof that is not theSerial Dictatorship? If so, state the mechanism and show that it satisfies efficiencyand strategyproofness.5. Suggest a mechanism for allocating students to courses in a situation where preferences are non-responsive, and study its properties (efficiency and strategyproofness). Please be creative

3. Consider a course allocation problem with strict and non-responsive preferences. Isthere a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof? If so, state the mechanismand show that it satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness. {hint serial dictatorship}4. Consider a course allocation problem with responsive preferences and at least 3students. Is there a mechanism that is efficient and strategy-proof that is not theSerial Dictatorship? If so, state the mechanism and show that it satisfies efficiencyand strategyproofness.5. Suggest a mechanism for allocating students to courses in a situation where preferences are non-responsive, and study its properties (efficiency and strategyproofness). Please be creative

Answer 2

Question

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Answer 3

Question

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Answer 4

Question

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Answer 5

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 6

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 7

Chapter 22, Problem 7PA

Subpart (a):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 8

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 9

Subpart (b):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 10

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 11

Subpart (c):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 12

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 13

Subpart (d):

To determine

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Answer 14

Expert Solution & Answer

Answer 15

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Answer 16

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Answer 17

Ch. 22.1 - Prob. 1QQ Ch. 22.2 - Prob. 2QQ Ch. 22.3 - Prob. 3QQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 1CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 2CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 3CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 4CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 5CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 6CQQ Ch. 22 - Prob. 1QR

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Solution Summary: The author explains Arrow's impossibility theorem: there is no voting system that can satisfy conditions such as transitivity, unanimity, non-dictatorship, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Applying Borda count and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

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Chapter 22 Solutions