Macroeconomics (Book Only)
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781285738314
Author: Roger A. Arnold
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 20, Problem 8QP
To determine
Calculate simple majority voting with consistent and inconsistent efficiency.
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"No voting system is perfect." What does it mean by economist K. Arrow? Give a brief account on Condorcet Voting Paradox. A public school district is voting on the school budget and the resulting student-teacher ratio. A poll finds that 20 percent of the voters want a ratio of 9:1, 25 percent want a ratio of 10:1, 15 percent want a ratio of 11:1, and 40 percent want a ratio of 12:1. What outcome would you expect the district to
In a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale.
1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible.
In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…
Chapter 20 Solutions
Macroeconomics (Book Only)
Ch. 20.3 - Prob. 1STCh. 20.3 - Prob. 2STCh. 20.3 - Prob. 3STCh. 20.4 - Prob. 1STCh. 20.4 - Prob. 2STCh. 20.6 - Prob. 1STCh. 20.6 - Prob. 2STCh. 20.6 - Prob. 3STCh. 20.6 - Prob. 4STCh. 20 - Prob. 1VQP
Ch. 20 - Prob. 2VQPCh. 20 - Prob. 3VQPCh. 20 - Prob. 4VQPCh. 20 - Prob. 5VQPCh. 20 - Prob. 1QPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QPCh. 20 - Prob. 7QPCh. 20 - Prob. 8QPCh. 20 - Prob. 9QPCh. 20 - Prob. 10QPCh. 20 - Prob. 11QPCh. 20 - Prob. 12QPCh. 20 - Prob. 1WNGCh. 20 - Prob. 2WNGCh. 20 - Prob. 3WNG
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- Suppose that friends Jennifer, Stephanie, and Megan cannot agree on how much to spend for a bouquet of flowers to send to a person who allowed them to use her beach house for the weekend. Jennifer wants to buy a moderately priced bouquet, Stephanie wants to buy an expensive bouquet, and Megan wants to buy a very expensive bouquet. Assuming no paradox of voting, majority voting will result in the decision to buy Multiple Choice an inexpensive bouquet. a very expensive bouquet. a moderately priced bouquet. an expensive bouquet. Barrow_forwardBriefly explain why the principle that the majority of voters should decide an election outcome may not always make logical sense.arrow_forwardGive both answers I give you thumparrow_forward
- Which of the following is true? a. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that There is no voting method that will satisfy a reasonable set of fairness criteria when there are three or candidates. b. Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem states that there is a voting method is completely resistant to strategic voting. c. None of the given choices d. May's Theorem states that the majority method will always have a winner.arrow_forwardExplain why majority rule respects the preferencesof the median voter rather than those of the averagevoter.arrow_forwardHow can a small special interest group win in a situation of majority voting when the benefits it seeks flow only to a small group?arrow_forward
- Could you please explain why you divided the 250 votes by 2?arrow_forward2) What is straight-ticket voting? How does this help candidates in down ballot races?arrow_forward4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.arrow_forward
- 4arrow_forwardConsider two political candidates A and B facing an electorate with ideological positions uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. (To remind you, uniformly distributed means there are equal numbers of voters in the interval between 0.4 and 0.6 as between 0.8 and 1.0 and any interval of the same length.) Candidates want to maximize their vote shares. Each simultaneously and independently of the other announces a position between O and 1. A voter chooses to vote for a candidate who is closest to her but will abstain rather than vote for a candidate whose announced position is more than 0.20 distance away. Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Explain your answer.arrow_forward1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?arrow_forward
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