MICROECONOMICS (LL)-W/ACCESS >CUSTOM<
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781264207718
Author: Colander
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Chapter 20, Problem 7QE
(a)
To determine
The dominant strategy of Players A and B.
(b)
To determine
The dominant strategy of Players A and B.
(c)
To determine
The dominant strategy of Players A and B.
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Use the following payoff matrix to answer the questions below.
Cooperate
Defect
1
Cooperate
100, 100
40, 125
Defect
125, 40
50, 50
Which player (if any) has a Dominant Strategy?
[ Select ]
What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? [ Select ]
Does this game satisfy the definition of a prisoner's dilemma? [ Select ]
Imagine two vendors (our players) who must simultaneously choose a location to position
their displays. There are n possible locations that form a straight line. Further, there is one customer at
each location, and customers will choose the closest vendor (and split their time at each vendor if they're
equally distanced from both). The profit for each vendor equals the number of customers they attract. Using
iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), what is the dominant strategy equilibrium? Explain.
2.
Here is a table representing the gains for the server if he serves on his opponent's forehand or backhand
and for the receiver the gains if he returns on his forehand or backhand.
Each player can choose to play the forehand or the backhand of the other player :
Server
D R
D 50,50 80, 20
R 90,10 |20, 80
Receiver
D
Determine the Nash equilibrium(s) (pure strategies and mixed strategies).
Chapter 20 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS (LL)-W/ACCESS >CUSTOM<
Ch. 20.1 - Prob. 1QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 2QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 3QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 4QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 5QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 6QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 7QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 8QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 9QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 10Q
Ch. 20.A - Netflix and Hulu each expects profit to rise by...Ch. 20.A - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QECh. 20 - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 3QECh. 20 - Prob. 4QECh. 20 - Prob. 5QECh. 20 - Prob. 6QECh. 20 - Prob. 7QECh. 20 - Prob. 8QECh. 20 - Prob. 9QECh. 20 - Prob. 10QECh. 20 - Prob. 11QECh. 20 - Prob. 12QECh. 20 - Prob. 13QECh. 20 - Prob. 14QECh. 20 - Prob. 15QECh. 20 - Prob. 16QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 1IPCh. 20 - Prob. 2IPCh. 20 - Prob. 3IPCh. 20 - Prob. 4IPCh. 20 - Prob. 5IPCh. 20 - Prob. 6IPCh. 20 - Prob. 7IP
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- Consider the game shown below. In this game, players 1 and 2 must move at the same time without knowledge of the other player’s move. Player 1’s choices are shown in the row headings (A, B, C), Player 2’s choices are shown in the column headings (D, E, F). The first payoff is for the row player (Player 1) and the second payoff is for the column player (Player 2). Player 2 Player 1 D E F A 6, 8 4, 7 2, 9 B 2, 3 2, 6 4, 7 C 5, 4 7, 5 3, 6arrow_forwardConsider the game shown below. In this game, players 1 and 2 must move at the same time without knowledge of the other player’s move. Player 1’s choices are shown in the row headings (A, B, C, D), Player 2’s choices are shown in the column headings (E, F, G). The first payoff is for the row player (Player 1) and the second payoff is for the column player (Player 2). Player 2 Player 1 E F G A 2, 4 7, 7 2, 6 B 10, 6 1, 7 12, 4 C 4, 6 8, 8 7, 7 D 1, 6 3, 9 6, 7arrow_forwardQuestion 2: Consider two players, A and B, each of which can choose action X or Y. Their payoffs are represented in the following matrix, where K is a constant. Player A X Y X A: 15 B: 12 A: 20 B: 30 Player B Y A: 18 B: 24 A: 18 + K B: 22 Q2 a) First assume that K > 0. Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, explain what it is and why. Q2 b) Again assuming that K > 0, explain with appropriate discussion what is the Nash equilibrium of this game. Q2 c) Now assume that K<0. Do players have dominant strategies and what is the Nash equilibrium in this case? Does your answer depend on the specific (negative) value of K? Explain the reason behind the differences between the results in point c) and those in points a) and b).arrow_forward
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