Microeconomics
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781260507041
Author: Colander, David
Publisher: MCGRAW-HILL HIGHER EDUCATION
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Question
Chapter 20, Problem 14QE
(a)
To determine
A rational person’s achievement in a standard highest bid auction.
(b)
To determine
The bid made by him in a Vickrey auction.
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Say that you are bidding in a sealed-bid auction and that you really want the item being auctioned. Winning it would be worth $500 to you. Say you expect the next-highest bidder to bid $300.a. In a standard “highest-bid” auction, what bid would a rational person make?
The rational choice is to bid $500 since that is what the item is worth to you.
The rational choice is to bid a little bit more than $300 because that is the expected next-highest bid.
The rational choice is to bid just under $500 so that you have a higher chance of winning the auction and would still have a net benefit.
The rational choice is to bid over $500 to guarantee that you win the item.
b. In a Vickrey auction, what bid would he make?
The rational choice is to bid slightly more than $500.
The rational choice is to bid $500.
The rational choice is to bid slightly less than $500.
The rational choice is to bid slightly more than $300.
Hey expert please do it for me asap
Discrete All-Pay Auction: In Section 6.1.4 we introduced a version of an all-
pay auction that worked as follows: Each bidder submits a bid. The highest
bidder gets the good, but all bidders pay their bids. Consider an auction in
which player 1 values the item at 3 while player 2 values the item at 5. Each
player can bid either 0, 1, or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins
the good and both pay. If both players bid the same amount then a coin is
tossed to determine who gets the good, but again both pay.
a. Write down the game in matrix form. Which strategies survive IESDS?
b. Find the Nash equilibria for this game.
Chapter 20 Solutions
Microeconomics
Ch. 20.1 - Prob. 1QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 2QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 3QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 4QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 5QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 6QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 7QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 8QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 9QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 10Q
Ch. 20.A - Netflix and Hulu each expects profit to rise by...Ch. 20.A - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QECh. 20 - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 3QECh. 20 - Prob. 4QECh. 20 - Prob. 5QECh. 20 - Prob. 6QECh. 20 - Prob. 7QECh. 20 - Prob. 8QECh. 20 - Prob. 9QECh. 20 - Prob. 10QECh. 20 - Prob. 11QECh. 20 - Prob. 12QECh. 20 - Prob. 13QECh. 20 - Prob. 14QECh. 20 - Prob. 15QECh. 20 - Prob. 16QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 1IPCh. 20 - Prob. 2IPCh. 20 - Prob. 3IPCh. 20 - Prob. 4IPCh. 20 - Prob. 5IPCh. 20 - Prob. 6IPCh. 20 - Prob. 7IP
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