Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 16, Problem 16.1IP
To determine
The post-merger bargaining outcome.
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Students have asked these similar questions
Consider two firms, referred to as firms 1 and 2, who compete in a market by choosing quantities produced and face the
following inverse demand:
P(Q) 10-20
Each firm has a marginal cost of production of $4.00.
Suppose these firms collude by agreeing to produce quantities to maximize their joint profits.
Firm 1 sticks to the agreement, but firm 2 does not.
If firm 2 can secretly change its produced quantity, how much would it produce?
American Airlines and Braniff Airways are the two airlines operating flights from your region. Suppose that each company can charge either a high price for tickets or a low price. First, American Airlines will choose the price level. Following this, Braniff Airways will observe its competitor’s decision and choose the price level for its tickets. If both of the companies choose High, they earn $25,000 each. If they both choose Low, they earn $18,000 each. If the companies choose different levels of prices, the one choosing the high price will earn $15,000 and the one choosing Low will earn $30,000.
a) Draw the game three.
b) Solve the game by using backwards induction.
c) If Braniff Airlines makes a promise to choose High if American Airlines chooses High, should American Airlines trust this promise? Explain.
Note: The answer should be typed.
Chapter 16 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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- Perrier and Apollinaris. Perrier and Apollinaris are two companies that sell mineral water in Tampa, FL. Each company has a fixed cost of $5,000 per period, regardless whether they sell anything or not. The two companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price ($2 per bottle) or a low price ($1 per bottle). Here are the rules of the game: At a price of $2, 5,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. At a price of $1, 10,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them. If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing. Payoffs are total profits. In this case, the NE is(are): (P=$2, P=$1). (P=$1, P=$2). (P=$2, P=$2). (P=$1, P=$1).arrow_forwardPerrier and Apollinaris. Perrier and Apollinaris are two companies that sell mineral water in Tampa, FL. Each company has a fixed cost of $5,000 per period, regardless whether they sell anything or not. The two companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price ($2 per bottle) or a low price ($1 per bottle). Here are the rules of the game: At a price of $2, 5,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. At a price of $1, 10,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them. If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing. Payoffs are total profits. In this case, Apollinaris has: no dominant strategy. Perrier has a dominant strategy of P=$1. a dominant strategy of P=$1. Perrier also has a dominant strategy of P=$2. a dominant strategy…arrow_forwardJones TV and Smith TV are the only two stores in your town that sell flat panel TV sets. First, Jones will choose whether to charge high prices or low prices. Smith will see Jones's decision and then choose high or low prices. If they both choose High, each earns $10,000. If they both choose Low, each earns $8,000. If one chooses High and the other chooses Low, the one that chose High earns $6,000 and the one that chose Low earns $14,000. a. Draw the game tree. Use backward induction to solve this game. b. Suppose Smith goes to Jones and promises to choose High if Jones chooses High. Is this a credible promise? c. Now suppose Jones starts a new policy that says it will always match or beat Smith's price. It advertises the new policy heavily and so must choose Low if Smith chooses Low. So the game now has the following structure. First, Jones chooses High or Low. Second, Smith chooses High or Low. Third, if Jones has chosen High and Smith has chosen Low, Jones meets Smith's price and…arrow_forward
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