Economics (Irwin Economics)
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259723223
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 14, Problem 10RQ
To determine
Nash equilibrium.
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Wal-Mart's dominant strategy is to pick a price of $.
Target
Price = $30
Price = $17
%3D
What is the Nash equilibrium for this game?
$6,000
$1,500
O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $17 and Wal-Mart to choose
a price of $30.
Price = $30
$6,000
$11,000
O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $30.
Wal - Mart
C. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $30 and Wal-Mart to choose
a price of $17.
$11,000
$4,500
Price = $17
%3D
$1,500
$4,500
O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $17.
South
OE.
O E. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game.
Team 2 plays A Team 2 plays B
Team 1 plays A
0, 24
10, 10
Team 1 plays B
4, 4
24, 0
Consider the infinitely repeated version of the game above. Which of the following is
the smallest discount factor such that the grim trigger strategy under which team 1
plays A and team 2 plays B until a team deviates, after which team 1 plays B forever
and team 2 plays A forever is a Nash Equilibrium?
O 1/2
O3/4
O 1/100
Newfoundland’s fishing industry has recently declined sharply due to overfish- ing, even though fishing companies were supposedly bound by a quota agree- ment. If all fishermen had abided by the agreement, yields could have been maintained at high levels. LO4
Model this situation as a prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are Company A and Company B and the strategies are to keep the quota and break the quota. Include appropriate payoffs in the matrix. Explain why overfishing is inevitable in the absence of effective enforcement of the quota agreement.
Provide another environmental example of a prisoner’s dilemma.
In many potential prisoner’s dilemmas, a way out of the dilemma for a would-be cooperator is to make reliable character judgments about the trustworthiness of potential partners. Explain why this solution is not avail-
able in many situations involving degradation of the environment.
Chapter 14 Solutions
Economics (Irwin Economics)
Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 1QQCh. 14.2 - The D2e segment of the demand curve D2eD1 graph...Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 3QQCh. 14.2 - Prob. 4QQCh. 14 - Prob. 1DQCh. 14 - Prob. 2DQCh. 14 - Prob. 3DQCh. 14 - Prob. 4DQCh. 14 - Prob. 5DQCh. 14 - Prob. 6DQ
Ch. 14 - Prob. 7DQCh. 14 - Prob. 8DQCh. 14 - Prob. 9DQCh. 14 - Prob. 10DQCh. 14 - Prob. 11DQCh. 14 - Prob. 12DQCh. 14 - Prob. 13DQCh. 14 - Prob. 14DQCh. 14 - Prob. 1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 5RQCh. 14 - Prob. 6RQCh. 14 - Prob. 7RQCh. 14 - Prob. 8RQCh. 14 - Prob. 9RQCh. 14 - Prob. 10RQCh. 14 - Prob. 1PCh. 14 - Prob. 2PCh. 14 - Prob. 3P
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Similar questions
- Derive the strategic form of the Mugging game shown, and determine whether any strategies are either strictly dominated or weakly dominated.arrow_forward4. The following payoff matrix shows the profit payoff to firms A and B from combinations of price strategies HI and LO. A НІ LOW B HI (6, 6) (16, -5) LOW (-7, 15) (0, 0) (a) In a one period game, what strategy would each firm follow, and why? Determine the equilibrium on the one-period game. (b) Now assume the game is infinite in length. Firm B goes HI in period 1 and continues with HI so long as A does as well. Firm A is deciding between HI and LO. Determine the range of discount rates for which HI is the better choice for Firm A.arrow_forward18. Answer the next question based on the payoff matrix for a two-firm oligopoly where the numbers represent the firms' respective profits given each of their pricing strategies: FIRM Y O $ 800,000 O $1,000,000 O $1,450,000 Strategies: High-price If both firms collude to maximize joint profits, O $1,250,000 FIRM X High-price X = $625,000 Y = $625,000 Low-price X = $275,000 Y = $725,000 Low Price X = $725,000 Y = $275,000 X = $400,000 Y = $400,000 tal profits for the two firms will be:arrow_forward
- O 100.10 O 60.20 O 75.15 O 80.30 D Question 26 Figure 1: Sequential Games) Use backwards induction to find the outcome of this game if Saudi Arabia goes first. Strategies for each player are choose a high or low level of oil output. Saudi Arabia Nigeria Nigeria high low 100 75 60 Saudi Arabia Nigeria 80 10 15 20 30arrow_forwardPlayer 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 0 1 O O 1.5 Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 3 O 6 Player 2 If the game is repeated finitely many times, what happens in the last period in Nash equilibrium? Both players choose C. Player 1 chooses C, Player 2 chooses D. Player 1 chooses D, Player 2 chooses C. Both players choose D. Defect (D) 0,8 1,1 If the game is repeated infinitely many times, what is the value of 1's future payoffs when both cooperate forever? Assume that the discount factor is 0.5 (i.e. payoffs in the next period are worth half as much as payoffs today).arrow_forwardSuppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and competing in Cournot fashion and let the market demand be given by Q = 240- Assume for simplicity that each firm operates with zero total cost. Find each firm's Cournot Nash equilibrium profit for each firm. $21600 O $19200 O $18000 O $16000arrow_forward
- 5 Suppose two players play one of the two normal-form games shown in Figure 1. L U 0,-1 D 2,4 R 2,0 6,0 L U | 4,-1 D 2,-2 R 2,0Now suppose that Player 2 knows which game is being played, but Player 1 does not. Find the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.arrow_forwardQ1arrow_forward2.arrow_forward
- 4. Consider a three-player bargaining, where the players are negotiating over a surplus of one unit of utility. The game begins with player 1 proposing a three-way split of the surplus. Then player 2 must decide whether to accept the proposal or to substitute for player 1's proposal his own alternative proposal. Finally, player 3 must decide whether to accept or reject current proposal (it is player 1's if player 2 accepts or player 2's if player 2 offer a new one). If he accepts, then the players obtain the specified shares of the surplus. If player 3 rejects, then the players each get 0. (a) Draw the extensive form game of this perfect-information game. (b) Determine the subgame perfect NE.arrow_forward5. The following represents the payoffs in a one period game in prices HI and LO. A HI LOW B HI (100, 100) (200,0) LOW (0, 200) (50, 50) (a) If A and B were playing this game only once, what strategy should A choose, and why? (b) A and B are playing the same game an infinite number of times and each has a discount rate of 50% (.50). Firm B adopts a trigger strategy and selects HI in the first round. What would be A's present value of profits from cooperation (HI)? What would be its present value from cheating (LO)? Would A choose to cooperate or cheat?arrow_forwardQuestion 3 Consider the following game. Which of the statements below are true for this game? L R. 2,2 -1,-1 1,1 M -1,-1 1,1 1,2 D 1,1 -2,1 -1,-1 a. The Row player has a strictly dominated action. b. The Column player has a strictly dominated action. c. There is no Nash equilibrium for this game. d. The row player playing D and the column player playing R constitutes a Nash equilibrium of this game. e. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria to this game. f. There is no mixed strategy equilibrium in this game.arrow_forward
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