Pearson eText for Engineering Economy -- Instant Access (Pearson+)
Pearson eText for Engineering Economy -- Instant Access (Pearson+)
17th Edition
ISBN: 9780137533138
Author: William Sullivan, Elin Wicks
Publisher: PEARSON+
Question
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Chapter 1, Problem 1P

a.

To determine

The implicit cost of a ton of greenhouse gas.

a.

Expert Solution
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Explanation of Solution

The reduced greehouse gases per year can be calculated as follows.

    ReducedGreenhousegasesperyear=[TotalGreenhousesgas×TargetAnnualemmission]=62,000,000×0.05=3,100,000

The reduced greehouse gases per year is 3,100,000.

The implicit cost of a ton of greenhouse gas can be calculated as follows.

ImplicitCost=[PlannedSpendingsReducedGreenhousegasesperyear]=[$1,200,000,0003,100,000]=$387.10

The implicit cost of greenhouse gas per year is $387.10 per ton.

b.

To determine

The cost to reduce the total emission by 3% over next five years.

b.

Expert Solution
Check Mark

Explanation of Solution

The reduced greehouse gases per year can be calculated as follows.

    ReducedGreenhousegasesperyear=[TotalGreenhousesgas×TargetAnnualemmission]=300,000,000×0.03=90,000,000

The reduced greehouse gases per year is 90,000,000.

The cost to reduce the total emission can be calculated as follows.

Total Cost=[PlannedSpendingsReducedGreenhousegasesperyear=$XReducedGreenhousegasesperyear]=[$1,200,000,0003,100,000=$X90,000,000]X=$34,870,000,000

The cost to reduce the total emission by 3% over next five years is $340,870,000,000.

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