Your company is going to produce two versions of its new video game systems, Boxy-x,B1, and Boxy-s,B2.Demand for each depends partly on the price of the other. The price for the Boxy-x and Boxy-s will berepresented by pi and p2 respectively. The demand function for the Boxy-x is:q (p1, р2) — 140, 000 — 800р1 + 18p2where qi is the number of Boxy-x units that will be sold per week. The demand function for the Boxy-s is:Ф (P1, р2) — 130, 000 + 18p1 — 300р2where q2 is the number of Boxy-s units that will be sold per week. Find the prices for the Boxy-x and Boxy-sthat will maximize the total revenue.(Round your answers to the nearest hundredths place.)Pi =P2 =

Total revenue is the amount received from the sale of a good. Total Revenue: TR =Price*Quantity

Your company is going to produce two versions of its new video game systems, Boxy-x,B1, and Boxy-s,B2. Demand for each depends partly on the price of the other. The price for the Boxy-x and Boxy-s will be represented by pi and p2 respectively. The demand function for the Boxy-x is: я (p1, рә) — 140, 000 — 800р1 + 18p2 - where q1 is the number of Boxy-x units that will be sold per week. The demand function for the Boxy-s is: 92 (p1, рә) — 130, 000 + 18р1 — 30р2 where q2 is the number of Boxy-s units that will be sold per week. Find the prices for the Boxy-x and Boxy-s that will maximize the total revenue. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredths place.) = ld P2 =

Your company is going to produce two versions of its new video game systems, Boxy-x,B1, and Boxy-s,B2. Demand for each depends partly on the price of the other. The price for the Boxy-x and Boxy-s will be represented by pi and p2 respectively. The demand function for the Boxy-x is: я (p1, рә) — 140, 000 — 800р1 + 18p2 - where q1 is the number of Boxy-x units that will be sold per week. The demand function for the Boxy-s is: 92 (p1, рә) — 130, 000 + 18р1 — 30р2 where q2 is the number of Boxy-s units that will be sold per week. Find the prices for the Boxy-x and Boxy-s that will maximize the total revenue. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredths place.) = ld P2 =

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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