You and your partner are choosing how much effort to put towards a group project for a course . You both care about the quality of the project , which increases in both of your effort choices . But you both also pay a cost of effort . You are enjoying the course much more than your partner , so your cost of effort is lower . Where y and p denote the amount of effort put by you and your partner , respectively , • Your payoff is 60yp - y³ . • Your partner's payoff is 60yp - 8p³ . Decisions about effort provision are made simultaneously . Answer the following questions about the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game . Please round to 3 decimal places where rounding is needed . a ) In one pure strategy Nash equilibrium , you put more effort towards the project than your partner . In this Nash equilibrium , what is your effort level ? b ) In one pure strategy Nash equilibrium , you put the same level of effort towards the project as your partner . In this Nash equilibrium , what is your effort level ?
You and your partner are choosing how much effort to put towards a group project for a course . You both care about the quality of the project , which increases in both of your effort choices . But you both also pay a cost of effort . You are enjoying the course much more than your partner , so your cost of effort is lower . Where y and p denote the amount of effort put by you and your partner , respectively , • Your payoff is 60yp - y³ . • Your partner's payoff is 60yp - 8p³ . Decisions about effort provision are made simultaneously . Answer the following questions about the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game . Please round to 3 decimal places where rounding is needed . a ) In one pure strategy Nash equilibrium , you put more effort towards the project than your partner . In this Nash equilibrium , what is your effort level ? b ) In one pure strategy Nash equilibrium , you put the same level of effort towards the project as your partner . In this Nash equilibrium , what is your effort level ?
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 2 steps
