Yakov, Charles, and Gilberto are hunters who live next to a recreational wildlife game area that is open to hunting; in other words, anyone is free to use the recreational wildlife game area for hunting. Assume that these men are the only three hunters who hunt in this recreational wildlife game are and that the recreational wildlife game area is large enough for all three hunters to hunt intensively at the same time. Each year, the hunters choose independently how often to hunt; specifically, they choose whether to hunt intensively (that is, to set several traps and hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area if enough people do it) or to hunt nonintensively (which does not hurt the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others hunt, and each hunter cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational wildlife game area. Assume that as long as no more than one hunter hunts intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational wildlife game area. However if two or more hunt intensively, the recreational wildlife game area will become useless in the future. Of course, hunting intensively earns a hunter more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals. The recreational wildlife game area is an example of a common resource nonexcludable ▼ and_rival in consumption because the animals in the recreational wildlife game area are Depending on whether Charles and Gilberto both choose to hunt either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Yakov's profit-maximizing response in the following table, given Charies and Gilberto's actions. Charles and Gilberto's Actions Hunt Nonintensively Hunt Intensively Yakov's Profit-Maximizing Response Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational wildlife game area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is enforceable? Check all that apply. Convert the recreational wildlife game area to private property, and allow the owner to sell hunting rights. O Develop a program that entices more hunters to move to the area. O Outlaw intensive hunting.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Yakov, Charles, and Gilberto are hunters who live next to a recreational wildlife game area that is open to hunting; in other words, anyone is free to
use the recreational wildlife game area for hunting. Assume that these men are the only three hunters who hunt in this recreational wildlife game area
and that the recreational wildlife game area is large enough for all three hunters to hunt intensively at the same time.
Each year, the hunters choose independently how often to hunt; specifically, they choose whether to hunt intensively (that is, to set several traps and
hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area if enough people do it) or to hunt nonintensively (which does not
hurt the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others hunt, and each hunter
cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational wildlife game area.
Assume that as long as no more than one hunter hunts intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational wildlife game area. However,
if two or more hunt intensively, the recreational wildlife game area will become useless in the future. Of course, hunting intensively earns a hunter
more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals.
The recreational wildlife game area is an example of a common resource
and_ rival in consumption
because the animals in the recreational wildlife game area are
nonexcludable
Depending on whether Charles and Gilberto both choose to hunt either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Yakov's profit-maximizing response in the
following table, given Charles and Gilberto's actions.
Charles and Gilberto's Actions
Hunt Nonintensively
Hunt Intensively
Yakov's Profit-Maximizing Response
Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational wildlife game area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is
enforceable? Check all that apply.
Convert the recreational wildlife game area to private property, and allow the owner to sell hunting rights.
Develop a program that entices more hunters to move to the area.
O Outlaw intensive hunting.
Transcribed Image Text:Yakov, Charles, and Gilberto are hunters who live next to a recreational wildlife game area that is open to hunting; in other words, anyone is free to use the recreational wildlife game area for hunting. Assume that these men are the only three hunters who hunt in this recreational wildlife game area and that the recreational wildlife game area is large enough for all three hunters to hunt intensively at the same time. Each year, the hunters choose independently how often to hunt; specifically, they choose whether to hunt intensively (that is, to set several traps and hunt long hours, which hurts the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area if enough people do it) or to hunt nonintensively (which does not hurt the sustainability of the recreational wildlife game area). None of them has the ability to control how much the others hunt, and each hunter cares only about his own profitability and not about the state of the recreational wildlife game area. Assume that as long as no more than one hunter hunts intensively, there are enough animals to restock the recreational wildlife game area. However, if two or more hunt intensively, the recreational wildlife game area will become useless in the future. Of course, hunting intensively earns a hunter more money and greater profit because he can sell more animals. The recreational wildlife game area is an example of a common resource and_ rival in consumption because the animals in the recreational wildlife game area are nonexcludable Depending on whether Charles and Gilberto both choose to hunt either nonintensively or intensively, fill in Yakov's profit-maximizing response in the following table, given Charles and Gilberto's actions. Charles and Gilberto's Actions Hunt Nonintensively Hunt Intensively Yakov's Profit-Maximizing Response Which of the following solutions could ensure that the recreational wildlife game area is sustainable in the long run, assuming that the regulation is enforceable? Check all that apply. Convert the recreational wildlife game area to private property, and allow the owner to sell hunting rights. Develop a program that entices more hunters to move to the area. O Outlaw intensive hunting.
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