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What are: The views expressed by the Psychologists on the topic. The student's understanding of the content of the topic. Reasons for agreement with or disagreement with the content shared by the Psychologists.

What are: The views expressed by the Psychologists on the topic. The student's understanding of the content of the topic. Reasons for agreement with or disagreement with the content shared by the Psychologists.

Ciccarelli: Psychology_5 (5th Edition)
Ciccarelli: Psychology_5 (5th Edition)
5th Edition
ISBN:9780134477961
Author:Saundra K. Ciccarelli, J. Noland White
Publisher:Saundra K. Ciccarelli, J. Noland White
Chapter1: The Science Of Psychology
Section: Chapter Questions
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Please read the case from the image attached and write a discourse on the following questions below. Thank you. 
 
Topic:  Do people who speak different languages think differently?
 
What are:
  • The views expressed by the Psychologists on the topic.
  • The student's understanding of the content of the topic.
  • Reasons for agreement with or disagreement with the content shared by the Psychologists.
  • The student's conclusions formed from the information gleaned from the content.
  • The student's evaluation of the content shared about the topic.
CHAPTER 9 LANGUJACE AND THOUGHT 352 SEEING BOTH SIDES DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? left brah hemisphere where language is processed (Gilbet etal., 2006), and that toddlers switch their categorical perception for color over to the left hemisphere as they leam color terms (Frankin et al, 2008a, b). Less suprisingly, a native language also changes aur audiion, we become bind (or rather deaf) in early infancy to sounds not in our language (Kuhi, 2000). Thus anguage alters our very perception of the world around us. What about more abstract domains like space and time? It turns out that the way we tak about timein a language makes a dfference to how we think about it. Ih Chinese, a vertical spatial metaphor is often used so that eadlier events are 'up' and later ones 'down', whereas in English we prefer to thirk of the future 'ahead' and the past "behind'. Chinese speakers, but not English speakers, are faster to respond to a ime question when they have previously seen a verfical spatal prime (Boroditsky, 2001). This suggests that fo thinking about abstract domains like time we borow the language we use for the more concrete spatial domain, and so different spatial language makes a difference to temporal thinking. Spatial language itsef differs radicaly across languages. In some languages there are no terms for teft' and Yight (as in the knifeis left of the fork). Instead one has to usenotions like north' and south' even for things on the table (Majd et a., 2004)! Systematic experdimentation in over a dozen languages and aultures shows how powerful these dfferences are (Levinson, 2003. Speakers o north/south vs. lefvright languages remem- ber and reason in ways consistent with thair spatial strategies in language, even when language is not required. An interesting question is which system is most natural? Experiments with apes and prelinguistic infants suggest that the north/south one is core, and the left/ight emphasis comes from our own aulture and language (Haun et al., 2006). Sonext time you pass the salt, hirk about how youmight be thirking aboutit differenty had you been bon in another aulturel Our senses, and aguably our more abstract thoughts too, may be set up imately to deliver veridical information and infer- ence, but rapidly in nfancy we imbbe the language and cate- gorles of our aulture and use these to make the discriminations and inferences that the culturehas found useful through historical adaptation to its environment. As psychology erters an era of preocaupation with individual differences, we can be sure that many more ways in which language and aulture infuence cog- nition (and, no doubt, constraints on those effects) will be The role of language in mind Stephen C. Levinson and Asifa Majd, Max-Planck-nsitute for Paycholinguistics, Njmegan. Imagine you were bom among the Araha, a remate tribe in he Amazon. You would speak a language with, it seems, no words for color, no words for uncles or cousins, no words for numbers, no easy way to tak about the future or to make complex sen- tences by embedding (Everett, 2005). What, then, would be he character of your thoughts? Or suppose you parachute into he tribe, and lean to speak their language, do you think you could easly tell them about your world? Amchar thought-experiments of this kind used to intrigue linguists, laymen, and psychologists, such as Sapir, Whorf and Carrol. Then with the rise of the cognitive sdence movement in the 1960s they became sudderly unfashiorable, because human cogrition was viewed as a uniform processing machine, with a structure and content largely bult into our genes. It fot loved that the Piraha, unbekownst to themseves, actually had the concepts "pink', tcousin', 17', next year", even 'algorithm' and 'symphony' – they simply didn't have the words for them (Fodor, 1975). There was a universal language of thought, 'mentalese', for which different languages were merely an input- output system (Pinker, 1994). This view is now bsing ascen- dancy, for a number of reasons, one is the rise of alternative computational metaphors (Parald Distributed Processing, neural networks) that emphasize leaming fromexperience, and another the phenomanal ise of neurocognition and the beginnings of neurogenetics, both of which reved the importance of human differences. Anather reason why interest is retuming to the rde of lan- guage in cognition is empitcal. It turns out for example that the Praha can't think 17'; they really don't have elementary number concepts (Gordon, 2004). No eperiments have been done on their color disaimination, but in other cultures we find a sys- tematic relation between the kinds of color words and cdor concepts. For example, speakers of a language lke English with a blue' vs. green' distinction exaggerate the actual distance (in JNDS or just noticeable differences) between blue and geen, whle speakers of a language (ike Taruhumaraj with a'grue' tem covering both green and blue, do not (Kay & Kempton, 1984, Davidoff et al, 1999). Recently Kay and coleagues have shown that this effectis due to the right visual feld, which projects to the discovered.
Transcribed Image Text:CHAPTER 9 LANGUJACE AND THOUGHT 352 SEEING BOTH SIDES DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? left brah hemisphere where language is processed (Gilbet etal., 2006), and that toddlers switch their categorical perception for color over to the left hemisphere as they leam color terms (Frankin et al, 2008a, b). Less suprisingly, a native language also changes aur audiion, we become bind (or rather deaf) in early infancy to sounds not in our language (Kuhi, 2000). Thus anguage alters our very perception of the world around us. What about more abstract domains like space and time? It turns out that the way we tak about timein a language makes a dfference to how we think about it. Ih Chinese, a vertical spatial metaphor is often used so that eadlier events are 'up' and later ones 'down', whereas in English we prefer to thirk of the future 'ahead' and the past "behind'. Chinese speakers, but not English speakers, are faster to respond to a ime question when they have previously seen a verfical spatal prime (Boroditsky, 2001). This suggests that fo thinking about abstract domains like time we borow the language we use for the more concrete spatial domain, and so different spatial language makes a difference to temporal thinking. Spatial language itsef differs radicaly across languages. In some languages there are no terms for teft' and Yight (as in the knifeis left of the fork). Instead one has to usenotions like north' and south' even for things on the table (Majd et a., 2004)! Systematic experdimentation in over a dozen languages and aultures shows how powerful these dfferences are (Levinson, 2003. Speakers o north/south vs. lefvright languages remem- ber and reason in ways consistent with thair spatial strategies in language, even when language is not required. An interesting question is which system is most natural? Experiments with apes and prelinguistic infants suggest that the north/south one is core, and the left/ight emphasis comes from our own aulture and language (Haun et al., 2006). Sonext time you pass the salt, hirk about how youmight be thirking aboutit differenty had you been bon in another aulturel Our senses, and aguably our more abstract thoughts too, may be set up imately to deliver veridical information and infer- ence, but rapidly in nfancy we imbbe the language and cate- gorles of our aulture and use these to make the discriminations and inferences that the culturehas found useful through historical adaptation to its environment. As psychology erters an era of preocaupation with individual differences, we can be sure that many more ways in which language and aulture infuence cog- nition (and, no doubt, constraints on those effects) will be The role of language in mind Stephen C. Levinson and Asifa Majd, Max-Planck-nsitute for Paycholinguistics, Njmegan. Imagine you were bom among the Araha, a remate tribe in he Amazon. You would speak a language with, it seems, no words for color, no words for uncles or cousins, no words for numbers, no easy way to tak about the future or to make complex sen- tences by embedding (Everett, 2005). What, then, would be he character of your thoughts? Or suppose you parachute into he tribe, and lean to speak their language, do you think you could easly tell them about your world? Amchar thought-experiments of this kind used to intrigue linguists, laymen, and psychologists, such as Sapir, Whorf and Carrol. Then with the rise of the cognitive sdence movement in the 1960s they became sudderly unfashiorable, because human cogrition was viewed as a uniform processing machine, with a structure and content largely bult into our genes. It fot loved that the Piraha, unbekownst to themseves, actually had the concepts "pink', tcousin', 17', next year", even 'algorithm' and 'symphony' – they simply didn't have the words for them (Fodor, 1975). There was a universal language of thought, 'mentalese', for which different languages were merely an input- output system (Pinker, 1994). This view is now bsing ascen- dancy, for a number of reasons, one is the rise of alternative computational metaphors (Parald Distributed Processing, neural networks) that emphasize leaming fromexperience, and another the phenomanal ise of neurocognition and the beginnings of neurogenetics, both of which reved the importance of human differences. Anather reason why interest is retuming to the rde of lan- guage in cognition is empitcal. It turns out for example that the Praha can't think 17'; they really don't have elementary number concepts (Gordon, 2004). No eperiments have been done on their color disaimination, but in other cultures we find a sys- tematic relation between the kinds of color words and cdor concepts. For example, speakers of a language lke English with a blue' vs. green' distinction exaggerate the actual distance (in JNDS or just noticeable differences) between blue and geen, whle speakers of a language (ike Taruhumaraj with a'grue' tem covering both green and blue, do not (Kay & Kempton, 1984, Davidoff et al, 1999). Recently Kay and coleagues have shown that this effectis due to the right visual feld, which projects to the discovered.
SEEING BOTH SIDES DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? How is language related to thought? encode space. In a series of experiments, Tseltal speakers were shown to remember spatal soenes in terms of absolute co ordinates rather than body-centered (et/right) spatial concepts; speakers of Dutch, a language which, ike English, possesses bft/right terms, showed the opposite preference (Levinson, 2003). The precise interpretation of these findings is greatly debated. Firstly, studies such as the above simply show that linguistic behavior and cognitive preferences can co-vary, not that lan- Ama Papafragou, University of Delaware How is language related to thaught? Do people who speak df- ferent anguages think diferently? According to one theory, language offers the concepts and mechanisms for representing and making sense of our experience, thereby radically shaping the way we think. This strong view, famously associated with the writings of Benjamin Wharf (Whorf, 1956), is certainly wrong. Firstly, people possess many concepts which their language does not directly encode. For instance, the Mundurukú, an guage causes cognition to differ across various linguistic pop- ulations. Furthermore, some of the reported cognitive differences may have been due to ambiguities in the way instructions to study participants were phrased. When Japanese and English speakers were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how ikely Amazonian indigene group, can recognize squares and tra- pezoids even though their language has no rich geometric terms (Dehaene, et al., 2006). Similarly, members of the Pirahă com- munity in Brazil whose anguage acks number words can nev- they were to classify a novel specimen as a kind of object or a kind of substance, their ratings converged (Li, et al., in press). Similarly, when Tseltal speakers were given implicit cues about how to solve spatial tasks, they were able to use left/right rea- soning; in fact, on some tasks, they were more accurate when using leftright concepts compared to absolute co-ordinates, contrary to what one might expect on the basis of how Tseltal encodes space (Li, et al, 2005). These data show that human cognitive mechanisms are fexible rather than streamlined by inguistic terminology. Other studies have confirmed that cross-linguistic differences do not necessarily lead to cogntive differences. For instance, memory and categorization of mation events, such as an air- ertheless perform numerical computations involving large sets (even though they have trouble retaining this information in memory, Frank, et al., 2008). Secondy, there are often broad similarities in the ways different languages carve up domains of experience. For instance, crucial properties of color vocabularies across anguages appear to be shaped by universal perceptual constraints (Regier et al., 2007). Aso many languages seem to label basic tastes by distinct words (e.g., sweet, salt, sour and bitter; Majid & Levinson, 2008). The presence of constraints on cross-linguistic variation suggests that language categories are shaped by cognitive biases shared across humans. A weaker version of the Whorfian view maintains that, even plane fying over a house, seem to be independent of the way anguages encode motion (Papafragou et al., 2002). Relatedly, though language does not completely determine thought, it still affects people's habitual thought patterns by promoting the salience of some categories and downgrading others. One ineof studies set out to examine how Engish and Japanese speakers draw the conceptual distincion between objects and sub- similarity judgments for containers such as jars, bottles and cups converge in speakers of different languages despite words for such containers varying cross-linguistically (Malt et al., 1999). In a striking recent demonstration, using eye tracking methods, Engish and Greek speakers were found to attend to different parts of an event while they were getting ready to describe the event verbally; however, when preparing to memorize the event stances. Engish distinguishes between count nouns (a pyramic) and mass nouns (cork), while Japanese does not (all nouns behave like mass nouns. When taught names for novel simple exemplars (e.g., a cork pyramid), which could in principle be considered either objects or substances, English speakers pre- dominantly took the name to refer to the object (pyramid") but Japanese speakers were at chance between the object or the for a later memory task, speakers of the two languages per- formed identically in terms of how they allocated attention, presumably because they relied on processes of event per- ception that are independent of language (Papatragou et al., 2008). This research suggests that language can be usefuly thought of as an additional route for encoding experience. Rather than permanently reshaping the processes supporting perception and substance ('cork) construal (Imai & Gentner, 1997). These findings have been interpreted as evidence that the linguistic count/mass distinction affects how people draw the conceptual object/substance distinction (at least for indeterminate cases). Another set of studes focused on speakers of Tseltal Mayan living in Mexico, whose language acks left/right terms for giving directions and locating things in the environment. Tsetal speakers cannot say things such as 'the cup is to my left'; cognitive processing, language offers an altenative, often optionally recruited system of encoding, organizing and tracking experience. The precise interplay between linguistic and cogni- five functions wil continue to be a topic of intense experimen- tation and theorizing for years to come. instead they use absolute co-ordihates (e.g., 'north' or 'south') to
Transcribed Image Text:SEEING BOTH SIDES DO PEOPLE WHO SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES THINK DIFFERENTLY? How is language related to thought? encode space. In a series of experiments, Tseltal speakers were shown to remember spatal soenes in terms of absolute co ordinates rather than body-centered (et/right) spatial concepts; speakers of Dutch, a language which, ike English, possesses bft/right terms, showed the opposite preference (Levinson, 2003). The precise interpretation of these findings is greatly debated. Firstly, studies such as the above simply show that linguistic behavior and cognitive preferences can co-vary, not that lan- Ama Papafragou, University of Delaware How is language related to thaught? Do people who speak df- ferent anguages think diferently? According to one theory, language offers the concepts and mechanisms for representing and making sense of our experience, thereby radically shaping the way we think. This strong view, famously associated with the writings of Benjamin Wharf (Whorf, 1956), is certainly wrong. Firstly, people possess many concepts which their language does not directly encode. For instance, the Mundurukú, an guage causes cognition to differ across various linguistic pop- ulations. Furthermore, some of the reported cognitive differences may have been due to ambiguities in the way instructions to study participants were phrased. When Japanese and English speakers were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how ikely Amazonian indigene group, can recognize squares and tra- pezoids even though their language has no rich geometric terms (Dehaene, et al., 2006). Similarly, members of the Pirahă com- munity in Brazil whose anguage acks number words can nev- they were to classify a novel specimen as a kind of object or a kind of substance, their ratings converged (Li, et al., in press). Similarly, when Tseltal speakers were given implicit cues about how to solve spatial tasks, they were able to use left/right rea- soning; in fact, on some tasks, they were more accurate when using leftright concepts compared to absolute co-ordinates, contrary to what one might expect on the basis of how Tseltal encodes space (Li, et al, 2005). These data show that human cognitive mechanisms are fexible rather than streamlined by inguistic terminology. Other studies have confirmed that cross-linguistic differences do not necessarily lead to cogntive differences. For instance, memory and categorization of mation events, such as an air- ertheless perform numerical computations involving large sets (even though they have trouble retaining this information in memory, Frank, et al., 2008). Secondy, there are often broad similarities in the ways different languages carve up domains of experience. For instance, crucial properties of color vocabularies across anguages appear to be shaped by universal perceptual constraints (Regier et al., 2007). Aso many languages seem to label basic tastes by distinct words (e.g., sweet, salt, sour and bitter; Majid & Levinson, 2008). The presence of constraints on cross-linguistic variation suggests that language categories are shaped by cognitive biases shared across humans. A weaker version of the Whorfian view maintains that, even plane fying over a house, seem to be independent of the way anguages encode motion (Papafragou et al., 2002). Relatedly, though language does not completely determine thought, it still affects people's habitual thought patterns by promoting the salience of some categories and downgrading others. One ineof studies set out to examine how Engish and Japanese speakers draw the conceptual distincion between objects and sub- similarity judgments for containers such as jars, bottles and cups converge in speakers of different languages despite words for such containers varying cross-linguistically (Malt et al., 1999). In a striking recent demonstration, using eye tracking methods, Engish and Greek speakers were found to attend to different parts of an event while they were getting ready to describe the event verbally; however, when preparing to memorize the event stances. Engish distinguishes between count nouns (a pyramic) and mass nouns (cork), while Japanese does not (all nouns behave like mass nouns. When taught names for novel simple exemplars (e.g., a cork pyramid), which could in principle be considered either objects or substances, English speakers pre- dominantly took the name to refer to the object (pyramid") but Japanese speakers were at chance between the object or the for a later memory task, speakers of the two languages per- formed identically in terms of how they allocated attention, presumably because they relied on processes of event per- ception that are independent of language (Papatragou et al., 2008). This research suggests that language can be usefuly thought of as an additional route for encoding experience. Rather than permanently reshaping the processes supporting perception and substance ('cork) construal (Imai & Gentner, 1997). These findings have been interpreted as evidence that the linguistic count/mass distinction affects how people draw the conceptual object/substance distinction (at least for indeterminate cases). Another set of studes focused on speakers of Tseltal Mayan living in Mexico, whose language acks left/right terms for giving directions and locating things in the environment. Tsetal speakers cannot say things such as 'the cup is to my left'; cognitive processing, language offers an altenative, often optionally recruited system of encoding, organizing and tracking experience. The precise interplay between linguistic and cogni- five functions wil continue to be a topic of intense experimen- tation and theorizing for years to come. instead they use absolute co-ordihates (e.g., 'north' or 'south') to
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