We talk about a problem in Corporate Governance in active monitoring. A monitor learns about the Bad Project, which yields private benefit B, with probability M. The monitor learns nothing with probability 1-M. This probability of M of effective monitoring (=monitoring level) is dependent on the effort cost or what we call disutility of effort g(M) incurred by this monitor. It is assumed that disutility of effort is increasing g’()>0 and convex g’’()>0. We also assume that g’(0) and g’(1) = ∞. Let Rb be the borrower’s reward. In successful case, its value is b/Δp < Rb < B/Δp. Let Rm be the monitor’s payoff in a successful case. The question is: Show the Net Present Value of the project for monitoring level M.
We talk about a problem in Corporate Governance in active monitoring. A monitor learns about the Bad Project, which yields private benefit B, with probability M. The monitor learns nothing with probability 1-M. This probability of M of effective monitoring (=monitoring level) is dependent on the effort cost or what we call disutility of effort g(M) incurred by this monitor. It is assumed that disutility of effort is increasing g’()>0 and convex g’’()>0. We also assume that g’(0) and g’(1) = ∞. Let Rb be the borrower’s reward. In successful case, its value is b/Δp < Rb < B/Δp. Let Rm be the monitor’s payoff in a successful case. The question is: Show the Net Present Value of the project for monitoring level M.
Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1PS
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We talk about a problem in Corporate Governance in active monitoring.
A monitor learns about the Bad Project, which yields private benefit B, with probability M. The monitor learns nothing with probability 1-M. This probability of M of effective monitoring (=monitoring level) is dependent on the effort cost or what we call disutility of effort g(M) incurred by this monitor. It is assumed that disutility of effort is increasing g’()>0 and convex g’’()>0. We also assume that g’(0) and g’(1) = ∞. Let Rb be the borrower’s reward. In successful case, its value is b/Δp < Rb < B/Δp. Let Rm be the monitor’s payoff in a successful case.
The question is: Show the Net Present Value of the project for monitoring level M.
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